Paradigms of Political POWER

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To Linda, Clementine, Sam, and Ralph

Contents

Preface

This book of readings is one product of a continuing concern with the use and utility of the concept of power in political thinking. It can be compared to a puzzle and, as such, is offered to students of politics: the pieces merit their contemplation, the intellectual activities involved in solving the puzzle (including, perhaps, trimming some of the pieces) should be instructive, and a solution is well worth having.

For such judgment as I have been able to muster, I owe more than I can acknowledge to more teachers and colleagues than I can list; equally unrequitable is my debt to my students in “The Study of Power” at the Ohio State University. A Fellowship in Political Theory and Legal Philosophy from the Social Science Research Council helped very considerably at the inception of my power projects.

Introduction

JOHN R. CHAMPLIN

Students of politics may be forgiven for suspecting that "controversies" presented for their inspection are less controversial than may initially appear, and it usually turns out that the compiler of such controversies holds decided views as to which side has the best of the argument. The editor of this book is no exception to the rule, although he occasionally admits to being quite perplexed. Students are therefore warned to view even this Introduction as part of the controversy; the task of trying to resolve the issues raised throughout these readings is very much theirs.

The term "power" has been used by generations of men in seeking to make sense of their political experience. Accordingly, attaining a true understanding of power has long been a goal of men who have aspired to replace opinion with knowledge. The word was employed in Plato's *Gorgias*, where Socrates defended the paradoxical claim "that the orators and the despots alike have the least power in their cities,"[1] and it is employed by contemporary sociologists and political scientists, although not all will accept the statement of Lasswell and Kaplan that "political science, as an empirical discipline, is the study of the shaping and sharing of power."[2]

In the past few years, however, the term power has fallen into comparative disfavor. Despite the sweeping claims for power made by such writers as Hans Morgenthau,[3] many have expressed disappointment with the concept, as in the essays by McClelland[4] and March.[5] The central controversy in this book will present the question of whether or not it is

advantageous to do serious political thinking in terms of power. Inquiry into this issue will of course lead to other questions. Although a comprehensive and adequate theoretical account of power remains to be written, what such a theory might be like is suggested by the questions it would have to answer, and from each question will rise contributory controversies that enlarge upon the main controversy.

In order to make good its claim to an important place in our political thinking, a theory of power would have to answer at least three questions: (1) What is power? (2) What true statements can we make about power and how can we know that they are true? (3) So what? That is, what are the consequences of our knowledge of power to thought and action? Let us consider what is involved in answering each of these questions.

Power and Definition

The question "What is power?" has often been treated as a request for a definition, and many of the difficulties we have had understanding power go back to yet another question: Is it possible to state a definition of power that will bear the weight of theory that is claimed for the concept?

In attempting to define such a word, one might simply stipulate that he will understand it in a specific way without claiming any validity for the definition. Provided that one is consistent, this procedure is not necessarily wrong, but it raises the unanswerable question of why it is asserted that the stipulation is a definition of power rather than of some neutral term or symbol without the assumptions and connections already implicit in power.

Political scientists who have tried to define power have been said to be offering "explications" more frequently than barefaced stipulations.

> Taking its departure from the customary meanings of the terms, explication aims at reducing the limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies of their ordinary usage by propounding a reinterpretation intended to enhance the clarity and precision of their meanings as well as their ability to function in hypotheses and theories with explanatory and predictive force.[6]

Explicators assume that ordinary usage is subject to serious limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies, but set out to preserve at least a large part

of the term's sense while attempting to improve its scientific usefulness; the explication stands or falls with its utility. The record of explications of power, however, is most paradoxical when contrasted with the explicators' intentions: While ordinary discourse about power flows smoothly, scientific studies of power grounded on explications appear full of "limitations, ambiguities, and inconsistencies." It might be the case, of course, that while ordinarily we fail to notice our confusion, the discipline of science forces it to our attention; this is typically the complaint of those who would read power out of the vocabulary of political science. It might also be the case, however, that scientific explications of power have missed some important element in the term as it is ordinarily used.

Many, if not most, scientific definers have followed Hobbes (perhaps not knowingly) in attempting to treat power in terms of causation. "For the assertion 'A has power over B,' we can substitute the assertion 'A's behavior causes B's behavior.' If we can define the causal relation, we can define influence, power, or authority, and *vice versa*."[7] While Simon states it quite bluntly, Riker is somewhat more circumspect:

> Power and cause are clearly related concepts. Power is potential cause. Or, power is the ability to exercise influence while cause is the actual exercise of it. . . . Differences in the notion of cause stand back of differences in the notion of power. Once we have straightened out some basic problems of causality, it will be simple enough to straighten out, to explain if not to reconcile, differences in the notion of power.[8]

Unfortunately, attempts to explicate power in terms of cause are usually blind to an important element in the situations one naturally discusses when one speaks of power. When we say "A has power over B," we mean not simply that B can be caused to do something by A, but more importantly that A is in a position to get what he wants, to satisfy his purposes or desires; if this is not so, we find it strange to discuss the situation in terms of power at all. When we discuss a man's (or a state's) power, we do not randomly consider all his abilities or capacities to do something affecting someone; rather we narrow our consideration to those abilities which might conceivably enable him to get what he wants—"his present means, to obtain some future apparent good,"[9] in Hobbes's words. Explications of power in terms of cause alone leave us without criteria for narrowing our

field of attention; thus this necessary focusing of attention is left without guidance and is capable of being influenced by a host of irrelevant considerations, such as a favorite research technique, ideological presumptions, convenience, or whatever.

Dorothy Emmet offers a collection of distinct uses of power and suggests that the collection might be added to or refined.[10]It is, of course, possible that these various uses coexist peacefully in their ordinary contexts, but that when one tries to present a single concept of power, they get confused. We should bear in mind, however, that our concern is not with every use of the word, but only with those involved in social and political life. An examination of the uses to which power is naturally put in these contexts may well reveal a single, coherent situation capable of being expressed in a definition. While anyone may be capable of using the term properly in casual speech, social scientists may be required to make explicit, and support with evidence, certain elements in a situation left implicit in casual conversation; the definition serves to indicate such elements. A definition of power, however coherent and faithful to the term's uses, is only the beginning; in order to prove its usefulness, it must aid political analysis.

Power and Scientific Truth

A good deal of time and energy have been spent studying power by political scientists. Although the results have produced controversy rather than consensus, a look at their efforts is still rewarding. While certain themes appear at all levels of analysis, debates have highlighted various issues at the local, national, and international levels. In community power studies, a prime issue has been technique or methodology: How does one go about studying power, and what sorts of evidence are worth collecting? At the national level, a major point of disagreement concerns alternative hypotheses about power: Where is power located and how is it distributed? In international politics, the controversy has most commonly raised questions of theoretical strategy: Should power be the focus of analysis?

Controversies over community power and how to study it were initiated by a number of studies inspired by the work of Floyd Hunter.[11] Hunter's method was simple: From a list of leaders holding positions of prominence in civic, governmental, business, and status organizations, knowledgeable "judges" and leaders on the list were asked to select the most influential

people. Although a number of variations on Hunter's technique were developed, this "reputational" method of studying community power has been largely discredited, a crucial argument being that the research design itself guarantees the conclusion that power is stratified, with relatively few powerful men at the top. The question "Who has the most power here?" assumes that *someone* has power.[12]

A competing method of studying community power has been employed by some political scientists; among these Robert Dahl is prominent. In this method the making of actual decisions is traced, with information on the decisions compiled from a variety of sources.[13] Since the observation is of the actual exercise of power, conclusions are supposedly reliable. This method for studying community power has also been subject to criticism. Perhaps the most revealing charge is that by basing conclusions as to the distribution of power on evidence about those situations where there is noticeable conflict leading to a political decision, the "decisional" method has a marked tendency to focus on situations where power is rather equal and well-dispersed, that is, the "pluralist" model. Opponents of the method argue that it misses the way the political arrangements of a community filter out some types of decisions—or nondecisions, since they are never openly decided—and this fact constitutes an important aspect of power.[14]

It would seem undeniable that in order to defend the choice of power as the vehicle for our political thinking, it must be possible to state unambiguously what constitutes grounds for statements about power. This need not imply a single method of studying power, but it does require some way of disciplining whatever methods of gathering evidence may be employed, so that the various sorts of evidence can be brought into coherent relation. The inventors of unique methods have failed to win general acceptance largely because their methods missed some important aspect of power. A possible candidate for the task of disciplining evidence supporting conclusions about power is one's definition of power. If the definition is faulty, there is no reason to expect the conclusions to be reliable. To the extent that political scientists have failed to examine their conceptual apparatus, or to the extent to which they have treated power as simply analogous to cause, it is likely that the selecting and ordering of evidence in their work can be seen to have been guided very little by relevant considerations of power. Hence the controversy.

Probably the best known controversy in recent power studies is the continuing dispute as to how the United States is to be characterized. C. Wright Mills argued that it is dominated by a "power elite,"[15] or, as it is termed in a later variation on his theme, a "military-industrial complex." The other pole of this controversy is "pluralism"; according to pluralists, power is rather widely distributed and varies from issue to issue, with no one having power on a very wide range of issues.[16] Peter Bachrach has argued that the situation described by the self-proclaimed pluralists is more accurately labeled "democratic elitism," since participation in political decisions and power are, in fact, very unequally distributed.[17]

In the absence of an accepted definition of power or of standard methods for obtaining evidence about power, it should not be surprising that the dispute continues. Sorting out what the disagreement is about and how it might be resolved is commended to the student of power. One interesting line of argument appears when we question the common assumption that it is possible and important to couch our conclusions in a statement about *the* distribution of power, similar to the distribution of prestige or money. This common assumption makes some sense if power can be equated to the possession of a given sort or amount of resources (money, votes, official position, military hardware, and the like). It makes less sense once we note that the possession of a given resource constitutes power only when it entails the satisfaction of the possessor's desires and preferences. Theodore Lowi achieved a fresh start on power studies by distinguishing "arenas" of power according to the expectations held regarding costs and benefits.[18] His detailed discussion illustrates the type of work that will be required to bring the very general and abstract concept of power to bear on concrete situations.

Power and Political Theory

We have now sketched some of the controversies over power that have presented problems to political scientists and sociologists. A very apt description of the situation could read:

> Though the field's practitioners were scientists, the net result of their activity was something less than science. Being able to take no common

> body of belief for granted, each writer on [power] felt forced to build his field anew from its foundations. In doing so, his choice of supporting observation and experiment was relatively free, for there was no standard set of methods or of phenomena that every [student of power] felt forced to employ and explain. Under these circumstances, the dialogue of the resulting books was often directed as much to the members of other schools as it was to nature.[19]

As applicable as this description is, it was written not about contemporary power studies but about physical optics before Newton!

According to Kuhn, Newton's work provided a "paradigm" which made possible the transformation of physics from an immature science to a mature or "normal" science. Paradigms are created by successful examples of scientific practice, which "accepted examples of scientific practice—examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together—provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research."[20] A paradigm, when accepted by a community of scientists, provides "an object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions."[21] Normal science consists of such articulation and specification. Since the paradigm is widely shared, scientific researchers jointly test the adequacy of the paradigm, and their work is both cumulative and quite specialized. They do not need to reconstitute their field each time they begin a project, but rather take for granted the achievements of their predecessors; the successes of science are won in this fashion.

Many political scientists aspire to "normal science" status for their discipline, and if Kuhn's analysis is correct, this means that they need a paradigm for political science (or some part of it). Many of the controversies surrounding power may be viewed in this light; Morgenthau's claims for "power as a political concept" are strikingly paradigmatic in scope; his *Politics Among Nations* may be seen as an attempt to do "normal science" in the area of international politics, and his work won both imitators and critics. David B. Truman's *The Governmental Process*, Floyd Hunter's *Community Power Structure*, and Dahl's *Who Governs?* all seemed, for a while, to provide a model for political study that could be further applied, articulated, specified; all received serious criticism and all failed to receive general acceptance.[22]

This paradigmatic perspective on power leads us to ask two crucial questions. The answers to these questions will determine our position on the central controversy of this volume, that is, whether or not it is profitable to think about politics in terms of power. First, we must ask whether power *can* provide a paradigm—a way of organizing and disciplining the study of politics to avoid confusion, ambiguity, and irrelevant controversy. Second, we must ask whether a paradigm based on power is preferable to other methods we might use and whether there are reasons for organizing our studies around power rather than around its various competitors, such as group theory, equilibrium analysis, systems theory, game theory, and the like.

To the first question of whether power is capable of generating a paradigm for political science, I would give a qualified yes. We have had many "examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together" in the area of power studies, embodying much ingenuity, sophistication, and insight. The problem has been that none have received for long the general recognition that Kahn identifies as the hallmark of a paradigm. The heart of the answer to the possibility of a power paradigm lies in our diagnosis of the reasons for this problem. If we consider the problem as stemming from the concept of power itself, we would be well advised to abandon it altogether. However, if we decide that the difficulty with power studies is inadequate analysis of the concept, as I am inclined to do, then the problems are remediable. Given an adequate analysis or definition of power, it should be possible both to devise a variety of techniques and methods for garnering the required evidence and to assemble such evidence in the framework provided by our general conception of power. Since most work on power has been based either on inarticulated and common-sense understandings of the word or on highly technical and "operational" definitions that usually treat power as a type of cause, our past difficulties certainly do not entail the conclusion that an adequate definition could not remedy them; hence my affirmative answer. In order to be confident, however, this possibility will have to be confirmed by achievements; this is my qualification.

Although political scientists must invest more energy in order to perfect the study of power, we cannot postpone judgment. What reasons have we *now* for persisting with power? What advantages would the disciplined study of power provide? A full comparison of power with various

competing approaches to political analysis is far beyond the limits of this Introduction, but some answer to these questions must be given.

This set of questions is similar to those that confront scientists faced with what Kuhn calls a "scientific revolution," the situation were paradigms compete for their allegiance. In the natural sciences, revolutions occur when some scientists come to believe that "an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which the paradigm itself had previously led the way"[23] and a new paradigm replaces the existing one. In political science, of course, we do not obviously have an accepted paradigm,[24] but the problem is still whether or not to accept a candidate for "paradigmhood."

During a scientific revolution Kuhn shows that disagreements among partisans of old and new paradigms are not susceptible of resolution by rational argument: "When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense."[25] In his explanations of scientific revolutions, he discusses "techniques of persuasion"[26] rather than criteria of proof, because "there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community."[27]

The import of Kuhn's analysis of science for our questions, then, is that they are improper questions, that no rational answers are possible, that the standards or principles of science are crucially irrelevant. If we accept his analysis of science and if we consider political science to be a science of the same sort as physics and chemistry, we should do power analysis if we wish, or not do it if we do not wish, and we are incapable of defending our wishes with noncircular reasons.

It would be most distressing to be left in such a blind alley; fortunately there is a way out, although not all political scientists will be willing to take it. In order to escape this dilemma, it will be necessary to reject the widely shared dogma that there are two separate and distinct kinds of political theory, empirical and normative, and to recognize instead that political theory is a single enterprise having both empirical and ethical implications.[28] If we do this, we can offer ethical considerations as reasons for preferring to do our political thinking in terms of power.

Analyses of power have manifested a marked tendency to involve political evaluation; discussions of who has power tempts one to ask who

ought to have power, although scientific students of power have resolutely tried to resist this temptation. The connection between power and moral evaluation is not accidental, but rather occurs because both power analysis and moral evaluation treat the same basic considerations: human wants or desires and their satisfaction. The study of power can tell us *who* is in a position to satisfy which wants, while ethical conclusions frequently depend on *information* as to the satisfaction of wants. As Brian Barry put it:

> Want-regarding principles . . . are principles which take as given the wants which people happen to have and concentrate attention entirely on the extent to which a certain policy will alter the overall amount of want-satisfaction or on the way in which the policy will affect the distribution among people of opportunities for satisfying wants. By calling such principles "want-regarding principles" the point I am emphasizing is that, in order to evaluate the desirability of a state of affairs according to such principles, all the information we need is the amount and/or distribution among persons of want-satisfaction.[29]

This argument for power obviously takes for granted some controverted positions regarding ethical theory, but it holds out the possibility that by studying power, political scientists might still find their researches directly relevant to the resolution of moral questions without compromising their status as scientists and while following their own professional procedures. This situation is sufficiently desirable to constitute a reason for our choosing to do the work required in order to put the study of power on a satisfactory basis.

A second (moral) argument for continuing work on power stems from the fact that power is a word generally understood by and familiar to people-at-large, to citizens. While usually one of the costs of achieving a scientific discipline is to make the discipline unintelligible to the layman, this need not be true of the study of power. (In this respect it is quite unlike certain other approaches to political analysis, which involve jargon sometimes unintelligible to political scientists as well as laymen!) To the extent that an informed citizenry is considered important, we have a further reason for continuing with power.

A last aspect of power as a potential vehicle for political evaluation may be noted. One of the standard criticisms of the power approach is that it is

too broad. Thus David Easton has argued that writers on power fail to

> provide us with a satisfactory minimal orientation to political phenomena. [Such] writers argue that all power relations, wherever they may exist, are automatically an index of the presence of a political situation. For these writers the hierarchical arrangement of relationships within a criminal band or in a respectable fraternal club both testify to the existence of political life there. The realization of this implication when politics is described as power, pure and simple, reveals the excessive breadth of the definition.[30]

We may grant that power is too inclusive a term to serve as a synonym for political. It need not be conceded, however, that power is too broad to serve as the focus for our thinking about politics. This apparent paradox can be converted into a platitude quite easily. Let us follow Sheldon Wolin's suggestion that political is synonymous with public, common, or general, in that "political rule is concerned with those general interests shared by all members of the community; that political authority is distinguished from other forms of authority in that it speaks in the name of a society considered in its common quality; that membership in a political society is a token of a life of common involvements; and that the order that political authority presides over is one that should extend throughout the length and breadth of society as a whole."[31]

If we analyze politics in terms of power, we may ask how it is that the political arrangements of a society exist at all, that is, how power is exercised through and over the arrangements. We may inquire how political arrangements work, what sorts of people have what sorts of power over what other people. But most importantly, since "power" is admitted by both critics and advocates to be more inclusive than "political," we may ask to what extent arrangements, other than strictly political ones, play an important role in the exercise of power in a society. In asking such questions we may also discover the extent to which political arrangements are or are not significant, with regard to what matters, and how they are or are not significant. If they are not in a position to discover these things, political scientists will fail even to consider what may be the most urgent and important set of questions about political life, that is, questions concerning what is properly public and private, what areas of life are best

directed by political means, what the scope of political institutions should be, and the like. To restrict our attention to those phenomena considered political by a society runs the considerable risk of making political scientists little more than intellectual servants of the *status quo*. The very breadth covered by the concept of power can thus provide an important intellectual integrity. At the very least, claims such as "The university is not a political institution" are shown not to be true by definition, but rather as what they are, either moral judgments or reports about a *status quo.*

NOTES

1. Plato, *Gorgias*, 466D; tr. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 325.
2. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. xiv.
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Power as a Political Concept," pp. 19–34 following.
4. Charles McClelland, "Power and Influence," pp. 35–65 following.
5. James G. March, "The Power of Power," pp. 167–185 following.
6. Carl Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 12.
7. Herbert Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1952), p. 5.
8. William H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 347, 346.
9. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chap. 10, pp. 69–77 following.
10. Dorothy Emmet, "The Concept of Power," pp. 78–103 following.
11. Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
12. See Nelson Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of 'Community Power,' " *American Sociological Review*, 25 (1960), 636–644; and Lawrence J. R. Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (1961), 817–830.
13. Dahl's *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) is perhaps the classic work of this sort.

14. See Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” pp. 118–131 following.
15. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
16. See Polsby, *op. cit.*, for a coherent statement of the pluralist model. Dahl uses pluralism to organize an elementary text, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967). For an elaborate refutation of Mills by a pluralist, see Arnold Rose, *The Power Structure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
17. See Bachrach’s *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
18. Theodore Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory,” pp. 132–166 following.
19. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 13. The words omitted are “physical optics” and “optical writer.”
20. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
22. We can see the same pattern in other areas of political science: in survey research on voting, in comparative government around the work of Gabriel Almond and others doing “structural–functional” theory, in “communications” theory as in the work of Karl Deutsch, and elsewhere.
23. Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
24. It has, however, been argued that equivalents are available. See David Truman, “Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline,” *American Political Science Review*, 59 (1965); Gabriel Almond, “Political Science and Political Theory,” *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966); Sheldon Wolin, “Paradigms and Political Theories,” in Preston King and B. C. Parekh, eds., *Politics and Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
25. Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
28. For a recent demonstration of this position, see Charles Taylor, “Neutrality in Political Science,” in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman,

eds., *Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Third Series* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968).

29. Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 38.
30. David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 123.
31. Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 10.

I : The Great Debate

1 : *Power as a Political Concept*

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

Any attempt at reorganizing political science around a central concept must come to terms with three factors which in the past have impeded such organization: its subject matter, its method, its moral orientation.

I

Political science as an academic discipline owes its existence to two factors: the breakdown in the late nineteenth century of the great philosophic systems which had dominated Western thought, concomitant with emphasis upon the empirical investigation of the social world, and the lack of interest of the established academic disciplines in the investigation of certain aspects of politics.

All the social sciences are the result of the emancipation of the Western mind from metaphysical systems which had made the social world primarily a subject for metaphysical speculation and ethical postulates. In certain fields, such as economics, that emancipation occurred early; in others, such as political science, it occurred relatively late (for reasons which, as we shall see, are inherent in the nature of political science). Yet when the first departments of political science were established in this country toward the end of the nineteenth century, they did not grow organically from a general conception as to what was covered by the field of political science, nor did they respond to a strongly felt intellectual need.

Rather they reflected the negative attitude of other academic disciplines, especially law, toward certain aspects of the political world. Furthermore, they tried to satisfy certain practical needs. For instance, in that period the law schools would not deal with public law. Yet it was felt that somebody ought to deal with it, and thus it was made part of political science. There was a demand for instruction in journalism, but there was no place for it to be taught; and thus it was made part of political science. There was a local demand for guidance in certain aspects of municipal administration, such as sewage disposal, and thus a course in that subject was made part of the curriculum of political science.

In other words, political science grew not by virtue of an intellectual principle germane to the field, but in response to pressures from the outside. What could not be defined in terms of the traditional academic disciplines was defined as political science. This inorganic growth and haphazard character of political science is strikingly reflected in the curricula of the earliest departments of political science, such as those of Columbia and Michigan.

In the meantime, a process of contraction has eliminated from the curriculum the more disparate elements. But still today the curriculum of political science bears the unmistakable marks of its haphazard origin and development. To pick out at random some courses from two departments of political science with which I am familiar, what have “Plato’s Political Philosophy and Its Metaphysical Foundation” and “The Politics of Conservation” in common, or “General Principles of Organization and Administration” and “International Law,” or “Conduct of American Foreign Relations” and “Introduction to Jurisprudence,” or “Nationalism” and “Political Behavior and Public Policy,” or “Russian Political and Economic Institutions” and “Public Personnel Administration”? The only common denominator which ties these courses loosely together is a general and vague orientation toward the nature and activities of the state and toward activities which have in turn a direct bearing upon the state. Beyond that orientation toward a common subject matter, defined in the most general terms, contemporary political science has no unity of outlook, method, and purpose.

II

As concerns method, political science is split in five ways, and four of these methodological positions have hardly anything in common. Their disparity is such that there is hardly even a possibility of fruitful discourse among the representatives of the different approaches beyond polemics which deny the very legitimacy of the other approaches. These approaches can be classified as philosophic theory, empirical theory, empirical science, description, and practical amelioration.

These five methodological approaches are not peculiar to political science. They have appeared in other social sciences, such as psychology, economics, and sociology, as well, but with two significant differences. First of all, the other social sciences have traditionally shown a much greater awareness of the existence, nature, and separate functions of these approaches than has political science. Second, they have been able to rid themselves in good measure of the ameliorative and vocational approach which has by itself only a minimum of intellectual relevance. Political science, on the other hand, has never squarely faced the methodological problem in terms of the intrinsic character of these different approaches and the functions which they are able to perform for the understanding of political science. These five approaches have rather coexisted indistinctively within the departments of political science, one to be emphasized over the others at different times and places according to the pressures of supply and demand. Here, too, the development has been haphazard and subject to accident rather than guided by certain fundamental theoretical requirements.

Thus political science has not generally been able to make that distinction which is a precondition for the development of any true science: the distinction between what is worth knowing intellectually and what is useful for practice. It is this distinction which economics and sociology accomplished some decades ago, when schools of business, home economics, retailing, social work, and the like took over the practical concerns which at best develop practical uses for theoretical knowledge or else have but the most tenuous connection with it. Political science has taken a similar step in some instances by organizing the practical uses of political science for the amelioration of government activities in schools of administration and the like. But not only has this separation been exceptional rather than typical, it has also been made as a matter of convenience rather than in application of a generally accepted theoretical

principle. In consequence, improvement of the processes of government is still generally considered not only a worthwhile activity to be engaged in by political scientists, but also a legitimate, and sometimes even the only legitimate, element of political science as an academic discipline, to be taught under any of the course headings composing the curriculum of political science.

It should be pointed out in passing that we are dealing here not with a specific subject matter, but with a particular method, a particular intellectual approach. This approach will naturally manifest itself most frequently and typically in those fields of political science which have a direct relevance to the operations of government, such as public administration, but it is by no means limited to them. The other fields of political science, such as international relations, American government, constitutional law, and parties, have at times been dominated by the practical approach seeking practical remedies for conditions regarded as being in need of amelioration.

Today, however, description is still the method most widely used in political science. Factual information arranged according to certain traditional classifications still dominates most of the textbooks in the field. While it is unnecessary to argue the case for the need for factual information, it ought to be no more necessary to argue that factual description is not science but a mere, however indispensable, preparation for the scientific understanding of the facts. It may, however, point toward a theoretical awakening that descriptive political science tends to dress up descriptive accounts of facts in theoretical garb and to use fancy classifications and terminologies in order to conceal the mere descriptive character of its substance. While the theoretical pretense of factual accounts shows an awareness of the need for theoretical understanding, that understanding itself requires more than the demonstrative use of an elaborate apparatus of classification and terminology.

With this last type of descriptive political science which overlays its descriptive substance with theoretical pretense, we are in the borderland where description and empirical science merge. Empirical science is today the most vigorous branch of political science which tends to attract many of the abler and more inventive students. Taking its cue from the natural sciences, or what it thinks the natural sciences are, it tries to develop rigorous methods of quantitative verification which are expected in good time to attain the same precision in the discovery of uniformities and in

prediction to which the natural sciences owe their theoretical and practical success.

I have argued elsewhere against this analogy between the social and the natural sciences, and this is not the place to resume the controversy. It must suffice here to state dogmatically that the object of the social sciences is man, not as a product of nature but as both the creature and the creator of history in and through which his individuality and freedom of choice manifest themselves. To make susceptibility to quantitative measurement the yardstick of the scientific character of the social sciences in general and of political science in particular is to deprive these sciences of that very orientation which is adequate to the understanding of their subject matter.

The inadequacy of the quantitative method to the subject matter of political science is demonstrated by the limitation of its success to those types of political behavior which by their very nature lend themselves to a certain measure of quantification, such as voting, and the barrenness of the attempts to apply the quantitative method to phenomena which are determined by historic individuality and moral choice. It will not do to argue that this failure is due to the "backwardness" of political science which could be overcome if only more and better people would spend more time and money for quantification. For that argument to be plausible the failure is too persistent, and it becomes ever more spectacular as more and better people spend more time and money to make it a success.

Once quantification has left that narrow sphere where it can contribute to relevant knowledge, two roads are open to it. Either it can try to quantify phenomena which in their aspects relevant to political science are not susceptible to quantification, and by doing so obscure and distort what political science ought to know; thus much of quantitative political science has become a pretentious collection of trivialities. Or, dimly aware of this inadequacy, quantification may shun contact with the empirical phenomena of political life altogether and try to find out instead what the correct way of quantifying is. Basic to this methodological concern is the assumption that the failure of quantification to yield results in any way proportionate to the effort spent results from the lack of a correct quantitative method. Once that method is discovered and applied, quantification will yield the results in precise knowledge its adherents claim for it.

However, it is obvious that these methodological investigations, patently intended for the guidance of empirical research, have hardly exerted any

influence upon the latter. This divorce of methodology from empirical investigation is not fortuitous. For it points not only to the inadequacy of the quantitative method for the understanding of much of the subject matter of political science, an inadequacy which must become particularly striking when quantification is confronted in its pure theoretical form with the actuality of political life. That divorce also illuminates a tendency, common to all methodological endeavors in the social sciences, to retreat ever more from contact with the empirical world into a realm of self-sufficient abstractions. This "new scholasticism," as it has been aptly called, has been most fully developed in sociology; yet it has left its impact also upon political science. The new scholastic tends to think about how to think and how to conceptualize about concepts, regressing ever further from empirical reality until he finds the logical consummation of his endeavors in mathematical symbols and other formal relations.

With this emphasis upon theoretical abstractions which have no relation to political reality, the methodology of political science joins a school which from the beginning to this day has occupied an honored but lonely place in the curriculum of political science: political theory. Political theory as an academic discipline has been traditionally the history of political philosophies in chronological succession, starting with Plato and ending, if time permits, with Laski. As an academic discipline, political theory has been hardly more than an account of what writers of the past, traditionally regarded as "great," have thought about the traditional problems of politics, without ever a systematic attempt being made to correlate that historic knowledge to the other fields of political science and to the contemporary political world. Thus political theory as an academic discipline has been intellectually sterile, and it is not by accident that some of the most important contributions to contemporary political theory have been made not by professional political scientists, but by theologians, philosophers, and sociologists.

Political theory has remained an indispensable part of the curriculum not because of the vital influence it has been able to exert upon our thinking, but rather because of a vague conviction that there was something venerable and respectable in this otherwise useless exercise. Thus the academic concern with political theory has tended to become an intellectually and practically meaningless ritual which one had to engage in for reasons of

tradition and prestige before one could occupy oneself with the things that really mattered.

The awareness of this contrast between the prestige of political theory and its actual lack of relevance for the understanding of contemporary political problems has led theory closer to the contemporary political world. On the other hand, the awareness of the meagerness of the insights to be gained from strictly empirical investigations have made empirical political science search for a theoretical framework. Avoiding the limitations of the traditional approaches and fusing certain of their elements, contemporary political science has revived a tradition to which most of the classics of political science owe their existence and influence. The intent of that tradition is theoretical: it wants to understand political reality in a theoretical manner. The subject matter of this theoretical concern is the contemporary political world. This branch of political science, which we call empirical theory, reflects in theoretical terms about the contemporary political world. The political world, however, poses a formidable obstacle to such understanding. This obstacle is of a moral rather than an intellectual nature. Before we turn to the requirements of such an empirical theory and its central concept, we have to dispose of the moral problem with which political science must come to terms.

III

The moral position of the political scientist in society is ambivalent; it can even be called paradoxical. For the political scientist is a product of the society which it is his mission to understand. He is also an active part, and frequently he seeks to be a leading part, of that society. To be faithful to his mission he would, then, have to overcome two limitations: the limitation of origin, which determines the perspective from which he looks at society, and the limitation of purpose, which makes him wish to remain a member in good standing of that society or even to play a leading role in it.

The stronger the trend toward conformity within the society and the stronger the social ambitions within the individual scholar, the greater will be the temptation to sacrifice the moral commitment to the truth for social advantage. It follows that a respectable political science—respectable, that is, in terms of the society to be investigated—is in a sense a contradiction in terms. For a political science which is faithful to its moral commitment of

telling the truth about the political world cannot help telling society things it does not want to hear. This cannot be otherwise in view of the fact that one of the main purposes of society is to conceal the truth about man and society from its members. That concealment, that elaborate and subtle and purposeful misunderstanding of the nature of man and of society, is one of the cornerstones upon which all societies are founded.

A political science, true to its moral commitment, ought at the very least to be an unpopular undertaking. At its very best, it cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force with regard to certain vested interests—intellectual, political, economic, and social in general. It stands to reason that political science as a social institution could never hope even to approach this ideal; for it would destroy itself in the attempt. Only individuals have achieved the distinction of unpopularity, social ostracism, and criminal penalties, which are the reward of constant dedication to the truth in matters political.

While political science as a social organization cannot hope even to approach the ideal, it could at least be aware of its existence, and the awareness of its moral commitment could at least mitigate those compromises between the moral commitment and social convenience and ambition which no political scientist can fully escape. It is the measure of the degree to which political science in America meets the needs of society rather than its moral commitment to the truth that it is not only eminently respectable and popular but—what is worse—that it is also widely regarded with indifference.

A political science which is mistreated and persecuted is likely to have earned that enmity because it has put its moral commitment to the truth above social convenience and ambition. It has penetrated beneath the ideological veil with which society conceals the true nature of political relations, disturbing the complacency of the powers-that-be and stirring up the conscience of society. It helps to cover political relations with the veil of ideologies which mollify the conscience of society; by justifying the existing power relations, it reassures the powers-that-be in their possession of power; it illuminates certain aspects of the existing power relations; and it contributes to the improvement of the technical operations of government. The relevance of this political science does not lie primarily in the discovery of the truth about politics but in its contribution to the stability of society.

A political science which is neither hated nor respected, but treated with indifference as an innocuous pastime, is likely to have retreated into a sphere that lies beyond the positive or negative interest of society. Concerning itself with issues in which nobody has a stake, this political science avoids the risk of social disapproval by even foregoing the chance of social approbation. The retreat into the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical—in short the politically irrelevant—is the unmistakable sign of a "noncontroversial" political science which has neither friends nor enemies because it has no relevance for the great political issues in which society has a stake. By being committed to a truth which is in this sense irrelevant, it distorts the perspective under which the political world is seen. It passes in silence over such burning problems as alternative foreign policies, the political power of economic organizations and of religious and ethnic minority groups, the relation between government and public opinion, as well as most of the other fundamental problems of contemporary democracy. By doing so, it makes it appear as though these problems either did not exist or were not important or were not susceptible to theoretical understanding. By its predominant concern with the irrelevant, it devaluates by implication the really important problems of politics.

IV

The content of a theory of politics is not to be determined a priori and in the abstract. A theory is a tool for understanding. Its purpose is to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible. Its content, then, must be determined by the intellectual interest of the observer. What is it we want to know about politics? What concerns us most about it? What questions do we want a theory of politics to answer? The replies to these three questions determine the content of theory, and the replies may well differ not only from one period of history to another, but from one contemporaneous group of observers to the other.

Hypothetically one can imagine as many theories of politics as there are legitimate intellectual perspectives from which to approach the political scene. But in a particular culture and a particular period of history, there is likely to be one perspective which for theoretical and practical reasons takes

precedence over the others. At one time theoretical interest was focused upon the constitutional arrangements within which political relations take place, and in view of the theoretical and practical problems to be solved, this was then a legitimate interest. At another time in the history of political science, theoretical interest was centered upon political institutions and their operations, and in view of what was worth knowing and doing at that time—this theoretical interest was again legitimate. Thus political science is like a spotlight which, while trying to illuminate the whole world, focuses in one period of history upon one aspect of politics and changes its focus in accordance with new theoretical and practical concerns.

In our period of history, the justice and stability of our political life is threatened, and our understanding of the political world is challenged, by the rise of totalitarianism on the domestic and international scene. The novel political phenomenon of totalitarianism puts in doubt certain assumptions about the nature of man and of society which we took for granted. It raises issues about institutions which we thought had been settled once and for all. It disrupts and overwhelms legal processes on which we had come to look as self-sufficient instruments of control. In one word, what has emerged from under the surface of legal and institutional arrangements as the distinctive, unifying element of politics is the struggle for power, elemental, undisguised, and all-pervading. As recently as a decade ago, it was still held by conservatives, liberals, and Marxists alike either that the struggle for power was at worst a raucous pastime, safely regulated by law and channeled by institutions, or that it had been replaced in its dominant influence by economic competition, or that the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy or the classless society, which were expected to be close at hand, would make an end of it altogether. These assumptions and expectations have been refuted by the experience of our age. It is to the challenge of this refutation that political science must respond, as political practice must meet the challenge of that experience.

It may be pointed out in passing that all great contributions to political science, from Plato and Aristotle to *The Federalist* and Calhoun, have been responses to such challenges arising from political reality. They have not been self-sufficient theoretical developments pursuing theoretical concerns for their own sake. Rather, they were confronted with a set of political experiences and problems which defied understanding with the theoretical tools at hand. Thus they had to face a new political experience,

unencumbered by an intellectual tradition which might have been adequate to preceding experiences but which failed to illuminate the experience of the contemporary world. Thus they have been compelled to separate in the intellectual tradition at their disposal that which is historically conditioned from that which is true regardless of time and place, and to pose again the perennial problems of politics and to reformulate the perennial truths of politics in the light of the contemporary experience. This has been the task of political science throughout its history and this is the task of political science today.

By making power its central concept, a theory of politics does not presume that none but power relations control political action. What it must presume is the need for a central concept which allows the observer to distinguish the field of politics from other social spheres, to orient himself in the maze of empirical phenomena which make up the field of politics, and to establish a measure of rational order within it. A central concept, such as power, then provides a kind of rational outline of politics, a map of the political scene. Such a map does not provide a complete description of the political landscape as it is in a particular period of history. It rather provides the timeless features of its geography distinct from their everchanging historic setting. Such a map, then, will tell us what are the rational possibilities for travel from one spot on the map to another, and which road is most likely to be taken by certain travelers under certain conditions. Thus it imparts a measure of rational order to the observing mind and, by doing so, establishes one of the conditions for successful action.

A theory of politics, by the very fact of painting a rational picture of the political scene, points to the contrast between what the political scene actually is and what it tends to be, but can never completely become. The difference between the empirical reality of politics and a theory of politics is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye. The painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed. Thus a theory of politics must seek to depict the rational essence of its subject matter.

By doing so, a theory of politics cannot help implying that the rational elements of politics are superior in value to the contingent ones and that

they are so in two respects. They are so in view of the theoretical understanding which the theory seeks, for its very possibility and the extent to which it is possible depend upon the rationality of its subject matter. A theory of politics must value that rational nature of its subject matter also for practical reasons. It must assume that a rational policy is of necessity a good policy, for only such a policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success. A theory of politics must want the photographic picture of the political scene to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait.

Hence, a theory of politics presents not only a guide to understanding, but also an ideal for action. It presents a map of the political scene not only in order to understand what that scene is like, but also in order to show the shortest and safest road to a given objective. The use of theory, then, is not limited to rational explanation and anticipation. A theory of politics also contains a normative element.

V

A curriculum of political science which would try to put such a theoretical understanding of politics into practice for the purposes of teaching would have to eliminate all those subjects which do not serve this theoretical understanding. It would also have to add subjects which at present are not included, but which are essential to such understanding.

The process of elimination must move on two fronts. First, it must concern those subjects which have been traditionally included in the field but which have no organic connection with its subject matter or with the perspective from which contemporary political science ought to view it. In this category belong, for instance, all the legal subjects with which political science concerns itself because the law schools at one time did not. However, this practical consideration is unfounded today when law schools offer courses in jurisprudence, administrative, constitutional, and international law.

On the other hand, there has been a strong tendency in political science to add to the curriculum subjects which happen to be of practical importance at a particular moment, regardless of their theoretical relevance. However, what is worth knowing for practical reasons is not necessarily worth

knowing on theoretical grounds. A certain innovation in municipal administration or international organization may attract at one time wide attention by virtue of the practical results it promises, or the political developments in certain areas of the world may become a matter of topical interest for public opinion. It still remains to be shown on theoretical grounds that such topics ought to be included as independent subjects in the curriculum of political science. On a limited scale this problem raises again the issue of liberal *vs.* vocational education.

The additions of the curriculum of political science, too, must be of two different kinds. On the one hand, the curriculum must take into account the fact that its central concept is a general social phenomenon which manifests itself most typically in the political sphere, but is not limited to it. The phenomenon of power and the social configurations to which it gives rise in the political sphere play an important, yet largely neglected, part in all social life. A configuration, such as the balance of power, for instance, is a general social phenomenon to be found on all levels of social interaction. The theoretical understanding of specifically political phenomena and configurations requires the understanding of the extent to which these political phenomena and configurations are merely the specific instances of general social phenomena and configurations and to which they grow out of their specific political environment. One of the cornerstones of the curriculum of political science, then, ought to be political sociology, which deals with the phenomenon of power and social configurations to which it gives rise in general, with special reference, of course, to those in the political sphere.

On the other hand, the contemporary political scene is characterized by the interaction between the political and economic spheres. This interaction runs counter to the liberal assumption and requirement of actual separation, which is reflected in the academic separation of the two fields. This interaction reverts to a situation which existed before political science was established as an academic discipline and which was reflected by the academic fusion of the two fields in the form of political economy. The curriculum of political science must take theoretical notice of the actual development of private governments in the form of giant corporations and labor unions. These organizations exercise power within their own organizational limits, in their relations to each other, and in their relations to

the state. The state in turn exercises power with regard to them. These power relations constitute a new field for theoretical understanding.

A new curriculum of political science would have to rest on three cornerstones: political sociology, political theory, and political institutions. Political sociology deals with the empirical phenomena and problems to which the general social phenomenon of power gives rise. Political theory concerns itself with the theoretical attempts which have been made throughout history to understand the phenomena and solve the problems of politics. (It might be noted in passing that political theory ought not to limit itself to the understanding of the political theories of the Western world but ought to take the political theories of India and China into account.) Political institutions would be the empirical counterpart of political theory; this course would not deal exclusively with contemporary political institutions but would consider the main types of political institutions developed in the Western world as well as those of the main non-Western political societies.

On that common foundation the curriculum of political science would be divided into four wings, housing in turn American politics, international politics, foreign politics, and the politics of private government. Each of these four wings ought to be subdivided into institutions and processes. What further subdivisions as to substance and functions may be advisable will depend on both theoretical interest and available resources.

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2 : *Power and Influence*

CHARLES A. McCLELLAND

Power is an explanatory concept that is applied with equal facility to physical phenomena and human affairs. It is a common word in the vocabularies of most people and is used very frequently to account for the reasons behind observed events. In public affairs, both domestic and international, the notion is virtually unchallengeable that the success of a man or an organization depends on the possession of accumulated power greater than the amount of power held by opponents. The power concept appears to be ingrained in the common culture, with the result that no particular instruction is needed to establish a definition of the term or to suggest its various denotations and connotations. References to power simply make sense; it is meaningful to speak about a powerful man, a powerful group, or a powerful nation. It is to be expected that interpretations of international relations often will put power in the forefront and that the power concept figures prominently in international theory.

At least three somewhat different images are evoked in the common use of the term power. The first image makes out power to be something akin to a possession or a piece of property. The second causes it to be conceived as a moving force resembling, in social affairs, the functions of an electric current or the flow of a fluid in physical or biological structures. The third image causes power to be viewed as a trait or an attribute appearing in the relations of men. These three images often are interwoven in the interpretations of events with the result that it is usually impossible to separate the references. The important fact is that the mixture of the images seldom creates a feeling of confusion or arouses the reaction that one's sense

of reality is being violated. As a simple exercise in which the reader is invited to separate the images, let us consider a series of definitions and statements about power and note how they can be associated with the theory of the international system. Let us see if these assertions maintain a general plausibility despite several shifts from one image to another.

Power is something possessed by persons and social groups. Like money, it can be employed for many different purposes. It is something that can be used, it is something that can be distributed, it is something that can be won, and it is something that can be lost. Power may be pitted against power; the use of power is intimately associated with conflict. Power is also a force that can be balanced among power-holders or that can be thrown out of balance. Power varies from situation to situation. . . .

Power is the motive force in the international system. Each national system possesses an amount of power, and each national system is able to mobilize and use its power by calling on subsystems for assistance. National systems, in interacting with one another, may consume power and generate power. What we previously have called the international system by referring to all the transactions and exchanges among national systems must be, in terms of power, something like an energy system. There is a world-wide distribution of power among the many national systems. Some nations, being more powerful than others, will tend to attract weaker nations. Under the forces of this attraction, groups or camps of nations will be formed. Under the effects of repulsion such camps may break apart. A transformation in the international system will occur as a result of changes in the power situation, either gains or losses or redistribution of power among the members of the system. The uneven gains in power and the consequent redistributions of power are the phenomena behind most international conflicts and behind the instabilities of this age, as Organski has duly observed.

In order to control the international system or in order to induce or prevent transformations, one would need to know how to cause changes in power sources, in power relationships, or in both. The theory of the international system is really a theory about power configurations and about the necessary and sufficient conditions for maintaining these configurations or for changing them.

The foregoing remarks about power probably appear to be entirely reasonable, and some readers may feel that an approach to the explanation of the international system in terms of power has the advantage of bringing the

subject suddenly into a sharp focus. If power operates in a complicated way in international relations and if several images are required to understand its effects, it might still follow that the power approach explains a great deal about international events within a single frame of reference. Since it has been made abundantly clear that it is impossible to know everything about the workings of the international system, should we not exploit the simplification that results from concentrating on the single aspect of the phenomenon of power in international relations? This question has already been answered in the affirmative. A major school of thought has developed around the power concept in the study of international relations, and it has been accepted for several decades by many scholars that power is the organizing idea for the whole discipline of political science.

There is a large and wide-ranging literature on political power. Indeed, the great interest in power has resulted in persistent investigations of its foundations. Recently, these probings have gone so far as to call into question the validity of the concept and to raise challenges both to the common understanding about power and to the teachings of what we shall call the realist school of thought. One investigator has been led to remark lately about the power conception "that we are still not at all sure of what we are talking about when we use the term."[1] In order to understand the current status of the power idea, we must give attention to three tasks: (1) to understand the formulation of the power interpretation of the realist school of international relations, (2) to consider the criticisms advanced against realist interpretations, and (3) to assess the place of power phenomena in international relations according to the new perspective.

The Realist Formulation

There is broad agreement that the most comprehensive and successful characterization of international relations in the frame of reference of political power is to be found in the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau. As one might expect, not all realists have espoused each and every statement made by Morgenthau. Kenneth W. Thompson, a leading realist, has observed, in fact, that "much of the literature of international politics is a dialogue, explicit or not, between Morgenthau and his critics...."[2] Many differences in point of view and on details exist within the realist school of thought; we

must recognize, however, that the Morgenthau version of the power theory of international politics occupies the center of the stage.

For twenty years, Professor Morgenthau has explained, defended, and reinterpreted his system of ideas on power in a series of books and in scores of essays and articles. He has remained remarkably consistent in his outlook; the result is that his main contentions can be summarized easily, while the detailed lines of his reasoning and the particular elements of his defense can be understood only through an extended study. Thus, only his main contentions are reviewed, in brief, in this treatment.

"International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power"[3] is the famous statement by which Morgenthau has characterized his subject. International politics differs from the play of politics within national societies only with respect to the limiting and controlling effects imposed on the latter by the restraints of law, common custom and culture, and the monopolization of violence by the government. In the international environment, these restraints are either too weak to exert real controls or are nonexistent. Whenever relations among independent and sovereign political units come into being in history, as in the ancient Greek city-states and in the modern European state system, the power consideration becomes dominant. Morgenthau finds this situation to be inescapable in history and the reflection of an iron law of politics. The unit of the system is always the state, and no other units have any appreciable significance. Further, differences in previous historical experience, the particular structure of a society, and any other national or societal characteristics are not crucial factors in how a state behaves, for the basic reason that the struggle for power is a concern so strong that it will override these factors.

International relations, as a whole, may be conceived to take in a range of interests and activities beyond the power focus, but international *politics* is that part of the whole that is defined as having *the* central significance. In this age, Morgenthau has contended, the interest in international relations is concentrated on international politics, which is to say, on the struggle for power among nation-states. Every national government is preoccupied with the struggle, and every government must adjust its actions to power requirements. Depending on its relative power position and the overall distribution of power in the system, a nation-state has only a limited number of choices to make among policies. Fundamentally, a state can pursue only three types of policies and can make an appropriate choice among these at

any given time according to its power position. The three policies to choose among are (1) the status quo, (2) expansion, or imperialism, and (3) prestige. The latter policy involves the action of demonstrating the power that the state has. The other two are concerned with holding power and increasing it.

There are two reasons, each of which reinforces the other, for such a narrow range of choice for the policy-making of nation-states. One might ask why a state could not invent a fourth fundamental type of policy. Or it could be asked why states could not merely decide to cease the struggle for power. In particular, why could it not happen that the men who run governments would see that conflicts over power are wasteful and destructive for all and would undertake to build international arrangements for cooperation instead of conflict? The first answer is that the will to power is simply a part of human nature; human beings are possessed by that will and reforms are not available to correct an underlying and permanent condition of man-in-society. The second answer is that the logic of the power situation is unassailable. Whenever or wherever a system of relations among separate, sovereign political entities comes into being, the rules of power prevail, without alternative. Moral restraints and the limitations on conduct imposed by legal rules invariably prove to be too weak to change the relations among the political entities to any form other than that of the patterns controlled by power considerations.

Some readers may still wish, at this point, to resist these two fundamental answers to why the world cannot lift itself out of the struggle for power, both domestically and internationally. They may not be content to accept the assertion that it is Utopian to expect anything else. How do Morgenthau and his followers meet resistance of this type? A clue can be found in what was said earlier about the different approaches to the justification of theory—the tests of the literary tradition and the tests of the scientific tradition. Morgenthau is perfectly clear in his mind about these tests; he accepts the literary tradition and rejects the scientific. Essentially, he relies on the force of reasoned arguments based on the lessons of history and the words of earlier authorities to give validity to the power theory of international politics, and he warns others of the dangers and follies that come from rejecting time-honored truths of the long human experience.

Much that has been given attention in this discussion about the need for increased knowledge of international behavior and about the possibilities of matching research findings and intelligent actions to the vast problems of the

multiple transformations of the international system is not relevant in the perspective of the realist school of thought. The reason has already been shown: the international system is caught in the meshes of the absolutely basic condition of power competition and power struggle and there is no way to extricate it. The essence of realism is to come to terms with the inevitable and the unchangeable and to find ways to live with the facts. Is Morgenthau, then, a gloomy pessimist who predicts no possible escape from oncoming disasters? The answer seems to be that he is extremely critical of current foreign policies but not at all in despair over the eventual outcome. He is not without hope and solutions.

Intelligent actions by the governments of states have a limited but important capacity to guide the interplay of power. Many different kinds of concrete historical situations confront governments, and, of course, statesmen must deal with these as they occur. Further, a nation will conceive of many desired objectives in international relations. It is natural, especially in democratic countries, to have high hopes that things will turn out well and everybody will live happily ever after. Responsible governments cannot permit themselves the luxury of such sentiments, however. The cardinal rule for the nation-state is to respond to historical situations and to the multitudes of desired national objectives strictly according to its own national interest. Morgenthau refers repeatedly to the national interest defined in terms of power; what this means, simply, is that the concern over the power position of the nation is the primary consideration and that it conditions everything else. Thus, any historical situation or any particular desired national objective is to be evaluated and measured by the yardstick of the nation's power position. The sober calculation of the national interest is the key to a viable system of international relations.

Collaborative relations between nations ensue from a convergence of interests. Coalitions form and endure when several nations are willing to act on their strong common interests. International conflicts are the consequences of clashing national interests. Conflict and collaboration, when firmly based on calculated interests, often can be brought into a desirable condition of equilibrium. A balance of power is a stabilizing arrangement and should be sought in the interplay of the policies of states.

Although the nature of the state system, made up of sovereign states, prevents any final outcomes or permanent arrangements, wise diplomacy often can bring about suitable accommodations among competing states. The

extremes of violence in international relations can be avoided. Indeed, the road to peace—and the only real recourse for nations—is to conduct affairs through adept diplomacy. Good diplomats are rare men who can see through the superficialities of daily events, who recognize the limitations on their activities, and who have a deep intuitive grasp on the realities of power. Great statesmen come on the historical stage only infrequently, but when they appear they make a vast difference in the affairs of the world. Great statecraft and efficient diplomacy are practices that belong in the realm of art; the sciences really have nothing to do with these skills. Knowledge that can be produced by the special cultures of science will have little contribution to make to the managing of relations among nations. Along with "moralism" and "legalism," the "scientism" of the social sciences is a misleading influence and is capable of damaging the conduct of international relations to the extent that trust is placed in scientific research to relieve the problems of the international system.

One further point about the realist formulation must be emphasized: at best it is a simplification and an idealization of how relations may be conducted. As a distillation of historical experience, this model is not regarded as an outline of important and unanswered research questions. It contains answers, not questions. Research is important to the realists, however, to discover how current policies and contemporary developments vary from the ideal of the model. That there will be a divergence of actual practice from the ideal is to be expected; but it is the responsibility of the scholar to find the differences and to exhort the practitioners of foreign affairs to reduce the disparities. Thus, a normative tendency in the power approach is persistent.

As long as the basic laws of international politics are known, asserts the realist, there is no reason for the theorist who understands the rules to hesitate to urge other men to bring practices as closely in line with the laws as possible. To the objection sometimes raised that a law of politics could not be violated—that if men are subjected to laws they have no choice but to be bound, as in the case of the law of gravitation—the realist answer is that the model of power politics contains only the ideal rules. Men, being imperfect, can only approach the ideal. When they make errors by moving *away* from the ideal, rather than toward it, however, these shortcomings are to be pointed out and criticized.

The struggle for power among nations is traceable, according to the realist conception, to a trait in human nature. It is human to seek power. If power is so all-encompassing, how do we recognize its presence and its nonpresence and how do we distinguish it from other phenomena? What is power? How is power to be described and defined?

In writing about power in many places and contexts, Morgenthau has offered numerous descriptions and definitions of what he means by power. The characterization *the struggle for power* suggests, of course, the ideas of power as a possession and of power as a force. Most frequently, Morgenthau defines power as a special value; it is a possession but not in a tangible form like money or real estate. In a definition that has often been singled out for attention, he says that power is an attribute of a relationship between actors, in these terms:

> Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which the former exerts over the latter's mind.[4]

It is interesting that Morgenthau often uses the word *control* to indicate the meaning of power.

It is precisely to the point of how to identify power that inquiry has returned, time and again. Neither Morgenthau nor anyone else has been able to satisfy this curiosity. If power is to be used as a central organizing concept of a theory of international relations, then we must discover what it is with sufficient precision that it will not be mixed and confused with other manifestations, whatever the latter may be. If there is nothing but power to be discriminated, understanding will be frustrated. Not everything can be power; we must have at least one other class, perhaps to be called only *not-power*, to provide some contrast or comparison. Thus, in the literature one finds many efforts to say what power is, of what it is composed, and how it is to be recognized.

One familiar method for describing power is to look into its sources. Representative of the approach is the treatment given in the textbook by Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins.[5] The authors list and discuss seven contributing elements: geography, natural resources, technology,

population, ideology, morale, and leadership. That these probably are the sources of national power seems quite obvious. One might think that the actual calculations of the power of nations would be a straightforward process of studying each of these sources in detail. Expert analyses must, by now, have established ratings of power for all nation-states. Indeed, such attempts have been made.[6] The results are not satisfactory, however, for at least two basic reasons.

The elements of power are considered to play back and forth on one another—to affect the set of elements mutually—so that the products of combinations of elements are made difficult to assess. Deficiencies in natural resources may be offset by clever technologies. Leadership may be diminished by a particular ideology. All the elements are so intertwined and the ensuing complexity is so great that some observers have been led to give up all hope of evaluating power with any precision. If there is no way to measure—which is also to say, to assess, estimate, and evaluate—then there is really no way to tell what the power status of a country is. And if there is no way to decide about the power of nations, nothing of importance can be asserted about power distributions. We may *deduce*, however, what the power status of a country once *was*, relative to the power of other countries, by noting the outcomes of historical events. Such findings are also very uncertain and are less valuable than one would wish. The more important question is always what the power situation is now or what it will be in the immediate future.

The second reason for finding power calculations at the source unsatisfactory is bound up in the question, power for what? It should be immediately apparent that many of the typical actions of international relations—the negotiating of a treaty is one example—do not require the direct use of much power and do not draw appreciably on the power sources. Further, if psychological efficacy produced by the presence of power is to be taken as a test of power, certain negative consequences are sometimes noticed to occur. The existence of massive power sources in one country sometimes causes adjacent countries to react with fear and anxiety and results in attempts to reduce the possibilities of future control by the powerful neighbor. Here, the power in hand tends to offset the power to control. If a nation’s objective is to increase its potential to control through acts of goodwill—by foreign assistance or disaster relief, for instance—morale, the size of the population, geographical location, and other elements

of power may not have any connection with the attainment of the goal. Many other observations have been made along this line. Apparently, it is necessary to take into account both the sources of power and the objectives of power; the consideration of only the elements of power does not identify sufficiently the power of nations.

Many scholars think that the underlying answer to the question, power for what, is obvious. Power really refers to the ability to win an international war. The Sprouts write on this point: “It should be emphasized that in American popular usage, the term *power* tends more often than not to denote *military* power, or at least to connote some idea of *coercion* or threatened coercion which is the essence of military power.”[7] Morgenthau excludes the military aspect from his definition while Claude makes it the central element of his.[8]

One of the proposed solutions to the troublesome problem of identifying power in terms of the elements at the source has been to employ the concept of *capability* as an additional and essential distinction. National capabilities suggest the potential to be powerful. This notion helps to separate that which *could be* mobilized and brought into play from the actual effort and effect. The effort and the effect can then be characterized as power. An advantage in the idea of separating capability and power lies in the need to identify the *process* of converting potential power at the source into applied and effective power. Some directions for answering the power-to-do-what question take shape in the tracing of the conversion process. An analytic scheme for following the main steps of the conversion can be constructed from the following statements.

1. National capability is a complex of elements, the particular combinations of which lie latent within a national society.

2. The varying situations of international politics require decision-makers to make estimates and judgments on what kinds, combinations, and amounts of the national capability will be needed for future use and, hence, will be mobilized.

3. The capabilities that are allocated for ultimate use as designated by the decision-makers are processed through the channels of relevant political, military, economic, and social organizations. Factors of selection, control, coordination, timing, and phasing are influences that bear on the effectiveness of the conversion process and, therefore, on the production of power. Power losses may arise from breakdown, overload, miscalculation,

interruption, bad timing, and other disorders in the organizational channels. Another way to express the idea of the conversion of capabilities into usable power is to say that power must be brought up through the subsystems of a national system to the point of application and that the complex situations existing in the subsystems will have an effect on the mobilizing of power.

4. Since the conversion from capability to power involves planning and operations in the channels of organization, there will be, invariably, a passage of time from the moment when a decision to mobilize power is made to the time of its readiness for use. The use of power occurs in the context of some particular international situation. The passage of time and the participation of two or more actors will result, almost always, in changes in the international situation. Thus, a factor influencing the effectiveness of power is the variable of change in the situation. To cite an obvious example, if air power is mobilized to meet a certain type of international situation and that situation develops in a way that requires only the deployment of ground troops, the air power mobilization will have proved to be not relevant to the situation. Nations face great difficulties in arranging the conversions of capabilities to power to meet the many varieties of changing international relations that confront them endlessly.

5. The mobilizing of power, then, is a dynamic process having organizational and situational limits on its uses. Power is limited further at the place and time of its application by a calculus involving desired objectives and realistic payoffs. Some objectives are always in play provided the activity is not merely aimless. National objectives are, without exception, numerous and complexly ordered with respect to their priorities. Specific international situations, as perceived, will frequently cause a shift in the combinations of active national objectives and will result in temporary rearrangements of their priorities. In rapidly changing international situations, the use of mobilized power in pursuit of certain objectives may, even in a matter of days, become displaced and ineffective simply because a reordering of immediate objectives will accompany changes in the situation. Different kinds of power applied in different ways and amounts may be needed to realize objectives.

Decision-makers do not expect to satisfy a full set of national objectives in every international situation. Instead, they are required to settle for what they can get. They search for the best possible payoffs, given both circumstances and goals. Thus, there is an additional calculus at work that conditions the

use of power. How far a nation pushes toward its objectives depends on what the local factors are in the situation, what capabilities are ready in the channels, what level of measures is deemed most appropriate to that situation and to the active values, and what degree of success the decision-makers are willing to accept. Short- and long-term anticipated consequences of the employment of power complicate the choice of objectives further and, hence, these considerations also influence the effectiveness of power in use.

The notion of a conversion process between capability and power leads to a more complicated conceptualization of power in international relations than was suggested at the beginning of the discussion. It has the additional consequences of stimulating questions about the simple idea that power is something possessed and applied. The realization that the presence of power is contingent on the working of a complex process tends to encourage the proposition that the thing called power is a misconception. Theoretical questioning of the power concept has produced the tentative conclusion that power is only an abstract attribute or property connected with interactions and relationships . . .

The international system is made up of transactions and patterns of transactions. This idea is readily ignored because of a natural tendency to emphasize the sources of the transactions—the national systems—and to consider them as the units of the system. Further, the power approach to international politics makes the nation-state the unit of the state system. To the question of what the international system is composed, the easy answer is likely to be that the international system is composed of nation-states. This is wrong according to the system outlook. In order to indicate that the nation-state should *not* be thought of either as the constituting part of the international system or as a fixed body, the term *national system* was introduced. It was stressed that the national system, itself being composed of large numbers of interactions of subsystems, should be conceived more in the analogy of the flow of a river, changing its condition according to the environment through which it moves, than in the analogy of some kind of fixed physical structure. Throughout, our concern has been to establish the view that, in considering international relations, we are dealing with activities on the move and impinging on one another to create relationships. The realities that interest us are *acts*; the main facts are reports about acts. References to structures are references to patterned and recurring relationships. If we require units for counting or evaluating purposes, we

should look for them in the transactions, and perhaps we should even assign to them a general name such as *transacts*. Units certainly will not be nation-states or national systems. Given these ideas, we can conceive of power only as some characteristic, trait, or property associated with streams of transactions.

Although there is no necessity to fall back on physical analogies, some illustration on the idea of power in the system context is afforded in what most of us know about motors and engines. A certain gasoline engine is said to *have* fifty horsepower. We are not under any illusion, however, that a quantity of fifty horsepower is possessed or owned by that engine. All that we are willing to accept is that it *rates* at fifty horsepower when it is running under certain specified conditions. We understand that horsepower results from interacting processes involving fuel, air, combustion, and mechanical motions, all of which occur in going through the engine. The horsepower of the engine is a performance trait. Similarly, we can say that power is a performance trait of international relations. We repeat the idea by saying that power is to be interpreted as a property of the international system. The old, stubborn question remains, however. What means or methods are to be used to determine when the trait of power is present in an international transaction? What is power?

The Behavioral Inquiry

During recent years a number of students of political behavior have been attracted to the study of power, more often because of an interest in power-holders in local communities than because of a concern with the phenomenon of power in international relations. Because the investigators of community power frequently ask questions of those who are known as powerful or who are presumed to know who is powerful in a city or local region, they have been especially concerned to formulate what are called *operational definitions*. An operational definition is one that identifies the subject under consideration in terms of the research processes that are to be carried out in investigating it. Thus, Robert Dahl's definition of power is operational and is applicable as a guide to asking certain questions of respondents. His definition states: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do."[9] The community power researcher is not faced by insuperable obstacles in finding instances

when some A did something to some B. If he can locate these instances and also A and B, he may be able to interview B and persuade him to recall his intentions at the time A was attempting to influence him. If it is ascertained that A was attempting to get B to do something and if B reports that he meant to do something else until A intervened, the researcher then has identified a case in which power was present. If the test fails, then no assertion about the presence of power may be made. A very desirable specificity of what is meant by power is provided by Dahl's formulation.

In the study of international politics, a student would almost always encounter great difficulties in applying Dahl's test to current international situations. One of the things that heads of state do not do is to submit to questionnaires and interviews about their intentions. In addition, foreign policy decisions are rarely as simple as the resolve of A to get B to do something. In turn, what B does in response frequently is intricately related to many different potential purposes. B usually turns out to be not one individual but a committee, a group, or a whole special organization. Even if a particular B could be located and persuaded to give candid replies to questions about his motives, he might well respond that he had a great many possibilities in mind and therefore could not say truthfully whether A did, in fact, seriously influence his actions. As J. David Singer has pointed out, while A was attempting to influence B, B probably was also attempting to influence A. Further, the reconstructions of past power manifestations are not as important as calculations of present and future power situations, but Dahl's technique is most easily used on past instances.

Other research difficulties exist beyond those mentioned here for those who would seek to identify power through Dahl's approach. Despite the obstacles, it would probably be possible to build a certain amount of indirect evidence of B's intentions as expressed in policy statements and actions, before and after some particular effort or intervention on the part of A. Occasionally, clear evidence of the presence of power may appear. The significant advance is, however, not in the easing of the research problem but rather in the shift, under the behavioral impact, in the concept of what power is and where to look for it. Harold and Margaret Sprout have remarked in their recent textbook: "The notion of power as a quantifiable mass is giving way to the concept of power as a behavioral relationship."[10] An active theorist of international behavior, J. David Singer, has reached the same conclusion: "The concept does not come to life except as it is observed

in action, and that action can be found only when national power is brought into play by nations engaged in the process of influencing one another. Until that occurs, we have no operational indices of power. . . .”[11]

Power in international relations is being reconceptualized as one among other traits that appear in the transactions of nations. The Sprouts call attention to the fact that the transactions of international politics are made up of the demands and responses of governments. Political demands and responses take many forms and occur with different degrees of intensity and urgency. Governments are engaged unceasingly in attempts to influence the actions of other governments and to cope with influence efforts directed at them by others. This shift of focus, apparently slight but actually more radical than it appears at first, leads theory away from the idea of the struggle for power among nations and toward a theory of influence oriented to the transactions—the successions of demands and responses—of governments. This transition is still so new that some serious terminological problems have yet to be resolved.

Some writers have wished to use power and influence as interchangeable terms while others have preferred to preserve a distinction between the two to identify separate behavioral properties. Singer, for example, merely defines power as the capacity to influence, and turns thereafter to an analysis of the influence processes. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, both political scientists, make the distinction and preserve power and influence as two different concepts for properties of political action systems. We shall follow Bachrach and Baratz here because their discussion appears to be a particularly valuable contribution to the subject.

Bachrach and Baratz adhere to the notions that “power is relational, as opposed to possessive or substantive,”[12] and that a manifestation of power requires the presence of certain conditions in the transactional situation: (1) that there be a conflict of values or interest between the parties of the transaction, (2) that one of the parties of the conflict must actually comply with the other’s demands, and (3) that “a power relation can exist only if one of the parties can threaten to invoke sanctions. . . .”[13] They can say that the threat to apply sanctions—the holding forth of the prospect of a specified punishment—is the condition that distinguishes power from influence. Further requirements are that the party subjected to the threat of sanctions must understand the nature of the threat, must regard the consequences that

would follow from noncompliance as more punishing than other likely outcomes, and must believe in the intent of the threat of sanctions.

The presence of a *power* relationship, according to the Bachrach and Baratz specifications, is marked most impressively and clearly by the occurrence of threats. An *influence* relationship is substantially the same as a power relationship except that it is manifested without the presence of threatened sanctions. They point out, further, that power and influence relationships often co-occur and that one frequently leads to the other. A *force* relationship, on the other hand, involves the carrying out of sanctions and greatly contracts the element of choice that exists in the response in the power relationship. In other words, A no longer waits for a modification in B's behavior but undertakes instead to coerce B into compliance.

Bachrach and Baratz have identified two other classes of behavior in transactional situations. A *manipulative* relationship is defined as one in which one party acts to secure the compliance of another party through measures of which the affected party remains unaware. Thus, manipulation is unlike power and influence, since the recipient does not recognize either the source or the technique affecting his behavior, and therefore is presented with no choices to which he might respond in the relationship. As the theorists suggest, manipulation is related more closely to force than to power and influence. The relationship of *authority* is the last of the categories outlined by Bachrach and Baratz. They argue that authority does not work like power in relational situations. In the authoritative situation, when A makes a demand on B the requirement that B must comply is as strong as in a power situation. The difference is, however, as the authors say, that B complies not because he makes a choice of some lesser evil for the reason that he must but rather "because he recognizes that the command is reasonable in terms of his own values. . . ."[14]

Let us make certain at this point that we recognize the significance of the foregoing ideas and classifications of behavior for the study of international relations. First, we need to recognize that as observers we have at our disposal a source of data in the reports of events taking place on the international scene. Our basic facts are, as the Sprouts point out, a succession of demands and responses by the officials of governments. A struggle *is* constantly in progress in which the general objective is to get others to do what we want. Concurrently, the others try to get us to do what they want. The overall result is an interplay of actions in which demands and

responses are the basic data. Now, the observer's purpose is to gain knowledge about what is going on; clearly, if the observer decides to label the whole interplay of demands and responses only a struggle for power among nations, he loses his chance to probe more deeply into the subject. On the other hand, if the observer is able to inspect a body of accumulated demand-response data from the standpoint of several performance traits, his prospects of gleaning additional knowledge are improved. With the help of operational indices, the student may be able to point out with some degree of precision and confidence that, in a given stream of transactions, one type of relationship occurs more often than others or that shifts from one type to another appear. Bachrach and Baratz provide a set of behavioral categories, and, more important, some operational indices to be used for matching empirical data to specific relationship characteristics. They offer us precisely the kind of theoretical equipment that we need for developing knowledge.

Power turns out, now, to be one particular kind of relationship in international transactions and not a pervasive quality or force running through all international diplomacy and statecraft. If we use this framework, the analytic questions that we shall apply to a given record of exchanges and transactions between governments will take the form of queries about the manifestations of the

1. Relationship of power
2. Relationship of authority
3. Relationship of influence
4. Relationship of manipulation
5. Relationship of force.

Let us not assume that the locating of clusters of facts in the appropriate categories will be an easy task; the accomplishment is only that a theoretical addition has been made. One can now see more clearly what would need to be found out in order to understand more exactly what is going on in international relations. In fact, reflection on the problem may cause a person to conclude that we can never find out precisely what is going on because the essential requirement of the Bachrach and Baratz formulation is to know what is going on in men's minds, particularly with reference to their intentions and motives. It is simpler to say that all men are dominated by the will to power and to be contented with that explanation of motivation.

However, we may not be willing to assume that this generalization is satisfactory.

One solace is that government officials talk a great deal about their reasons for foreign policy actions and, therefore, provide some information about their intentions. Further, in international relations, it is a common practice for governments to make decisions and to announce them in public. The more that we find out about the processes through which foreign policy decisions are arrived at, the more closely we shall come to the necessary information about motives and intentions. The more sure we are about motives and intentions, the more accurately can we characterize the nature of international relationships.

Already, the theoretical inquiry into power and influence in international behavior has led beyond the decision-making focus. The tests for the presence of power and influence—as well as for authority, manipulation, and force—all require behavioral evidence of the successful execution of positive acts. Decision-making is, obviously, the taking of the resolve to commit acts and to succeed. In filling out a theoretical framework, we shall wish to account for transactional phenomena that do not fall into the framework as described above. Two additional categories for observable international transactions can be put in place to accommodate those demands and responses that otherwise do not fit in the picture.

A large amount of activity in international politics appears to have no immediate effect. A may undertake to exert influence over B, but A frequently fails. In addition, A often anticipates that the attempt will fail but makes the effort anyway. Yet, no trace of behavioral effect remains. Further, public announcements are commonly made about the exchange of views between foreign ministers and about conversations being held between heads of states. What fitting characterization will cover the relationships that consist mainly of explorations, efforts to gain up-to-the-minute information on the intentions of other governments, and the influence attempts that fail and are often expected to fail? Such behavior appears to be very common in international politics and deserves, therefore, a category in the scheme of relationship types. It is proposed that evidence of this kind be identified as belonging to the probing relationship. “Probes’ are usually preliminary encounters; they seek out immediate opportunities for dealing with an opponent and they provide fresh information.

Both Singer and Bachrach and Baratz have observed a recurring relationship that closely resembles the trait of influence, but yet does not produce any observable change in the behavior of the party being influenced. Bachrach and Baratz have taken note of the efforts that frequently are made in political situations to keep potentially dangerous issues in the background and to avoid confrontations and controversies. The main purpose of such action usually is to avert the development of situations that call for decisions. Hence, the authors refer to a process of *non*decision-making. Singer speaks about the action that may characterize a relationship in the situation where B is already behaving as A wishes but A acts "to insure the continuation of such behavior."[15] There is some resemblance here, of course, between Morgenthau's policy of the status quo and Singer's influence form that he calls perpetuation or reinforcement. It seems appropriate to gather together all the transactions that keep situations in a nondecision state, meant to preserve the status quo and creating the effect of perpetuation and reinforcement, and to group them under the heading of the *maintenance relationship*. As we have already emphasized in the treatment of the theory of systems, the maintenance of a system is an important function.

We arrive, at this point, at the inquiry into ways and means of modifying the global concept of power in its classical form, at seven types of international political behavior—power, authority, influence, manipulation, force, probing, and maintenance. As we view these types in the theoretical perspective of the international system, we should expect a long succession of its transacts to exhibit combinations and mixtures of these behaviors, some of which would be recurrent enough to be regarded as patterns. Theory passes on to research the problem of identifying and interpreting the patterns.

It would be of only limited value to have well-developed theory and research on the mixture of behavioral types in the flows of political transactions among nations without the development of explanations of the process by which national systems introduce behaviors into the stream. On what basis is it ever decided to make an influence attempt, to impose a force situation, or to act to strengthen a maintenance relationship? It will be recalled that the question of similar type in the realist formulation is answered by the concept of the pursuit of the national interest through the arts of diplomacy. Under the theory of the international system, J. David Singer has approached an answer, with special reference to power and

influence relationships, through the building of a model that will now be described.

Singer accounts for the persistent efforts of governments to exert influence in international politics by reference to certain basic characteristics of the international system. He points out that nations are interdependent in the international system, yet the system provides virtually no safeguards to protect the welfare of the interdependent parties—"the scarcest commodity in the international system is security. . . "[16] The anxiety over security combines with a very poor ability to predict the future state of the system and impels governments to make repeated influence attempts. Singer concludes that "the international system itself is the key element in explaining why and how nations attempt to influence the behavior of one another."[17]

Given the pressure to undertake influence attempts, what circumstances will cause a government to make a particular attempt? Singer proposes that three fundamental considerations enter into an influence situation. First is the *perception* of the decision-makers of one government of what another government is presently doing. The second consideration of the decision-makers of one government is what they want the future behavior of the other government to be. The third is the *prediction* of the decision-makers of one government of what the future behavior of the other government is likely to be. These three factors—perceived present behavior, preferred future behavior, and predicted future behavior—when brought together in combination with the relevant facts of the situation, give the decision-makers the essential setting within which they exercise choice. In arriving at a choice of whether or not to make an influence attempt, and, when appropriate, in deciding which particular kind of influence attempt to make, the decisionmakers face the additional problem of anticipating outcomes. It is not simply a matter of estimating the probability of successful action that faces the decision-makers; they must take into account how much they like and dislike various prospects involved in various approaches and outcomes. They face a *decisional calculus* made up of the variables of *utilities* and *disutilities*, on the one hand, and of probabilities of outcomes, on the other hand.

The nightmarish task of deciding what to do in the setting of such complicated factors is followed by the problem of making choices of actions. It will be remembered that Morgenthau found three fundamental policy

choices that can be made—to maintain power, to increase power, and to demonstrate power. Singer shows how policy choices are imbedded in a matrix of possibilities. According to the situation, the influence attempt will be either to persuade or dissuade the party to be influenced. Secondly, it will have to be decided whether to attempt to reinforce or modify the behavior of the other. Then there are four possible modes of action to be employed: to undertake efforts to threaten the other, to hold forth promises to the other, to punish the other, or to reward the other. What line of action will the decision-makers follow and, therefore, what will they contribute to the ongoing stream of transactions of the international system? Singer's answers are theoretical in that they set up problems and questions for research. A study of Singer's table, reproduced on this page, reveals what decision-makers are theoretically predicted to do under different conditions.[18]

Power, Influence, and Other Behavioral Traits in the International System: A Summary

The survey of the ideas of power and influence of this chapter arouses some serious problems. These problems cannot be evaded. It should be entirely apparent from the discussion that a very large investment has been made in the past in the theoretical explanation of international politics in terms of power. A major part of the current understanding of international relations is based squarely on the power concept. In addition, the means of communication between specialists and generalists and between the special culture of political science and international relations and the common culture depend heavily on the employment of power descriptions and explanations. It is almost true that if a prohibition were imposed to eliminate the use of the idea of power, the field would be struck dumb. Although there is, fortunately, no sure way either to start or stop the appeal of an idea, the direction of our discussion has been to raise serious doubts about the integrity of the power concept.

Hypothesized Relevance of Influence Techniques

	Persuasion Situations: A prefers X				Dissuasion Situations: A prefers O			
Preferred future behavior	X	X	X	X	O	O	O	O
Predicted future behavior	X	X	O	O	O	O	X	X
Perceived present behavior	X	O	X	O	O	X	O	X
Reinforce or modify?	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M
Punish?	No	P*	No	Yes	No	P	No	Yes
Reward?	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Threaten?	P	Yes	Yes	Yes	P	Yes	Yes	Yes
Promise?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

* P is probably.

To put the matter most radically, we may conclude that, with rare exceptions, the users of power explanations of international politics have only a misty notion of what they are talking about. Power is an arousing and poetic symbol capable of evoking a wide range of feelings, fears, satisfactions, and discontents in people without contributing, however, to any genuine understanding. Under hardheaded and clear-sighted scrutiny, the concept of power is diminished from a commanding theoretical resource to a very modest abstraction for which an occasional legitimate use can be found in theory and research.

It is a reasonable scholarly demand—not only a scientific requirement—to insist that vagueness and ambiguity be reduced to the lowest possible levels in the terms and concepts employed in serious inquiries. Although precision is not, itself, a proper objective of study, neither is the preservation of avoidable confusion. The issue at hand is merely a theory problem: of two

intellectual policies, which is the one to be preferred? Will we be further ahead to keep the power concept intact in its classical form and with all its uncertain references, ambiguous definitions, and shadowy explanations or to overthrow it by reducing it to minor proportions so that it will be called upon only when it meets the requirements of specified operational indices?

In order to illustrate the severities lurking in the foregoing question, let us investigate only a few of the consequences that follow from the second choice and from an innocent-appearing proposition that was set forth earlier. As we have seen, several writers subscribe to the statement that power can be defined properly only in relational terms and that it is necessary to *not* consider it as a possession, a substance, or a force. Further, the conception of international relations in the frame of reference of a system of transactions makes the relational definition mandatory and results in the rejection of other images of power. It does not seem to be too drastic to impose this restriction on the definition of power, in the interests of clarity.

We talk easily about a powerful individual; in personal experience we find, however, that we arrive at the judgment that a certain man is powerful either because others say he is or because we have discovered in our own dealings with him that he is. Of the two ways of identifying the powerful individual, we are far more certain that he is powerful on the evidence of direct dealings than through hearsay. What the man did and how we responded to what he did provide the data that give a basis of judgment. Thus, power appears in a relationship—in the example, in the relationship between the man and us. Why should we not always accept this kind of test? There is no reason why we should not. Therefore, let us see what happens to the power explanations of international politics if we set aside notions of possession, force, and substance of power. As in interpersonal affairs so also in international politics, the quality of power is recognizable only in the experience with relationships.

Almost everything that was asserted in the first pages of this chapter now must be rejected. Apparently, we are being quite poetic—but not informative—if we say that power can be won and lost, distributed and balanced, and applied and withheld. It is the same if we declare that power directs international events, shapes relations among nations, advances or impedes international transformations, and furnishes the means to control the international system. If we hold firmly to the concept of power as a relational property and continue to reject the possessive and substantive

attributions, what happens to the realist conception of international politics? In particular, what are the consequences for the Morgenthau theory?

International politics could not possibly be the struggle of nations *for* power. How could anyone struggle for a relational property—a quality of a relationship? Morgenthau's statement about the importance of the national interest defined in terms of power takes a most peculiar shape when it is poured into the mold of the Bachrach and Baratz definition of power. It seems to have the following meaning: the national interest is the value placed on exerting influence on another nation and securing compliance by exercising threats or sanctions. If this is the great national aspiration and the only fundamental guide to policy, perhaps we should approve only those Administrations that undertake projects to require the compliance of the Soviet Union by the use of potent threats. When the Soviet Union fails to comply, our regret would be great over the loss of national interest, but we would rejoice when the Soviet Union does comply. All this is, of course, a severe distortion. The realist formulations relating to power distributions and to the balance of power seem to be just as irrelevant. Similarly, the will to power would be something like a drive to get into situations characterized by goal conflicts, demands for compliance, and threat attempts. These effects on meaning are simply aberrations resulting from the use of the language of the rejected images of possession, force, and substance of power. Further illustrations are not needed; the status of the realist formulation is not in doubt. Hewing to the definition of power as a relational property has the consequence of undermining the theoretical underpinnings of the Morgenthau theory. Only the foundations are ruined, however, leaving intact a great many of Morgenthau's shrewd observations on the state of foreign policy, wise comments on the condition of international politics, and realistic insights into the follies and errors of men. Increasing the rigor of the definition of power, and therefore reducing its ambiguities somewhat, have the effect of crippling the realist *theory*. It is quite important to stress, however, that the lack of soundness in theory, discovered in a particular perspective, may have little or nothing to do with the plausibility, value, or wisdom of the observations on affairs made under the guidance of an unsound theory.

Whether or not to throw over the common images of power and the classical conception that extends from Morgenthau far back in the literary tradition of the Western world is an intellectual policy problem that

confronts the reader as well as the specialist in the field. It is not the purpose of the present discussion to dictate an answer, however. In fact, a sufficient basis for an answer may not yet exist. The situation is worse than it has been made out to be here.

From the standpoint of rigorous empirical theory and strict operationalism, the writers whose observations were made to carry the criticism and reformulation of the power concept—the Sprouts, Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Singer—are not sufficiently skeptical and critical. The inadequacies of the new perspective, outlined earlier, are highlighted by the still more searching inquiries of the formalists. Certain social scientists have for some time been concerned with developing the idea of power as a tool for the analysis of the general subject of social choice. They have not been contented with mere verbalization but have insisted on the degree of conceptual clarity that comes only from the delineation of variables, constants, and relationships in mathematical form. These students of formal theory have also invested heavily in the power concept.

In a recent article one of the group, William H. Riker, has undertaken to survey and criticize the work to date in developing formal definitions of power. It is interesting to note that Riker is able to identify five different approaches to the conception of power at the formal mathematical level and to illustrate the contradictory meanings that are involved. Although the details of his inquiry are too remote from the purposes of this survey to require attention, Riker concludes that the ambiguities that remain in the mathematical formulations come from differences of outlook on the nature of causality. The point that this finding emphasizes for present purposes is that the new perspective on power may have undermined the old classical conception but that it is, itself, still on uncertain ground. What, then, should be the responsible conclusion on the value of the power concept?

Riker's comment states the problem and also a partial answer:

> The final question, once the full complication of the ambiguities is revealed, concerns the appropriate scientific attitude toward the conception of power itself. Ought we redefine it in a clear way or ought we banish it altogether? My initial emotion, I confess, is that we ought to banish it. But this suggestion will, I am sure, find little sympathy among my colleagues. Alternatively, I suggest minimally that each definition specify clearly the kind of theory of cause it reflects.[19]

The modest contribution that the power idea can make has been emphasized by James G. March, a social scientist who has spent over a decade in the effort to develop its formal definition and who has remarked: "On the whole, however, power is a disappointing concept. It gives us surprisingly little purchase in reasonable models of complex systems of social choice."[20]

The Sprouts, whose earlier book of readings did much to spread the idea of national power, express a similar disillusionment in saying: "It might help to think more clearly about the relations of states if the word *power* could be stricken from the vocabulary of international politics altogether."[21] Almost everyone seems to agree with the further statement of the Sprouts, however, that it is highly unlikely that the power concept will be cast aside. The evaluation is, at present, that the idea of power is defective, or at best of limited value, but that people will not cease to rely upon it merely because of its defects and limitations. Still, perhaps the one most obvious change is to be found in the fact that the power concept now provides us with questions instead of answers.

It is worthwhile to bear in mind that the recent inquiries that have thrown the integrity of the old concept of power into doubt have not been inspired by any underlying animus against power. The feeling that power is evil or that power corrupts is not a consideration in the latest investigations. Instead, most of the criticisms have come from students whose initial belief was that the power concept is a major tool in the understanding of politics. One result of this positive interest is the likelihood that fresh attempts will be made to restate definitions and to introduce other frames of reference so that the idea will be rehabilitated and the present somewhat pessimistic assessment will be revised.

NOTES

1. William H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (June 1964), p. 341.
2. Kenneth W. Thompson, "American Approaches to International Politics," *Yearbook of World Affairs* (1959), p. 222.
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations; The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 27.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

5. Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, *International Relations; The World Community in Transition*, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), pp. 35–91.
6. F. Clifford German, "A Tentative Evaluation of World Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 4 (March 1960), 138–144.
7. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1962), p. 141.
8. Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 28; Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 6.
9. Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science, 2* (July 1957), 202–203.
10. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
11. J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (June 1963), 420.
12. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (September 1963), 633.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 633.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 638.
15. Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 421.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 422.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 423.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 427.
19. William H. Riker, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
20. James G. March, "The Power of Power," pp. 167–185 following.
21. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

I : On Defining Power

3 : *Of Power*

THOMAS HOBBES

Correspondent to *cause* and *effect*, are POWER and ACT; nay, those and these are the same things; though, for divers considerations, they have divers names. For whensoever any agent has all those accidents which are necessarily requisite for the production of some effect in the patient, then we say that agent has *power* to produce that effect, if it be applied to a patient. But, as I have shown in the precedent chapter, those accidents constitute the efficient cause; and therefore the same accidents, which constitute the efficient cause, constitute also the *power* of the agent. Wherefore the *power of the agent* and the *efficient cause* are the same thing. But they are considered with this difference, that *cause* is so called in respect of the effect already produced, and power in respect of the same effect to be produced hereafter; so that *cause* respects the past, *power* the future time. Also, the *power of the agent* is that which is commonly called *active power.*

In like manner, whensoever any patient has all those accidents which it is requisite it should have, for the production of some effect in it, we say it is in the *power* of that patient to produce that effect, if it be applied to a fitting agent. But those accidents, as is defined in the precedent chapter, constitute the material cause; and therefore the *power of the patient*, commonly called *passive power*, and *material cause*, are the same thing; but with this different consideration, that in cause the past time, and in power the future, is respected. Wherefore the power of the agent and patient together, which may be called entire or *plenary power*, is the same thing with *entire cause;*

for they both consist in the sum or aggregate of all the accidents, as well in the agent as in the patient, which are requisite for the production of the effect. Lastly, as the accident produced is, in respect of the cause, called an effect, so in respect of the power, it is called an *act.*

As therefore the effect is produced in the same instant in which the cause is entire, so also every act that may be produced, is produced in the same instant in which the power is plenary. And as there can be no effect but from a sufficient and necessary cause, so also no act can be produced but by sufficient power, or that power by which it could not but be produced.

And as it is manifest, as I have shown, that the efficient and material causes are severally and by themselves parts only of an entire cause, and cannot produce any effect but by being joined together, so also power, active and passive, are parts only of plenary and entire power; nor, except they be joined, can any act proceed from them; and therefore these powers, as I said in the first article, are but conditional, namely, *the agent has power, if it be applied to a patient; and the patient has power, if it be applied to an agent*; otherwise neither of them have power, nor can the accidents, which are in them severally, be properly called powers; nor any action be said to be possible for the power of the agent alone or of the patient alone.

For that is an impossible act, for the production of which there is no power plenary. For seeing plenary power is that in which all things concur, which are requisite for the production of an act, if the power shall never be plenary, there will always be wanting some of those things, without which the act cannot be produced; wherefore that act shall never be produced; that is, that act is IMPOSSIBLE: and every act, which is not impossible, is POSSIBLE. Every act, therefore, which is possible, shall at some time be produced; for if it shall never be produced, then those things shall never concur which are requisite for the production of it; wherefore that act is *impossible*, by the definition; which is contrary to what was supposed.

A *necessary act* is that, the production whereof it is impossible to hinder; and therefore every act, that shall be produced, shall necessarily be produced; for, that it shall not be produced, is impossible; because, as is already demonstrated, every possible act shall at some time be produced; nay, this proposition, *what shall be, shall be*, is as necessary a proposition as this, *a man is a man.*

But here, perhaps, some man may ask whether those future things, which are commonly called *contingents*, are necessary. I say, therefore, that

generally all contingents have their necessary causes, as is shown in the preceding chapter; but are called contingents in respect of other events, upon which they do not depend; as the rain, which shall be tomorrow, shall be necessary, that is, from necessary causes; but we think and say it happens by chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist now; for men commonly call that *casual* or *contingent*, whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause; and in the same manner they used to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or no, they say it is possible it never was done.

Wherefore, all propositions concerning future things, contingent or not contingent, as this, *it will rain tomorrow*, or this, *tomorrow the sun will rise*, are either necessarily true, or necessarily false; but we call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some, who though they confess this whole proposition, *tomorrow it will either rain, or not rain*, to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it, as, *tomorrow it will rain,* or, *tomorrow it will not rain*, to be either of them true by itself; because they say neither this nor that is true *determinately*. But what is this *determinately true,* but true upon our knowledge, or evidently true? And therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be true or no; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words, with which they endeavor to hide their own ignorance.

I have shown that the efficient cause of all motion and mutation consists in the motion of the agent, or agents; and in the first article of this chapter, that the power of the agent is the same thing with the efficient cause. From whence it may be understood, that all active power consists in motion also; and that power is not a certain accident, which differs from all acts, but is, indeed, an act, namely, motion, which is therefore called power, because another act shall be produced by it afterward. For example, if of three bodies the first put forward the second, and this the third, the motion of the second, in respect of the first which produces it, is the act of the second body; but, in respect of the third, it is the active power of the same second body.

The writers of metaphysics reckon up two other causes besides the *efficient* and *material*, namely, the ESSENCE, which some call the *formal cause*, and the END, or *final cause;* both which are nevertheless efficient

causes. For when it is said the essence of a thing is the cause thereof, *as to be rational is the cause of man*, it is not intelligible; for it is all one, as if it were said, *to be a man is the cause of man;* which is not well said. And yet the knowledge of the *essence* of anything, is the cause of the knowledge of the thing itself; for, if I first know that a thing is *rational*, I know from thence, that the same is *man;* but this is no other than an efficient cause. A *final cause* has no place but in such things as have sense and will; and this also I shall prove hereafter to be an efficient cause.

. . . another kind of sense, of which I will say something in this place, namely, the sense of pleasure and pain, proceeding not from the reaction of the heart outwards, but from continual action from the outermost part of the organ towards the heart. For the original of life being in the heart, that motion in the sentient, which is propagated to the heart, must necessarily make some alteration or diversion of vital motion, namely, by quickening or slackening, helping or hindering the same. Now when it helpeth, it is pleasure; and when it hindereth, it is pain, trouble, grief, etc. And as phantasms seem to be without, by reason of the endeavor outwards, so pleasure and pain, by reason of the endeavor of the organ inwards, seem to be within; namely, there where the first cause of the pleasure or pain is; as when the pain proceeds from a wound, we think the pain and the wound are both in the same place.

Now vital motion is the motion of the blood, perpetually circulating (as has been shown from many infallible signs and marks by Doctor Harvey, the first observer of it) in the veins and arteries. Which motion, when it is hindered by some other motion made by the action of sensible objects, may be restored again either by bending or setting straight the parts of the body; which is done when the spirits are carried now into these, now into other nerves, till the pain, as far as is possible, be quite taken away. But if vital motion be helped by motion made by sense, then the parts of the organ will be disposed to guide the spirits in such manner as conduces most to the preservation and augmentation of that motion, by the help of the nerves. And in animal motion this is the very first endeavor, and found even in the embryo; which while it is in the womb, moves its limbs with voluntary motion, for the avoiding of whatsoever troubles it, or for the pursuing of what pleases it. And this first endeavor, when it tends toward such things as are known by experience to be pleasant, is called *appetite*, that is, an approaching; and when it shuns what is troublesome, *aversion*, or flying

from it. And little infants, at the beginning and as soon as they are born, have appetite to very few things, as also they avoid very few, by reason of their want of experience and memory; and therefore they have not so great a variety of animal motion as we see in those that are more grown. For it is not possible, without such knowledge as is derived from sense, that is, without experience and memory, to know what will prove pleasant or hurtful; only there is some place for conjecture from the looks or aspects of things. And hence it is, that though they do not know what may do them good or harm, yet sometimes they approach and sometimes retire from the same thing, as their doubt prompts them. But afterward, by accustoming themselves by little and little, they come to know readily what is to be pursued and what to be avoided; and also to have a ready use of their nerves and other organs, in the pursuing and avoiding of good and bad. Wherefore appetite and aversion are the first endeavors of animal motion.

Consequent to this first endeavor is the impulsion into the nerves and retraction again of animal spirits, of which it is necessary there be some receptacle or place near the original of the nerves; and this motion or endeavor is followed by a swelling and relaxation of the muscles; and lastly, these are followed by contraction and extension of the limbs, which is animal motion.

The considerations of appetites and aversions are divers. For seeing living creatures have sometimes appetite and sometimes aversion to the same thing, as they think it will either be for their good or their hurt; while that vicissitude of appetites and aversions remains in them, they have that series of thoughts which is called *deliberation;* which lasts as long as they have it in their power to obtain that which pleases, or to avoid that which displeases them. Appetite, therefore, and aversion are simply so called as long as they follow not deliberation. But if deliberation has gone before, then the last act of it, if it be appetite, is called *will;* if aversion, *unwillingness*. So that the same thing is called both will and appetite; but the consideration of them, namely, before and after deliberation, is divers. Nor is that which is done within a man while he wills any thing, different from that which is done in other living creatures, while, deliberation having preceded, they have appetite.

Neither is the freedom of willing or not willing greater in man than in other living creatures. For where there is appetite, the entire cause of appetite has preceded; and, consequently, the act of appetite could not

choose but follow, that is, had of necessity followed. And therefore such a liberty as is free from necessity is not to be found in the will either of men or beasts. But if by liberty we understand the faculty or power, not of willing, but of doing what they will, then certainly that liberty is to be allowed to both, and both may equally have it, whensoever it is to be had.

Again, when appetite and aversion do with celerity succeed one another, the whole series made by them has its name sometimes from one, sometimes from the other. For the same deliberation, while it inclines sometimes to one, sometimes to the other, is from appetite called *hope*, and from aversion, *fear*. For where there is no hope, it is not to be called fear, but *hate;* and where no fear, not hope, but *desire*. To conclude, all the passions, called passions of the mind, consist of appetite and aversion, except pure pleasure and pain, which are a certain fruition of good or evil; as anger is aversion from some imminent evil, but such as is joined with appetite of avoiding that evil by force. But because the passions and perturbations of the mind are innumerable, and many of them not to be discerned in any creatures besides men, I will speak of them more at large in that section which concerns *man*. As for those objects, if there be any such, which do not at all stir the mind, we are said to contemn them. . . .

The *power of a man*, to take it universally, is his present means; to obtain some future apparent good; and is either *original* or *instrumental.*

Natural power is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind: as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. *Instrumental* are those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more: as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck. For the nature of power is in this point like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste.

The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural, or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a commonwealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants is power; to have friends is power: for they are strengths united.

Also riches joined with liberality is power because it procures friends and servants; without liberality, not so, because in this case they defend not but

expose men to envy, as a prey.

Reputation of power is power because it draws with it the adherence of those that need protection.

So is reputation of love of a man's country, called popularity, for the same reason.

Also, what quality soever makes a man beloved or feared of many, or the reputation of such quality, is power because it is a means to have the assistance and service of many.

Good success is power because it makes reputation of wisdom or good fortune, which makes men either fear him or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power is increase of power because it gains love.

Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war is power because to prudent men we commit the government of ourselves more willingly than to others.

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths where it has privileges, for in such privileges consists their power.

Eloquence is power because it is seeming prudence.

Form is power because being a promise of good, it recommends men to the favor of women and strangers.

The sciences are small power because not eminent and therefore not acknowledged in any man, nor are at all but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such is in a good measure have attained it.

Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war, because they confer to defense and victory, are power, and though the true mother of them be science, namely the mathematics, yet, because they are brought into the light by the hand of the artificer, they are esteemed, the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother, as his issue.

From *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, William Molesworth, ed. (London, 1839), vol. 1, *De Corpore*, chaps. 10, 25; vol. 3, *Leviathan, Chap*, 10.

4 : *The Concept of Power*

DOROTHY EMMET

"Power" is one of those indispensable words of common speech which has collected into itself a number of different associations. In discussions in political philosophy and the philosophy of religion we constantly find ourselves using the word and its cognates, and in politics there have indeed been attempts to make the concept of power into something of a key concept. I believe that these attempts have suffered from too narrow a grasp of the complexities which it covers, and that some examination of these is therefore called for. I shall mainly be concerned here with uses of the concept in political and social philosophy, giving only a few hints as to possible bearings of the discussion on the philosophy of religion.

Difficulties for instance may arise because while it is said that there are different "kinds of power," attempts are made to bring these all under one definition.

Yet it is not obvious that distinctions in the meaning of the word can be precisely correlated with *kinds of power in* such a way that these can be presented as species of a common genus. This need not be merely a problem in definition; it can be linked with the empirical question whether all we call power may in the end consist in different manifestations of one fundamental drive or source of energy. To answer this would presumably be a problem analogous to that set by talking about the sublimation of sexual energy—can tests be devised to indicate that a drive normally manifested in one form is being transformed into others? I do not know whether, if there

is a fundamental “power drive,” this could be shown to undergo different specific manifestations; but in any case I believe the variety of references covered by the word “power” has a wider range than this. In looking at this range we can try to see respects in which its spread may be a hindrance and others in which it may be a help when attempts are made to use the concept of power in something like a technical sense.

It is sometimes said that Politics (the study, that is to say, not the activity) is “the science of power,” and this sounds tough-minded and sophisticated. Machiavelli is traditionally quoted as the founder of this view, though perhaps Machiavelli might be said to have been providing practical hints in a certain kind of Powermanship rather than anything systematic enough to be called a science of power. Russell, at the beginning of his book called *Power*, puts forward the suggestion that the concept of power should be the key concept of the social sciences, and he does so in a way which makes it sound precise and interesting. He writes:

> In the course of this book I shall be concerned to prove that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics. Like energy, Power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be regarded as subordinate to any other, and there is no one form from which the others are derivative. The attempt to treat one form of power, say wealth, in isolation, can only be partially successful, just as the study of one form of energy will be defective at certain points, unless other forms are taken into account. Wealth may result from military power or from influence over opinion, just as either of these may result from wealth. The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power, not in terms of this or that form of power. . . . Power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from one of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of social science to seek the laws of such transformations.[1]

Let us look for a minute at the analogy Russell draws with energy as a key concept. Energy is definable not as a thing in itself, but in terms of accumulated mechanical work. That is, there must be some quantitatively estimable change in a situation, and according to the kind of change it is,

we can speak of one kind of energy, e.g., kinetic or thermal. The word "power" is of course also used for the utilization of natural energy as when we speak of, e.g., electric or water power, and we speak of "horsepower" as a measure of the rate at which energy can be transformed into useful work. But these usages are not important for our present concern, which is with the sociological and psychological uses of the word. It is from these that Russell says the key concept of the social sciences should be derived. But to make power a technical term in these contexts seems to present greater difficulties than to make energy a technical term in physics. "Energy" is also a word of ordinary language. But because its technical use can be precisely defined and given quantitative applications, associations from its common speech meanings are not likely to get into the way and mislead. Physics is so highly precise a study that anyone who wants to talk about energy in this context must know its technical meaning if he is to talk about it at all. In any case the associations of the word in ordinary speech are close enough to a general idea of a capacity for doing work not to be seriously misleading. In the case of power the problem is more difficult. Can it be given a sufficiently precise meaning to do service as a technical term (here we have a problem of terminology); and if so, can we then so use it as to exclude associations from its much wider range of ordinary speech meanings? (Here we have a problem of acquiring skill in the use of a term.)

How might "power" be defined to serve this purpose? Russell says that he means by it "the production of intended effects" (*op. cit.*, p. 35), and that power can be measured by the number of intended effects achieved. But this is not easily applicable, for, as he immediately goes on to observe, of two men of whom one can achieve a particular group of desires and the other a different group, e.g., "two artists of whom each wishes to paint good pictures and become rich, and of whom one succeeds in painting good pictures and the other in becoming rich, there is no way of estimating which has the more power." This seems to make the quantitative properties of the concept so vague as to be almost valueless. Russell says, however, that they can be roughly estimated in terms of the number of intended effects. A has more power than B if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few. But is it useful to measure power by the *number* of achieved effects unless we also take into consideration the *kind* of effect? A may have wanted to do a lot of little things and have succeeded in doing them all. B, after a life of frustration, may have at last succeeded in one big thing. Are we to say that

A has more power than B? Or will Russell's definition work if we can say that B's one big success, by making more stir in the world, produces a larger number of effects than all A's trivial little successes put together? Not unless we can also say (*a*) that these were *intended* effects, and (*b*) that effects can be divided up and counted as units like ergs (to keep the analogy with energy).

There is yet another difficulty. Power as a key concept of social science, and defined as production of intended effects, would need to be distinguished as a generic term from *domination*, which means achievement of intended effects through coercing other people. Power as domination might more plausibly be given a quantitative significance. We saw the difficulty of counting, measuring, and comparing the purposes different individuals carry out. It might however be more possible to count the number of other persons one given individual or group is able to dominate, letting "each one count for one and no one for more than one." (We should, however, on the definition have to say that no one has power over another if he influences him without intending to do so.) Of course a technical concept need not be quantitative, unless we want to use it as a term of measurement. But there is another difficulty; the particular sense of domination is the commoner ordinary speech meaning of "power" and is therefore likely to get into the forefront of discussion. And this is in fact what Russell is talking about for the rest of his book; he is looking at some of the ways in which some persons or groups exercise pressure on others, and we lose sight of the proposal that the laws of social dynamics should be formulated in terms of transformations of power. We do not altogether lose sight of the general definition of power as the production of intended effects, some of which, like scientific discoveries or the painting of pictures, need not, at any rate directly, have anything to do with domination. But Russell's main interest is in pointing out ways in which some people or some groups try to get others to conform to their wishes either by "naked force," which appeals simply to physical fear, or by molding their opinions by propaganda. And as Russell, very properly, does not approve of either of these, in general power becomes a bad thing, to be "tamed." This raises a difficulty in using it as a key concept, since "power" is one of those emotionally charged words in the use of which we are susceptible to the kind of persuasive (or rather in this case we should perhaps say dissuasive) definition which comes of

carrying over emotional associations from a more familiar into a special meaning.

The greatest difficulty, however, about Russell's proposal seems to me to consist not so much in getting clear whether in each context "power" is being used with the particular implication of domination, as it consists in whether we can in fact say that all laws of social dynamics are laws of the transformations of power. The social sciences are concerned with studying changes arising out of the relations of people with one another and with their environments. Some of these changes arise as by-products of the repercussions of actions on one another, producing tendencies (sometimes desirable, sometimes undesirable) which are unintended effects.[2] Is it not Utopian to think that there might be a social planner's Paradise in which all the effects and crosscurrents of effects of all actions were intended? There may be generalizations which suggest possible explanatory correlations by collecting statistics of a number of individually uncoordinated actions, such as Durkheim's generalization that, the suicide rate varies with the degree of integration of the social group, increasing as this goes above or below a certain level. Again, we may take a very different kind of example of social change. Somewhere about 1930 there came a general move on the part of women to discard stockings in summer. Nobody organized this; the commercial power of trade and fashion and the ritual power of propriety were against it. (I can remember as an undergraduate in the middle 1920s that my colleagues and I were given a collective talk by a senior member on the subject of wearing stockings.) Quite suddenly, round about 1930, these resistances went down, not before any propaganda, but before a quickly spreading move on the part of people who had discovered the comfort and economy of going without stockings in hot weather. And, linked with other trends making for the standardizing of dress between classes and for greater freedom on the part of women, this was not a socially negligible move.

On the whole, therefore, it seems that the power concept will only hold as the key concept of social dynamics if it be made to stand for something quite general, such as "the causal factors in social changes," and then propositions about power as an explanatory concept are likely to be tautologous. Where, however, power as an explanatory concept is made to mean something sufficiently specific not to be tautologous, it is very doubtful whether it is generally applicable. Energy, on the other hand, is a

kind of concept which can be generally applicable in physics, in the sense of standing for precise quantitative transformations within a system.

A different analogy from Russell's energy analogy underlies M. de Jouvenel's discussion in his *Du Pouvoir*.[3] Here Power is "The Minotaur," an egoistic and greedy monster. It is true that by *"Le Pouvoir"* de Jouvenel intends to speak quite concretely of the institutions of Government (*l'ensemble des elements gouvernementaux*); that is to say of the actual behavior of governments or, to be more specific, perhaps we should say of those who exercise government. But though this is his intention, the effect of writing throughout about Power (with a capital P) is to produce a kind of metaphysical novel about "the natural history of Power." Power becomes a being with psychological characteristics, vices, and also some indirectly acquired virtues. It has an "essence" which is egoistic, but if it is to achieve its purposes it has also to acquire a social sense through the need to provide order and security. We must therefore, de Jouvenel says, learn to look at Power "stereoscopically," realizing that it combines these "two natures." A good deal of what de Jouvenel says can be translated into descriptive generalizations about the behavior of people in positions of government. But I think that his manner of writing throughout about *Le Pouvoir* as if it were a great being with an essence and two natures and with psychological characteristics produces too simplified a version of the ways of governments (even when we bear in mind that the word "Power" is being used in the book with this restricted reference; if we took other sides of its meaning into account the simplification would be still more serious, but to do this would not, I think, be fair to M. de Jouvenel's intention).

There are a number of discussions in which politics is presented as a study of relations based on power. I shall only refer briefly to a few, selecting from those like Russell's and de Jouvenel's, from which I have myself learned. There are interesting studies in aspects of the psychology of politics by Lasswell, for instance those collected in his *The Language of Politics* (New York, 1949). These are amplified in his *Power and Personality*.[4] Power is defined as participation in the making of decisions, where a "decision" is a policy involving severe sanctions against those who deviate from it. Politics is defined as "the study of influence and the influential" and also called "the science of power," the "political type" being characterized by intense craving for deference which includes, besides power, respect and affection. This craving is to be explained by

early deprivations of primary satisfactions, so that primary motives are "displaced on public objects rationalized in terms of public interest" (p. 38). Whatever Lasswell's intention, this description of political activity in terms of the psychopathology of personal relationships means that the dyslogistic associations of power as domination are carried over into the general view. Political activity is seen as a means of seeking compensation for infantile deprivations. "It is not too far-fetched to say that everyone is born a politician and most of us outgrow it" (p. 160). When Lasswell comes to talk about democratic education, he hopes that the deprivations leading to cravings for deference will be progressively eliminated, and on this view we should therefore presumably eventually look to a state where there would be no more politics. This might lead to a condition like that epitomized in Saint-Simon's maxim, "The government of men will be replaced by the administration of things." But the maxim might well represent a lower rather than higher view of human dignity, since it assumes a condition where there will be no need of a method of arriving at decisions between independent, so always potentially differing, views on matters of public concern.

Lasswell's conception of politics is given in terms of a speculative model, based largely perhaps on the type of the political boss in a certain kind of society. In *Power and Society*,[5] written in collaboration with Kaplan, the definitions in terms of which this speculative model is constructed are set out in order, with less emphasis on the psychoanalytic hypothesis with which they were formerly connected. A number of propositions are given, to be taken as empirical hypotheses about political behavior and political prudence suggested by the definitions. The exposition shows that it is possible to talk sytematically about a good deal of politics in terms of this model, but I do not think that it can be taken to represent a view of politics in the round. A model cannot of course ever fully give this, but in this case the omissions and deviations from type seem to me to be important. Politics is here shown as an interpersonal struggle for power as a means to further power and to other deference values, but the connection of power with social functions, such as responsibility for providing protection, is not examined. Nor is account taken of the fact that people may find it interesting, or indeed urgent, to try to cope with problems set by events or by social situations.

G. E. C. Catlin in *The Principles of Politics*[6] speaks of politics as concerned with activities of control, and he usefully distinguishes control from domination. Power he defines as "that condition when the will remains able to express itself in such action as tends to the fulfillment of wish" (p. 154), and this he rightly sees need not only be considered as meeting with other people's opposition and overcoming it. Such overcoming of one will by another may be called domination; but political activity as concerned with control also consists in attempts to produce an equilibrium of wills through securing conditions in which interests are likely to run parallel.

This is a vague phrase. Examples of the kind of activity it might mean, taken in this instance particularly from industrial organization, are described in some of the collected papers of the late Mary Parker Follett.[7] She draws a distinction between "power over" and "power with," coercive and coactive power, and frees the latter from the dyslogistic associations of power as domination. Coactive power is described as a capacity to make things happen effectively, in which people can grow in collaboration.

Miss Follett's general remarks on the theoretical side of the problem are all too brief, but they are free from the assumption which seems to underlie a number of such discussions. This is that we should start with a definition of power, connect this with a psychological root, and then go on to consider how power can be controlled, distributed, checked, or balanced. It may be more helpful to start by noticing that the word covers a varied family of meanings. If we want precision, it may best be sought not by bastardizing certain members of the family (saying that they "are not really power"), but by trying to discover their idiosyncracies in relation to the other terms with which they keep company in their several contexts. Different members of the family may have distinctive characteristics which can be brought out by adjectival qualification, and there may be a family likeness which can be indicated in some general phrase such as "capacity to make things happen." But this is a loose verbal description, to be made more precise in specific contexts. It does not imply an empirical hypothesis as to a common "root of power," or any metaphysical conception of an "essence of power."

The belief that there is an "essence of power," we may note in passing, may have theoretical and even practical consequences in politics. Thus, we may be told that "power is in its very essence indivisible."[8] This may lead to the confusions in the theory of Sovereignty by which Sovereignty as *de*

facto supremacy of government over all sides of communal life is identified with Sovereignty in the juristic sense of the constitutional power of a legislative assembly to make laws which no court can declare illegal. The juristic meaning of constitutional Sovereignty has its proper uses in describing the powers of a legislative assembly, or the powers to make treaties and declare war of a sovereign state. But we run into impasses when we connect these with a metaphysical notion of power as in its essence indivisible, and so fail to see that constitutional Sovereignty is quite compatible with a wide and indeed shifting distribution of actual political power throughout the community. A sovereign Parliament may know very well that there are some things it had better not interfere with.

I shall now try to distinguish some of the range of meanings which may be covered by the word "power," giving something like what I. A. Richards calls a "multiple definition."[9] I shall then look at some of the power words in other languages and try to see whether they also pick up different meanings within this range. I shall be almost exclusively concerned with uses where there is some bearing on human actions or psychological conditions, and hardly at all with the physical uses, where we speak of electric power, water power, horsepower, etc. We may note this usage as a first meaning; though by putting it first I should not want to imply any priority, either historical or logical. It is improbable that historically people first thought of power as a physical measure of work, and then transferred the conception to "psychical energies." In fact the evidence from primitive peoples is rather that it was the other way round. And we cannot, as far as I can see, say whether "psychical" energy is a transformation of physical energy. It may be so; but I do not know that there is any way in which we can show that a certain quantity of energy is expended in, e.g., thinking or in emotions, as distinct from their physiological concomitants. It might however become possible to find a satisfactory unified way of talking about "physical" and "psychical" energy, and so bringing them under one concept. But I think we should still have a number of usages of the notion of power which would be difficult to accommodate under the same formula.

I offer a few of these usages in what is not of course meant to be an exhaustive list, but merely a collection of such distinctions as I have noted.[10] If other people will add to them, or refine on them, I shall be very glad.

Type I. Power as causal efficacy shown in—

(a) Observable change in the physical world.
(b) Psychological pressure or manipulation, providing people with motives for choosing *x* rather than *y*.

Type II. Power as creative energy shown in—

(a) Production of, e.g., ideas or discoveries or works of art.
(b) Stimulating productive effort in other people.
(c) Heightening or concentrating vitality, or "will," or morale.

Type III. Power as personal influence due to—

(a) Moral strength of character.
(b) Prestige, either of person or office.
(c) "Charismatic" qualities.

Type IV. Ritual Power, thought of as—

(a) Causal efficacy in magical sense.
(b) Performatory utterances.
(c) Institutionalizing of charismatic power or grace
(d) Expression and canalizing of corporate sentiment.

Type V. Legal Power, illustrated by—

(a) The (legal) capacity of an authority, or the agents of an institution to do something (e.g., admit or exclude persons from membership).
(b) The (legal) capacity of a person to take certain kinds of action, e.g., in defense of his property against other members of society.
(c) The powers of, e.g., the police as a right and obligation to protect members of society.

Now for some brief notes on these headings. I(*a*), observable change in the physical world, has been already considered. Any difficulties it presents

are not, I think, especially relevant to our present concern, except in so far as the fact that there are philosophical puzzles about causal efficacy itself helps to reinforce our belief that the meaning or meanings of the still vaguer notion of power will be no simple matter. In social contexts I(*a*) would include such changes in the physical world as the forcible transfer of people's bodies from one place to another and the destruction or injury of their bodies or property by violent means. I(*b*), power as psychological pressure, is the topic of most discussions on power, when writers have seen that people can be manipulated and dominated by means other than naked force. It is the main theme of Russell's book, and of studies of propaganda such as Lasswell's.

I have called Type II "Power as various kinds of creative energy." What is meant by these is of course a profoundly difficult question, into which we cannot enter here; we can simply note that the word "power" is used in speaking of them. Here power is effectiveness in some form of original activity, so that it is possible to speak of a powerful writer or thinker with reference to his style or the content of what he writes, and without implying that he is seeking to influence and still less to dominate other people. We know that contact with such people or with their work may have the effect of heightening vitality, will power, or morale. I should maintain that the kind of stimulus which comes to a person A from contact with someone B who is a person of creative powers is distinguishable from the attempt on the part of B to direct and control A's actions [Type I(*b*)]. In the kinds of situation I have in mind under Type II, the effect of B's power on A will be to stimulate A to such first hand effort as he is capable of, and this need not take the form of his conforming to A's opinions or practice. I think that anyone who has had the good fortune to come in contact with great teachers will know the difference between these two kinds of power. But I think that it is also true that writers on power are usually so concerned with power of Type I(*b*) that they hardly notice that there is a distinction between the power some people have of stimulating activity in others and raising their morale and the power which consists in molding the opinions and practices of others through various forms of psychological pressure. And of course in some cases the one can fall away into the other; the power to inspire and stimulate can become the power to dominate, as the history of political leaders and of prophets and preachers all too sadly illustrates.

Under Type III, I am calling attention to meanings of power as the ability to influence other people, without this necessarily producing the heightening of energies which I think is produced by the kind of power indicated under Type II. We may speak of power in situations in which one person defers to another because of considerations which are not simply considerations of force. One reason may be that A respects moral strength of character in B and is therefore prepared to accept his direction. Or B may have prestige for reasons other than moral impressiveness. He may have the kind of prestige which may be attached to a position of authority as such, or in traditional forms of society to kinship relations such as that of father or of a matriarchal grandmother. There can be respect attaching to the office or relationship as such which can be a sanction for authority, over and above and even apart from the sanction of force (and by "authority" is generally meant power *plus* some belief that there is a right to exercise it). This is shown in the fact that most governments, and probably all stable ones, depend not only on powers of coercion, but on some kind of principle of legitimacy in virtue of which people think that they ought to be obeyed. By "principles of legitimacy" here I do not mean clearly formulated rules, and still less rules to which subjects give explicit consent, or necessarily any one set of principles (such as Rousseau's) which might be put forward as rational grounds of government. There is a helpful discussion of this in Ferrero's *The Principles of Power*, where he refers to a passage in Talleyrand's *Mémoires* in which Talleyrand, reflecting on the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814, says that governments become legitimate when their existence and mode of action have been accepted over a period of years.[11] Thus in the end the appeal is to prescription and not to abstractions; over a period people come to accept certain ways of exercising power and of determining the succession of those who exercise it. Hereditary monarchy or popular suffrage can thus be principles of legitimacy, but there is no compelling argument secure from criticism behind them. As Ferrero says, "The revolutionary thaumaturgy now in fashion popularized the idea that it is easy to change existing principles of legitimacy and to invent new ones."[12] This is not so; there is the problem of what principles of legitimacy are likely to get accepted at any time. Prescription is not in itself the only explanation; to be acceptable a principle of legitimacy cannot be considered in isolation, but "it must be in harmony with the customs, the culture, the science, the religion, the economic interests of an age."[13] We may comment

in passing that these different elements in the life of society are now so out of gear with one another in most parts of the world that societies are few—and they may be counted happy—where there are principles of legitimacy firmly and generally accepted.

The need to appeal to principles of legitimacy goes to show that political power is not only the power of coercion. The power of coercion is there, of course, but it is only effective when it reinforces the prestige of a general respect for authority. Or so we have believed. It is a moot point whether the power of a government could rest on sheer coercion if it could not command a measure of respect and goodwill from at least a considerable number of its subjects. We used to believe that it could not, and we used to quote Hume, that "Force is always on the side of the governed." The grim efficiency of means of coercion and suppression at the disposal of modern dictatorships shook our faith. It looked as though under such regimes even general civil insurrections were impossible or ineffective apart from external help. But perhaps recent events in East Germany, where a Soviet controlled government has had to make concessions as a result of popular strikes, can go some way to reinforce the old view that if a considerable part of a population is determined to make the power of a government ineffective, it has a fair chance of succeeding. In speaking of power, therefore, even in the context of *Machtpolitik* we must notice that it must be held to include subtler considerations than mere brute force. It must include *Credenda* and *Miranda* which help to maintain the prestige of government.[14]

Hitherto I have been considering the prestige which may attach to persons as holders of office, provided that their unsuitability for office does not put too great a strain on people's powers of respect. There is however another kind of power by which leadership may be accepted, which I have listed under Type III (*c*) as *Charismatic Power*. This is a term used by Max Weber.[15] He distinguishes "charismatic" from the ordinary workaday kinds of patriarchal and "bureaucratic" authority. Under bureaucratic authority one person can only issue orders in virtue of the holding of some office and according to the rules of the office, and others will obey them because of these rules. Weber also distinguishes the charismatic from economic or utilitarian relationships, where one person may accept direction from another because of some advantage he hopes to get out of it. A charismatic leader inspires allegiance because of some personal magnetic quality, and if

he issues rules or instructions, he does so either on his own direct authority or by appeal to some personal revelation of which he is the recipient. Founders of religions, shamans, prophets can be charismatic leaders, but the charismatic quality is not confined to religious contexts. A gifted pirate chief, as Weber remarks, may be a charismatic character. Charismatic leadership must, I think, be distinguished from the kind of stimulus which one person can give another which was noted above under II (*b*). In its finer forms it may well be combined with this, but it is primarily a kind of personal dynamism, which stimulates devoted obedience rather than creative effort in the people who come under its spell. It may be possessed by a Hitler as well as by a saint. Weber also allows for the way in which a certain amount of charismatic quality may permeate other kinds of power relation, for instance the leadership of an army or an expedition. One of the most interesting parts of his discussion, however, is the description of what may happen when the question arises of who is to succeed a charismatic leader, and attempts may be made to institutionalize the charisma through founding a hereditary charismatic family or an apostolic succession. We may note that here Weber speaks not of charismatic personalities, but of "the charisma." From a powerful personal dynamism we now have the idea of power as a mysterious sort of thing which can be handed down through a duly constituted order of succession, or by due procedures.

This leads to the consideration of what may be meant by Ritual Power (our Type IV). "Ritual Power" does not comprise one simple notion. Broadly, we may say that ritual is a stylized activity carried out on specified occasions, and to believe in ritual power is to believe in the efficacy of such activity. But this may be variously conceived. There may be a belief in the causal efficacy of recited formulae and procedures in producing changes in the empirical world where there is no observable chain of events, as there is in technological activity, connecting the recitation or procedure with its putative effect. This is the magical notion of ritual power. This must be distinguished clearly from the performatory character of some ritual acts. "Performatory" is here used in the sense made current by Professor J. L. Austin, who defines a performatory sentence as one which does not *describe* an activity, but is itself the activity. So, to say "I promise" is itself an act of promising. Some ritual utterances are clearly performatory; when a chairman says "I declare the meeting closed," his utterance effects what it signifies and is itself the act of closing the meeting. Certain persons may

thus have ritual powers to pronounce performatory utterances in virtue of a recognized role which they play in the community (such as being chairman of a meeting). All persons may have such power on the occasions when by pronouncing a form of words they effect a change in their legal status or undertake a commitment (as "I take this woman to be my wedded wife"). The fact that performatory utterances are a class of ritual utterances in which the pronouncing of a form of words effects what it signifies, in a rationally defensible way, may have encouraged the survival of the idea that ritual words can be causally efficacious in effecting changes in the physical world in the magical sense, through a failure to distinguish between the performatory and causal kinds of efficacy. I am not for a moment denying that sometimes ritual words and procedures, such for instance as blessings and curses, can act on people's minds and bodies so as to effect changes in them, but in these cases there is presumably a chain of psychosomatic causation which could be in principle observable.

As a recognized form of expression of corporate sentiments, ritual can display another form of power. I have listed this under Type IV (*c*), though here perhaps we should speak of the power of ritual rather than of ritual power. Corporate celebrations can heighten morale and make for the coherence of a community and provide occasions for the reconciliations of conflicts, and this can lessen the extent to which order and discipline depend upon coercive power. We had become suspicious of great occasions of public celebration, and tended to look on them as ways of engineering power in sense I(*b*), the pressure of propaganda designed to mold public opinion. But many of us must have felt about the Coronation this year that, though the element of propaganda may have been there, the celebration rose above it. It gathered up a number of the aspects of the noncoercive kinds of power. There was the *mana* of monarchy, the notion of an ancient office with religious as well as temporal functions (however this be interpreted: I shall try to say something about this later). There was elation in a magnificent spectacle superbly performed. Still more, there was the way in which virtually the whole country seemed for the time being to have turned itself into a vast family party, enjoying itself and sharing the same jokes. There was the note of dedication to service, brought out humbly, gently, firmly in the sincerity of the central figure. And the whole thing was saved from being only a gigantic manifestation of British tribal religion (though it was no doubt partly this, and not I think improperly) by the Christian

emphasis that temporal power must not be a matter for pride, which turns to *hubris*, but is held under recognition of transcendent obligations. The Coronation dramatized the "dignified" as distinct from "efficient" side of government (to use Bagehot's distinction). But in favorable cases a ritual of monarchy can emphasize, and thereby strengthen, the coherence of a community, and so be not without bearing on the "efficient" side.

The power of a ritual of monarchy may become confused with the idea of a ritual power in monarchy, in the sense to which we have already referred in commenting on Weber's discussion of the institutionalizing of "charisma." Thus power words such as "charisma," "grace," and indeed "power" itself, come to be thought of as names for a mystical substance which can be transmitted by certain procedures or through some due form of succession. It is safer to think of such power words as capacity words rather than as "thing" words; as ways of saying that certain people are able to be effective or creative in certain situations, or are able to influence or convey strength or encouragement to others in certain relations. A valuable aspect of Russell's analogy with Energy is that the Energy concept can be operationally defined in terms of different forms of useful and potential work, so that it is not necessary to speak about Energy as a thing in itself. But at the same time there are general formulae about Energy, e.g., $E = me^2$, and I doubt whether it is possible to produce anything like these in the case of power. When therefore the word "power" appears in a context in which it seems to have a technical meaning, we need to watch which part of its range of meanings is being emphasized and which excluded, and not to slide from one to the other. This is the more reason why it is probably a good exercise to learn not to treat the word "power" as a "thing word" which is uniquely referential but to try in each case to see who or what is being thought of as effective and in what way. Thus in uses of the term "Ritual Power" it is necessary to notice whether it is being used to mean (*a*) the right of persons in virtue of a role they play in the community to pronounce performatory sentences; (*b*) the power of ritual to express and reinforce corporate sentiments; or (*c*) the notion of the properties of some nonempirical substance which may be made effective by stylized procedures.

I shall here only call attention to Type V, Legal Power, by pointing out its distinction from coercive power. Legal powers are supported by sanctions of coercive power, but are not themselves coercion. A legal power is not the

granting of *carte Manche* to someone to use as much force as he likes or can in pursuit of some end. It is an undertaking that he will be upheld by the recognized force of the law in asserting certain claims or in performing certain prescribed functions. A power in this sense is thus a socially recognized claim on someone's part to be able to act in a certain way, and its correlative is a "liability."[16] It is not force, still less domination, as witness the phrase *ultra vires*, which signifies that a person will not be upheld if he acts outside his "powers," even if physically he has the force to do so.[17]

It may be asked why I have not included what is called "supernatural" or indeed "spiritual power" in my chart of types of meaning of the word. In some of its uses "spiritual power" seems to me to mean ritual power in sense (c), the magical sense, or miracle, which differs from the magical sense of ritual power in that its occurrence need not necessarily be held to depend on some procedure, but is like it in that there is held to be no empirically observable chain of events leading up to the miraculous occurrence. In other uses "spiritual power" may be a blanket expression for the kinds of power which I have tried to indicate under the various aspects of creative energy (my Type II), and some of the forms of personal impressiveness (my Type III) or for some kinds of ritual power insofar as they are allied to one of these. I believe that religious methods of life and discipline have much to teach about the conditions which encourage and frustrate the kinds of power of Types II and III, and also I believe that sometimes these come in ways not ours to command, so that we want to say "we are not just doing this in our own power." But I do not see how to speak of an exclusively supernatural kind of power, and I have therefore not put this down separately. There may, of course, be a number of other types of power concept which I have omitted. I hope however that those to which I have drawn attention are enough to illustrate some of the ambiguities in which we become involved through too simple a use of a concept with multiple meanings.[18] We can try to bring out some of these meanings by looking at the way the word is used in relation to nature and to different sides of human life, and in using a concept of this kind we may find that we need to be able to combine an imprecise general meaning with precision in the particular submeanings.

As a postscript to this discussion, we may ask whether the fact that other languages besides our own have power words with multiple meanings, and

sometimes in addition a variety of power words, may be evidence that this complexity is a general problem. Among Greek power words *menos* is interesting. Professor E. R. Dodds[19] calls attention to this Homeric word as meaning an access of energy which the gods may communicate to someone, Diomede for instance or Glaucus, and it can also be received by animals, such as Achilles' horses. It may mean the heightening of vital energy which can come in fighting, when it can come "thrusting up pungently into the nostrils." Or it may come as moral courage, as when Athene puts *menos* in Telemachus which makes him able to face the suitors.[20] Of more usual power words in classical languages, *exovsia* and *Imperium* have the connotation of authority; *virtus* and *arete* signify power with the emotional tone of approbation at effectiveness or achievement, whereas *potestas* and *dynamis* are neutral words for capacity, but when in the context of human affairs they acquire an emotional tone, it is usually the disapprobatory tone associated with domination. But *virtus* and *arete* seem to be free from this. Our previous discussion has suggested that for some purposes we need a power word charged with approbatory tone, and it might be that the word "virtue" could be disentangled from its more exclusively moral associations, and, like *virtus* and *arete*, could be used to refer to any kind of effectiveness in performance (moral virtue being a particular kind of effectiveness in the art of living). But this older use of the word "virtue" also has other associations from the range of power concepts. It may refer to mystical or magical properties, as when used of the "virtues" of plants or herbs (though this may also mean their empirically testable healing properties). In the mystical sense it is perhaps parallel to the notion of the "soul" of plants used as medicines, or the "soul" of witchcraft as described by Professor Evans-Pritchard in *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*.[21] This seems to be a concept belonging to our Type IV (*a*), as the notion of a mysterious power which fills the gap between the performance of a rite and the achievement of its putative result. "Virtue" may also be used to fill this gap where empirical connections are lacking—we remember Molière's well-known satire of the *"vertus dormitiva"* of opium. On the other hand "virtue" may also appear at the other end of the scale as a word for inner resources of strength which can be conveyed by one person to another, and it may be in this sense, and not in the magical sense, that it is used when we are told that after healing someone Christ felt that "virtue had gone out of him."

In the Old Testament a number of conceptions, which are variously indicated by words like “Glory,” “Honor,” “Power,” “Might,” are collected together in the Hebrew word *kabhodh. Kabhodh* originally meant “weight” (hence in the Authorized Version of the Bible we get the expression “the weight of glory”). It is that which makes a man considerable, and to the early Hebrews this generally includes wealth and strength. But it also means an inner quality which gives a man distinction and the power to create outward prosperity. The tragedy of Saul lay in the fact that he lost this power and the blessing which went with it, and saw it passing to David. (The story may be partly read in terms of the dynastic problem of the succession to the kingship, and partly it may be read as the personal tragedy of a charismatic character. Saul in his day could be taken to be “among the prophets,” but he lost his inner cunning and fell into dejection.) The man of *kabhodh*, such as the good chief, can maintain a community; he is a giver of counsel and upholder of others, as was Job in the days of his prosperity as the sheik of a small town. But a man may lose this power; or a holy object, such as the Ark of the Convenant which is thought to carry it, may be lost. And then the cry is *“Ichabod”*—”the glory has departed.” In its application to God, *kabhodh* is nearly always associated with the impression of power conveyed through the bright light of fire, through thunderstorms and meteorological phenomena. But it is also connected with the power of moral righteousness.

If we turn to the vexed question of the interpretation of the term *“mana,”* it is important to remember that power words may have a multiple range of meanings. And after all, if we find a good many ambiguities in our own use of the word “power,” why should we expect primitives to use the word *mana* with a single precise meaning? Codrington, who first drew attention to the word among the Melanesians, and gave it currency in anthropology, described it as “a force altogether distinct from physical power which acts in all kinds of ways for good or evil and which it is the greatest advantage to possess or control.... It is a power or influence not physical and in a way supernatural; but it shows itself in physical force or in any kind of power or excellence which a man possesses.”[22] This was taken up in particular by Marett and M. M. Hubert and Mauss, who made it virtually a technical term embodying a hypothesis for the interpretation of primitive religions. Primitive religions, they held, are concerned with the workings of *mana* as a kind of psychic energy which is mysterious, ambivalent as potent for good

or evil, and not clearly either personal or impersonal. This use of the term illustrates something of the difficulty of making power into a technical concept, but it illustrates it in reverse. For in the case of the *mana* concept, the technical use, embodying a theory of primitive religion, has been given wide currency, where as we have very few data as to the usages in ordinary speech by the peoples in whose languages the word or others akin to it occur. Hence instead of ordinary speech associations producing ambiguities in the use of the term as a technical concept, we find a technical meaning given by some anthropologists being read back into the supposed meanings in ordinary speech, as to which the data are scanty. Nevertheless it is worth looking at what is more or less ascertained about these and seeing whether there are indications that *mana* may also be a term of multiple definition, covering some of the same range as our power term. Bishop Williams' *Dictionary of the New Zealand Language* (later edition, 1917) gives it as "authority, control, influence, prestige, power, psychic force." Professor Firth's study of its use among the Tikopia[23] showed that it is there used as what in Rylian language we might call a success or achievement word. Firth's informants would not tell him what *mana* meant as a *Ding an Sich*. They seem to have been natural operationalists, to whom this appeared to be a nonsensical question. "The Tikopia is content with concrete descriptions of the results of activity, and does not pursue the intellectual problem as to the nature of that activity." The kinds of activity to which *mana* was ascribed were generally those bringing prosperity, success, and welfare, especially on the part of chiefs whose duty and responsibility it is to provide these things. There is also the implication that success above the normal in such matters needs an explanation, and so the power of the chief to succeed eminently in carrying out his responsibilities is to be ascribed to the influence of spirits, whether gods or ancestors. H. I. Hogbin compares this usage with the attitude which ascribes "good luck" to the workings of providence.[24] (I recall the translation of *Genesis* 39.2 in Tyndale's version, quoted by Tawney, at the head of Chapter IV of *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, "And the Lorde was with Joseph, and he was a luckie felowe.")

It is possible that this conception of *mana* might be generalized to refer to the efficacy of things that work well, the good hunting spear as well as the good hunter. "A thing has *mana* when it works; it does not have it when it does not work," according to a Fiji islander quoted by Paul Radin.[25] It may also mean the ritual power or prestige power attaching to certain persons

who hold certain offices, such as kings, chiefs, and priests, and be used not only in the pragmatic sense of their delivering the goods for which their society looks to them, but also in the sense that their authority as such is impressive. It may be that the prestige associations and the success associations are closely linked, since winning prestige—what Marett has called "The will to shine"—is a fundamental element in success among primitive (and perhaps not so primitive) peoples. My own suspicion is that almost as many changes might be rung on the word *mana* as on our word "power." It might bear interpretations in all my first four types of meanings of power—causal efficacy, creative energy, impressive influence (such as prestige or charismatic leadership), and ritual power. But we need more evidence from field studies before we can speak with assurance about this; meanwhile, though *mana* may be serviceable as a technical term in the interpretation of primitive religions, it needs to be used with caution.

Thus as we press further into problems of political and religious philosophy, and that combination of the two with which the social anthropology of primitive societies is largely concerned, I believe that we inevitably find ourselves needing to use power words. But when we want to speak of power in any of these contexts with anything like clarity, it is probably well, as I have suggested, to break up the concept by using the words available for its different aspects, or by introducing adjectival qualifications, as best serves, to bring out the particular sense required.[26] Nevertheless an omnibus term such as power may have its advantages when we are thinking about human efforts and relationships. For the complexity in its meaning, if we are aware of this, may serve as a reminder that government and the management of human affairs are not simple things which can be formulated in terms of force or impersonal mechanisms of control, but that a number of subtle considerations of prestige, faith, admiration, personal flair, social function all enter in. And as we try to understand better the symbolic and metaphorical terms in which people try to express these sides of human relationships, we may see further into the problems suggested by the multiple associations of the concept of power.

NOTES

1. *Power*, pp. 10 ff. (London, 1938).

2. Professor Popper has made us aware of the importance of this side of the social sciences.
3. English translation, *Power* (Hutchinson's, 1948).
4. *Power and Personality* (New York, 1948). See also *Politics, Who Gets What, When, How?* reprinted in *The Political Writings of H. D. Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951).
5. *Power and Society*, H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Yale Law School Studies, Vol. II, 1950.
6. Allen and Unwin: London, 1930.
7. *Dynamic Administration* (London Management Publications Trust Ltd., 1934). The book is much better than the title suggests.
8. E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, V, p. 4, quoted by Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. I, note to p. 106.
9. Cf. *Mencius on the Mind*, pp. 90 ff. (London, 1932).
10. The relation of the general heading of each type to its subheadings is not the same in all cases. I hope this may be indicated by the way I have worded each type.
11. Talleyrand, *Mémoires*, Vol. II, pp. 155–162. English translation, Vol. II, pp. 119 ff. Cf. Ferrero, *The Principles of Power*, p. 19 (English translation, New York, 1942).
12. Op cit., p. 290.
13. Op. cit., p. 144.
14. The terms "the Credenda and Miranda of Power" are taken from the all-too-short chapter in C. E. Merriam's book *Political Power* (New York, 1934) where Professor Merriam discusses different ways in which symbols help to maintain faith in and respect for a political system.
15. *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik, Abteilung* III; *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 753 ff. (Tübingen, 1925).
16. Cf. Hohfeld, *Fundamental Juridical Conceptions* (Yale, 1919).
17. J. P. Plamenatz in his contribution to the Symposium "Rights" in the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. XXV (pp. 75 ff.) seems to me not to make this distinction clear. In withdrawing an earlier attempt (in *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation)* to define a right as "a power which a creature ought to possess," he says "When there's nothing to prevent a man doing what he wants, he is said to have the power to do it; but he can be prevented from doing what he has a right

to do. In that case he hasn't the power where he has the right, and his right is therefore not a power. It is possible to talk of a power that a man ought to possess, but that, too, is a clumsy and misleading expression. There are things that men want to do but can't do even when they are not prevented by other people." This is to confuse power of my Type I (*a*) (physical capacity as causally efficacious) with power of my Type V (legal capacity). A man can, for instance, tell a trespasser to leave his property, but he may not assault him in order to remove him.

18. An analogous problem in connection with the interpretation of some concepts in law is considered by Professor Max Gluckman in the chapter called "The Paradox of the 'Uncertainty' of Legal Concepts and the 'Certainty' of Law," in *The Judicial Process among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia* (Manchester University Press: forthcoming). I have been greatly helped by discussing several of the questions in this paper with Professor Gluckman.
19. *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 8 (University of California, 1950).
20. *Odyssey*, I, 89; 320 ff.
21. P. 8; pp. 463 ff. (Oxford, 1937).
22. *The Melanesians*, p. 119.
23. *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 49 (December 1940). I am indebted to Firth's article for the reference to Williams' *Dictionary.*
24. *Mana*, *Oceania*, VI, No. 3.
25. *Primitive Man as Philosopher*, p. 24 (New York, 1927).
26. In *Power and Society* Lasswell and Kaplan give an interesting attempt at a detailed specification of power terminology in relation to their use of power as a key concept. But, as I have suggested, their treatment tends to reduce all forms of power other than naked force to manifestations of my Type I (*b*) (psychological pressure or manipulation). While personal influence (Type III) is recognized, this is assimilated to Type I(*b*).

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III : On Studying Power

5 : *Of Elementary Political Powers*

JEREMY BENTHAM

The Constitutional Code is principally employed in conferring powers on particular classes of society, or on individuals, and in prescribing their duties.

Powers are constituted by exceptions to imperative laws. Let me explain myself.

Every complete law is in its own nature *coercive* or *discoercive*. The coercive law demands, or prohibits: it creates an offense or, in other terms, it converts an act into an offense: “Thou shalt not kill”—“Thou shalt not steal.” The discoercive law creates an exception: it takes away the offense; it authorizes a certain person to do a thing contrary to the first law: “The judge shall cause such an individual to be put to death”—“The collector of taxes shall exact such a sum.”

Duties are created by imperative laws addressed to those who possess powers: “The judge shall impose a certain punishment, according to certain prescribed forms.”

The Constitutional Code will include an explanatory part, serving to indicate those events by which certain individuals are invested with certain powers: succession, nomination, presentation, concession, institution, election, purchase of place, etc., etc.; and the events by which such individuals are divested of such powers: dismission, amotion, deposition, abdication, dereliction, resignation, etc.

To analyze, to enumerate all the possible political powers, is a metaphysical labor of the highest difficulty, but of the greatest importance. In general, these rights, these powers, will not much differ from domestic rights and powers. If they were placed in a single hand, they would only differ in extent; that is to say, in the multitude of persons and things over which they would be exercised. But their importance has ordinarily led to their being divided among many hands, in such manner that for the exercise of a single kind of power, the concurrence of many wills is required.

Hitherto the political powers of one government have been, with regard to the political powers of another government, objects which have had no common measure. There has been no correspondency. There are only local names for expressing them: sometimes the names themselves differ—sometimes the same names are expressive of objects altogether different. There is no court guide which would serve for every court—there is no universal political grammar.

The titles of offices are mixtures, dissimilar aggregates, which cannot be compared together because no one has ever tried to decompose them—because no one has ever known their primordial elements. These elements, if anyone shall ever discover them, will be the hitherto unknown key of every given political system and the common measure of all actual and possible systems. But how shall I frame a uniform plan for the distribution of the political powers in any state? From what language shall I borrow the vocabulary of offices? If I employ the French, it will only serve to express the distribution of powers in the French government. What relation is there between the consuls of France and the consuls of Rome, or the consuls of commerce? Between the king of England, the king of Sweden, the king of Prussia? Between the emperor of Germany and the emperor of Russia—between the ancient French peer and duke—the English duke and peer—the grand-duke of Russia and the grand-duke of Tuscany—between the mayor of Bordeaux and the mayor of London? Etc., etc. A volume would not suffice to point out all these disproportions.

Such is the first difficulty. It has been the torment of those who have had to give an account of a foreign constitution. It is almost impossible to employ any denomination to which the readers shall not attach ideas different from those which it is intended to convey.

This confusion will cease if it be possible to employ a new nomenclature which shall not be composed of official names but which shall express the

elementary political powers exercised by those different offices.

Two methods may be employed for this decomposition: (1) By considering the end toward which they are directed: end of interior or exterior security, end of security against crimes, or against calamities, etc.; (2) By considering the different methods by which these ends may be attained: the method of operating may have for its object persons or things. This method of analyzing political powers presents the following results:

1. *Immediate power over persons*. This is what is exercised over the passive faculties: it is the power of doing with one's own hand acts whose effects terminate upon the person of another, whether upon his body or his mind. It is the power of doing acts which would be offenses against the person on the part of an individual who was not authorized. Directed to a certain end, it is the power of punishing; directed toward another end, it is the power of restraining and constraining. This power is the foundation of all others.

2. *Immediate power over the property of others*. This is the power of making use for the public of things the principal property in which belongs to individuals. For example, the power of a minister of justice to break open the house of a person not accused, that he may seek for an accused person there; the power of a public courier, in case of need, to make use of the horse of an individual.

3. *Immediate power over public things*. That is, of those which have only government for their proprietor.

4. *Power of command over persons, taken individually*. This operates upon the active qualities. It has commonly for its foundation immediate power over the person, without which he who commands would not be sure of finding motives for making himself obeyed. In the beginning of political societies, these two powers must have been united in the same hands, as they still are in domestic society. The habit of obedience being once established, we have almost lost sight of the dependence in which the more elevated power is found, in respect of that from which it springs. The first is only exercised by kings and their ministers; they have left the second to a baser sort of men. Ulysses chastised with his own hand the petulant Thersites. Peter I was also the executor of his own decrees: he proudly struck off with his imperial hands the head of the wretch whom he had condemned. The office of the executioner does not degrade the emperors of Morocco, and their dexterity in these punishments is one of the pomps of their crown.

In civilized states, the nobler power depends no less upon the ignoble power than in barbarous countries, but the disposition to obedience being once established, everything operates without our thinking of the constraint which is its first foundation.

5. *Power of command over persons taken collectively*. A state must be very small in which individuals could be governed one by one: this can only take place in a family. A company of soldiers can only be maneuvered when a head is given to the whole together. It is in the power of making men act by *class* that the strength of government consists.

6. *Power of specification*. I thus denominate the power of determining of what individuals particular classes shall be composed, over whom command may be exercised. This very extensive power is only, in respect to persons, the power of investment or divestment with regard to a certain class—class of nobles, class of judges, class of military, class of sailors, class of citizens, class of foreigners, class of offenders, class of allies, class of enemies.

The power of specification subdivides itself into two principal branches: specification of persons and specification of things.

Power *over persons* subdivides itself into the power of *locating* in a class and the power of *dislocating*.

Power *over things* consists in setting them apart for a certain use and making it a crime to employ them for any other.

To specify *a time*, *a day* as set apart for a religious festival, on which it is unlawful to work.

To specify *a place* as consecrated; for example, a church, an asylum.[1]

To specify *a metal* as the legal coin of the country.

To specify *a dress* as appropriated to a certain condition, etc. The right of specification over things embraces the totality of things.

It ought to be remembered that each of these powers may be indefinitely subdivided, according to the number of hands in which it is placed and the number of wills which may be required for its legitimate exercise. Hence the right of initiation or right of proposing; right of negation or right of rejecting. The copossessors may form only a single body, or many separate bodies. The concurrence of many bodies may be necessary to the validity of an act of command, as well as the concurrence of many individuals in a single body.

All these powers may be possessed in a chief, or in a rank more or less subordinate.

The subordination of a political power to another is established: (1) by the cassability of its acts or their liability to be abrogated; (2) by its subjection to the orders it receives.

7. *Attractive power*. I thus call the power of rewarding or not rewarding "power of influence," which is partly remuneratory and partly penal. Influence is one source of motives. In government, it is constituted: (1) By the power of locating in regard to desirable offices—Reward. (2) By the power of dislocating in regard to desirable offices—Punishment. (3) By the power of locating in regard to undesirable offices—Punishment. (4) By the power of *dis*locating in regard to undesirable offices—Reward.

There are three other sources of influence less direct: (1) Free employment of wealth. (2) The power of rendering or not rendering all sorts of free services. (3) Influence founded upon the reputation of wisdom.

The attractive power which is exercised by means of reward is more dangerous than the coercive power because it is liable to be more arbitrary. Every rich man possesses a portion of it in consequence of his wealth, without possessing any political power by name. It is only in a small number of cases that it has been possible to subject the exercise of this power to fixed rules. The laws against bribery and corruption are examples, and every one knows how difficult it is to execute the laws against the purchase of suffrages at an election, or against the venality of persons in official stations. Success is most easily attained by indirect rather than direct means: by rendering the offense difficult of commission; by diminishing temptation; by taking away the means of its concealment; by the cultivation of sentiments of honor; etc.

Recapitulation: Analysis of Abstract Elementary Political Powers

1. Immediate power over persons.
2. Immediate power over the things of another.
3. Immediate power over public things.
4. Power of command over persons taken individually.
5. Power of command over persons taken collectively, or over classes.
6. Power of specification or classification—
    (a) With regard to persons.

(b) With regard to things.
(c) With regard to places.
(d) With regard to times.

7. Attractive power. Power of granting or not granting rewards.

The foregoing enumeration of political powers presents a new nomenclature which requires justification and can only be justified by showing that the divisions most generally adopted at present leave all these powers in a state of confusion and disorder.

By some, these elementary powers are divided into two classes: (1) *legislative power;* (2) *executive power*. Others add to these a third class—*power of imposing taxes*; others again add a fourth class—*judicial power*.

When one of these plans has been adopted, it has been chosen without much regard to their differences; everything has been then considered as sufficiently defined, and reasons have then been sought out to support it. I shall endeavor to show how vague and obscure these terms are.

By each one of them, sometimes one thing and sometimes another is understood. Of each power no one knows to which class to refer it—no two persons entertain the same ideas as to what is called *legislative* or *executive* power.

Between the condition of a science and the condition of its nomenclature there is a natural connection. With the best arranged nomenclature, we may still reason badly; but with a badly arranged nomenclature, it is not possible to reason correctly.

Legislative Power. Everybody agrees to understand by this the power of commanding. Little scruple is made of employing this expression when this power is only exercised over classes, especially when the extent of these classes is considerable.

This title is more willingly yielded to a power whose orders are capable of perpetual duration than to a power whose orders are in their own nature perishable. It is agreed to consider that the exercise of this power is free from the restrains which characterize judicial power. Sometimes it is supposed that it is exercised in chief; sometimes the same word is employed to express cases in which it has only a subordinate exercise. We are much inclined to call that legislative power which is exercised by a political body; “executive power,” that which is exercised by a single individual.

Judicial Power. Among the authors who have considered this power as distinct from legislative power, I have not found one who has appeared to understand the difference.

The orders of the legislator bear at the same time upon a numerous class of citizens. But do not those of the judge the same? Does he not judge communities, provinces?

Those of the legislator are capable of perpetual duration; those of the judge are the same also.

Those of the judge bear upon individuals; but among the acts which emanate from the power called legislative, are there none which do the same?

Before a judge can issue his orders as a judge, a concurrence of circumstances is requisite, which is not requisite for legalizing the acts of the legislature:

1. It is necessary that an interested party should come and require the judge to issue the order in question. Here there is an individual to whom belongs the initiative, the right of putting into activity the judicial power.[2]

2. It is necessary that the parties to whom the orders of the judge may prove prejudicial should have the power of opposing them. Here there are other individuals who have a species of negative power—power of stopping the acts of the judicial power.

3. It is necessary that it should have proof produced of some particular fact upon which the complaint is founded and that the adverse party be permitted to furnish proof to the contrary. Here, then, is the person accused whose concurrence is required.

4. Where there is a written law, it is necessary that the order of the judge should be conformable to what such law prescribes: order to the effect of punishing, if it respects a penal case; order to the effect of investing the party with a certain right, or of divesting him, if it respects a civil case.[3]

Executive Power. At least twelve branches of this power may be distinguished:

1. Subordinate power of legislation over particular districts, over certain classes of citizens—even over all, when it refers to a particular function of government. The smaller the district, the shorter the duration of the order, the more inconsiderable the object, the more one is led to subtract this power from the *legislative* species in order to carry it to what is called the *executive*. When the supreme power does not oppose these subordinate

rules, it is the same as if it adopted them: these particular orders are, so to speak, in execution of its general will. But whatever it is, it is the power of command.

2. Power granted to classes of men, to a fraternity, to a corporation; powers of legislation, the power of making bylaws: it is still the power of command. To say “I will maintain the laws made by a certain body” is the same as making them oneself.

3. Power of granting privileges to individuals, titles of honor, etc. It is the power of specification *in individuos*.

4. Power of pardoning. If it be exercised after inquiry into the facts, it is a negation of the judicial power; if it be exercised arbitrarily, it is the legislative power. Power of command exercised in opposition to judicial orders.

5. Power of locating or dislocating subordinate officers. It is a branch of the power of specification.

6. Power of coining money, of legalizing it, of fixing its value—specification *in res.*

7. Military power. That of enrollment and disbanding is a branch of the power of specification *in personas*. That of employing is a branch of the power of command. The circumstance which has caused it to be considered as a separate power is the use for which it is established.

8. Fiscal power. This power in itself does not differ from that possessed by the cashier of an individual with regard to the money which is entrusted to him. It is constituted a public power in consideration of the source from which the money is derived and the end for which it is designed.

9. Power of administration over the magazines, munitions of war, and other public things. This is the same as the management of a house: the object alone makes it a political power.

10. Power of police, specification, command. We may observe that for the exercise of military power, the power of police, and even of management, a certain quantity of immediate power is requisite, both with regard to the persons and the goods of the citizens in general. In order to make use of any power whatever, it is necessary that the superior officer should possess immediate power over his inferiors, either by being able to dislocate them or by some other means.

11. Power of declaring war and making peace. This is a branch of the power of specification. To declare war is to transfer a class of foreign

friends into the class of foreign enemies.

12. Power of making treaties with foreign powers. The obligation of treaties extends to the mass of the citizens: the magistrate who makes a treaty exercises therefore a power of legislation; when he promises to another sovereign that his subjects shall not navigate a certain part of the sea, he prohibits his subjects from navigating there. It is thus that *conventions* between nations become *internal* laws.[4]

I do not know to what length this subdivision of the executive power may be carried: the relation which each individual branch bears to each of the others is altogether undetermined. They are always supposed to have determinate limits, but these limits have never been assigned to them.

The term *executive power* presents only one clear idea: it is that of one power subordinate to another, which is designated by the correlative appellation of *legislative power.*

Need we then be astonished that there is so much opposition among political writers, when all their works have been composed of terms so vague, so ill-defined, and to which each has attached the ideas to which he was accustomed!

It is not necessary absolutely to exclude these terms adopted into the vocabulary of all the nations of Europe, but it was necessary to show how far they were from representing the true elements of political powers.

The new analysis which has been attempted has many weak points: it is a subject nearly the whole of which remains to be created. The work has been begun, but it will require much labor and patience to finish it.

NOTES

1. When any such power exists without limits (that, for example, of specifying places as sanctuaries), nothing more is required for destroying the effect of all laws sanctioned by any considerably afflictive punishment.

   The clergy in England once endeavored to obtain possession of the landed property in England by “converting it into burying grounds, until the legislature put a stop to the progress of such metamorphosis.
2. This first condition may be wanting in those cases in which the judge acts in virtue of his office; for example, when he causes the arrest of an individual who has behaved improperly in court.

3. This fourth condition would be wanting when there is no written law—when custom is conjectured and followed. In new cases there is no custom to follow—and all cases were at first new.
4. Those who have ranked this power among the attributes of the executive power have not observed that it was purely a power of command, a power of legislation.

From *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, John Bowring, ed. (London, 1843), vol. 3, *A View of a General Code of Laws*, chaps. 20, 21.

6 : *Two Paces of Power*

PETER BACHRACH AND MORTON S. BARATZ

The concept of power remains elusive despite the recent and prolific outpourings of case studies on community power.[1] Its elusiveness is dramatically demonstrated by the regularity of disagreement as to the locus of community power between the sociologists and the political scientists. Sociologically oriented researchers have consistently found that power is highly centralized, while scholars trained in political science have just as regularly concluded that in "their" communities power is widely diffused.[2] Presumably, this explains why the latter group styles itself "pluralist," its counterpart "elitist."

There seems no room for doubt that the sharply divergent findings of the two groups are the product, not of sheer coincidence, but of fundamental differences in both their underlying assumptions and research methodology. The political scientists have contended that these differences in findings can be explained by the faulty approach and presuppositions of the sociologists. We contend in this paper that the pluralists themselves have not grasped the whole truth of the matter; that while their criticisms of the elitists are sound, they, like the elitists, utilize an approach and assumptions which predetermine their conclusions. Our argument is cast within the frame of our central thesis: that there are two faces of power, neither of which the sociologists see and only one of which the political scientists see.

I

Against the elitist approach to power several criticisms may be, and have been, leveled.[3] One has to do with its basic premise that in every human institution there is an ordered system of power, a "power structure" which is an integral part and the mirror image of the organization's stratification. This postulate the pluralists emphatically—and, to our mind, correctly—reject, on the ground that

> nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community. . . . If anything, there seems to be an unspoken notion among pluralist researchers that at bottom *nobody* dominates in a town, so that their first question is not likely to be, "Who runs this community?" but rather, "Does anyone at all run this community?" The first query is somewhat like, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" in that virtually any response short of total unwillingness to answer will supply the researchers with a "power elite" along the lines presupposed by the stratification theory.[4]

Equally objectionable to the pluralists—and to us—is the sociologists' hypothesis that the power structure tends to be stable over time.

> Pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent. ... To presume that the set of coalitions which exists in the community at any given time is a timelessly stable aspect of social structure is to introduce systematic inaccuracies into one's description of social reality.[5]

A third criticism of the elitist model is that it wrongly equates reputed with actual power:

> If a man's major life work is banking, the pluralist presumes he will spend his time at the bank, and not in manipulating community decisions. This presumption holds until the banker's activities and participations indicate otherwise. ... If we presume that the banker is "really" engaged in running the community, there is practically no way

> of disconfirming this notion, even if it is totally erroneous. On the other hand, it is easy to spot the banker who really *does* run community affairs when we presume he does not, because his activities will make this fact apparent.[6]

This is not an exhaustive bill of particulars; there are flaws other than these in the sociological model and methodology[7]—including some which the pluralists themselves have not noticed. But to go into this would not materially serve our current purposes. Suffice it simply to observe that whatever the merits of their own approach to power, the pluralists have effectively exposed the main weaknesses of the elitist model.

As the foregoing quotations make clear, the pluralists concentrate their attention, not upon the sources of power, but its exercise. Power to them means "participation in decision-making"[8] and can be analyzed only after "careful examination of a series of concrete decisions."[9] As a result, the pluralist researcher is uninterested in the reputedly powerful. His concerns instead are to (a) select for study a number of "key" as opposed to "routine" political decisions, (b) identify the people who took an active part in the decision-making process, (c) obtain a full account of their actual behavior while the policy conflict was being resolved, and (d) determine and analyze the specific outcome of the conflict.

The advantages of this approach, relative to the elitist alternative, need no further exposition. The same may not be said, however, about its defects—two of which seem to us to be of fundamental importance. One is that the model takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues. The other is that the model provides no *objective* criteria for distinguishing between "important" and "unimportant" issues arising in the political arena.

II

There is no gainsaying that an analysis grounded entirely upon what is specific and visible to the outside observer is more "scientific" than one based upon pure speculation. To put it another way,

> If we can get our social life stated in terms of activity, and of nothing else, we have not indeed succeeded in measuring it, but we have at least reached a foundation upon which a coherent system of measurements can be built up. . . . We shall cease to be blocked by the intervention of unmeasurable elements, which claim to be themselves the real causes of all that is happening, and which by their spook-like arbitrariness make impossible any progress toward dependable knowledge.[10]

The question is, however, how can one be certain in any given situation that the "unmeasurable elements" are inconsequential, are not of decisive importance? Cast in slightly different terms, can a sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that power is totally embodied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing directly upon their making?

We think not. Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.[11]

Situations of this kind are common. Consider, for example, the case—surely not unfamiliar to this audience—of the discontented faculty member in an academic institution headed by a tradition-bound executive. Aggrieved about a long-standing policy around which a strong vested interest has developed, the professor resolves in the privacy of his office to launch an attack upon the policy at the next faculty meeting. But, when the moment of truth is at hand, he sits frozen in silence. Why? Among the many possible reasons, one or more of these could have been of crucial importance: (a) the professor was fearful that his intended action would be interpreted as an expression of his disloyalty to the institution; or (b) he decided that, given the beliefs and attitudes of his colleagues on the faculty, he would almost certainly constitute on this issue a minority of one; or (c) he concluded that, given the nature of the lawmaking process in the institution, his proposed remedies would be pigeonholed permanently. But whatever the case, the central point to be made is the same: to the extent

that a person or group—consciously or unconsciously—creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power. Or, as Professor Schattschneider has so admirably put it:

> All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because *organization is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.[12]

Is such bias not relevant to the study of power? Should not the student be continuously alert to its possible existence in the human institution that he studies, and be ever prepared to examine the forces which brought it into being and sustain it? Can he safely ignore the possibility, for instance, that an individual or group in a community participates more vigorously in supporting the *nondecision-making* process than in participating in actual decisions within the process? Stated differently, can the researcher overlook the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to relative noncontroversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts?[13] To do so is, in our judgment, to overlook the less apparent, but nonetheless extremely important, face of power.

III

In his critique of the "ruling-elite model," Professor Dahl argues that "the hypothesis of the existence of a ruling elite can be strictly tested only if . . . [t]here is a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested."[14] With this assertion we have two complaints. One we have already discussed, viz., in erroneously assuming that power is solely reflected in concrete decisions, Dahl thereby excludes the possibility that in the community in question there is a group capable of preventing contests from arising on issues of importance to it. Beyond that, however, by ignoring the less apparent face of power Dahl and those who accept his pluralist approach are unable adequately to differentiate between a "key" and a "routine" political decision.

Nelson Polsby, for example, proposes that "by pre-selecting as issues for study those which are generally agreed to be significant, pluralist researchers can test stratification theory."[15] He is silent, however, on how the researcher is to determine *what* issues are "generally agreed to be significant," and on how the researcher is to appraise the reliability of the agreement. In fact, Polsby is guilty here of the same fault he himself has found with elitist methodology: by presupposing that in any community there are significant issues in the political arena, he takes for granted the very question which is in doubt. He accepts as issues what are reputed to be issues. As a result, his findings are foreordained. For even if there is no "truly" significant issue in the community under study, there is every likelihood that Polsby (or any like-minded researcher) will find one or some and, after careful study, reach the appropriate pluralistic conclusions.[16]

Dahl's definition of "key political issues" in his essay on the ruling-elite model is open to the same criticism. He states that it is "a necessary although possibly not a sufficient condition that the [key] issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups."[17] In our view, this is an inadequate characterization of a "key political issue," simply because groups can have disagreements in preferences on unimportant as well as on important issues. Elite preferences which border on the indifferent are certainly not significant in determining whether a monolithic or polylithic distribution of power prevails in a given community. Using Dahl's definition of "key political issues," the researcher would have little difficulty in finding such in practically any community; and it would not be surprising then if he ultimately concluded that power in the community was widely diffused.

The distinction between important and unimportant issues, we believe, cannot be made intelligently in the absence of an analysis of the "mobilization of bias" in the community: of the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others. Armed with this knowledge, one could conclude that any challenge to the predominant values or to the established "rules of the game" would constitute an "important" issue; all else, unimportant. To be sure, judgments of this kind cannot be entirely objective. But to avoid making them in a study of power is both to neglect a highly significant aspect of power and thereby to undermine the only sound basis for discriminating between "key" and

“routine” decisions. In effect, we contend, the pluralists have made each of these mistakes, that is to say, they have done just that for which Kaufman and Jones so severely taxed Floyd Hunter: they have begun “their structure at the mezzanine without showing us a lobby or foundation,”[18] i.e., they have begun by studying the issues rather than the values and biases that are built into the political system and that, for the student of power, give real meaning to those issues which do enter the political arena.

IV

There is no better fulcrum for our critique of the pluralist model than Dahl’s recent study of power in New Haven.[19]

At the outset it may be observed that Dahl does not attempt in this work to define his concept, “key political decision.” In asking whether the “Notables” of New Haven are “influential overtly or covertly in the making of government decisions,” he simply states that he will examine “three different ‘issue-areas’ in which important public decisions are made: nominations by the two political parties, urban redevelopment, and public education.” These choices are justified on the grounds that “nominations determine which persons will hold public office. The New Haven redevelopment program measured by its cost—present and potential—is the largest in the country. Public education, aside from its intrinsic importance, is the costliest item in the city’s budget.” Therefore, Dahl concludes, “It is reasonable to expect . . . that the relative influence over public officials wielded by the . . . Notables would be revealed by an examination of their participation in these three areas of activity.”[20]

The difficulty with this latter statement is that it is evident from Dahl’s own account that the Notables are in fact uninterested in two of the three “key” decisions he has chosen. In regard to the public school issue, for example, Dahl points out that many of the Notables live in the suburbs and that those who do live in New Haven choose in the main to send their children to private schools. “As a consequence,” he writes, “their interest in the public schools is ordinarily rather slight.”[21] Nominations by the two political parties as an important “issue-area” is somewhat analogous to the public schools, in that the apparent lack of interest among the Notables in this issue is partially accounted for by their suburban residence—because of

which they are disqualified from holding public office in New Haven. Indeed, Dahl himself concedes that with respect to both these issues the Notables are largely indifferent: “Business leaders might ignore the public schools or the political parties without any sharp awareness that their indifference would hurt their pocketbooks . . .” He goes on, however, to say that

> the prospect of profound changes [as a result of the urban-redevelopment program] in ownership, physical layout, and usage of property in the downtown area and the effects of these changes on the commercial and industrial prosperity of New Haven were all related in an obvious way to the daily concerns of businessmen.[22]

Thus, if one believes—as Professor Dahl did when he wrote his critique of the ruling-elite model—that an issue, to be considered as important, “should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups,”[23] then clearly he has now for all practical purposes written off public education and party nominations as key “issue-areas.” But this point aside, it appears somewhat dubious at best that “the relative influence over public officials wielded by the Social Notables” can be revealed by an examination of their nonparticipation in areas in which they were not interested.

Furthermore, we would not rule out the possibility that even on those issues to which they appear indifferent, the Notables may have a significant degree of *indirect* influence. We would suggest, for example, that although they send their children to private schools, the Notables do recognize that public school expenditures have a direct bearing upon their own tax liabilities. This being so, and given their strong representation on the New Haven Board of Finance,[24] the expectation must be that it is in their direct interest to play an active role in fiscal policymaking, in the establishment of the educational budget in particular. But as to this, Dahl is silent; he inquires not at all into either the decisions made by the Board of Finance with respect to education nor into their impact upon the public schools.[25] Let it be understood clearly that in making these points we are not attempting to refute Dahl’s contention that the Notables lack power in New Haven. What we *are* saying, however, is that this conclusion is not adequately supported by his analysis of the “issue-areas” of public education and party nominations.

The same may not be said of redevelopment. This issue is by any reasonable standard important for purposes of determining whether New Haven is ruled by "the hidden hand of an economic elite."[26] For the Economic Notables have taken an active interest in the program and, beyond that, the socioeconomic implications of it are not necessarily in harmony with the basic interests and values of businesses and businessmen.

In an effort to assure that the redevelopment program would be acceptable to what he dubbed "the biggest muscles" in New Haven, Mayor Lee created the Citizens Action Commission (CAC) and appointed to it primarily representatives of the economic elite. It was given the function of overseeing the work of the mayor and other officials involved in redevelopment, and, as well, the responsibility for organizing and encouraging citizens' participation in the program through an extensive committee system.

In order to weigh the relative influence of the mayor, other key officials, and the members of the CAC, Dahl reconstructs "all the *important* decisions on redevelopment and renewal between 1950–58 . . . [to] determine which individuals most often initiated the proposals that were finally adopted or most often successfully vetoed the proposals of the others."[27] The results of this test indicate that the mayor and his development administrator were by far the most influential, and that the "muscles" on the Commission, excepting in a few trivial instances, "never directly initiated, opposed, vetoed, or altered any proposal brought before them. . . ."[28]

This finding is, in our view, unreliable, not so much because Dahl was compelled to make a subjective selection of what constituted *important* decisions within what he felt to be an *important*"issue-area" as because the finding was based upon an excessively narrow test of influence. To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation. How, that is to say, can a judgment be made as to the relative influence of Mayor Lee and the CAC without knowing (through prior study of the political and social views of all concerned) the proposals that Lee did *not* make because he anticipated that they would provoke strenuous opposition and, perhaps, sanctions on the part of the CAC?[29]

In sum, since he does not recognize *both* faces of power, Dahl is in no position to evaluate the relative influence or power of the initiator and

decision-maker, on the one hand, and of those persons, on the other, who may have been indirectly instrumental in preventing potentially dangerous issues from being raised.[30] As a result, he unduly emphasizes the importance of initiating, deciding, and vetoing, and in the process casts the pluralist conclusions of his study into serious doubt.

V

We have contended in this paper that a fresh approach to the study of power is called for, an approach based upon a recognition of the two faces of power. Under this approach the researcher would begin—not as does the sociologist who asks, "Who rules?" or as does the pluralist who asks, "Does anyone have power?"—but by investigating the particular "mobilization of bias" in the institution under scrutiny. Then, having analyzed the dominant values, the myths and the established political procedures and rules of the game, he would make a careful inquiry into which persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handicapped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of *nondecision-making;* that is, he would examine the extent to which and the manner in which the *status quo* oriented persons and groups influence those community values and those political institutions (as, e.g., the unanimity "rule" of New York City's Board of Estimate[31]) which tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to "safe" issues. Finally, using his knowledge of the restrictive face of power as a foundation for analysis and as a standard for distinguishing between "key" and "routine" political decisions, the researcher would, after the manner of the pluralists, analyze participation in decision-making of concrete issues.

We reject in advance as unimpressive the possible criticism that this approach to the study of power is likely to prove fruitless because it goes beyond an investigation of what is objectively measurable. In reacting against the subjective aspects of the sociological model of power, the pluralists have, we believe, made the mistake of discarding "unmeasurable elements" as unreal. It is ironical that, by so doing, they have exposed themselves to the same fundamental criticism they have so forcefully leveled against the elitists: their approach to and assumptions about power predetermine their findings and conclusions. .

NOTES

1. This paper is an outgrowth of a seminar in Problems of Power in Contemporary Society, conducted jointly by the authors for graduate students and undergraduate majors in political science and economics.
2. Compare, for example, the sociological studies of Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, 1953); Roland Pellegrini and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (March 1956), 413–419; and Robert O. Schulze, "Economic Dominants and Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (February 1958), 3–9; with political science studies of Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961); and Norton E. Long and George Belknap, "A Research Program on Leadership and Decision-Making in Metropolitan Areas" (New York, Governmental Affairs Institute, 1956). See also Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," *Journal of Politics*, *22* (August 1960) 474–484.
3. See especially N. W. Polsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 475 f.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 476.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 478–479.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 480–481.
7. See especially Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June 1958), 463–469; and Lawrence J. R. Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (December 1961), 817–831.
8. This definition originated with Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), p. 75.
9. Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," *loc. cit.*, p. 466.
10. Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908), p. 202, quoted in Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 481 n.
11. As is perhaps self-evident, there are similarities in both faces of power. In each, A participates in decisions and thereby adversely affects B. But there is an important difference between the two: in the one case, A openly participates, in the other, he participates only in the sense

that he works to sustain those values and rules of procedure that help him keep certain issues out of the public domain. True enough, participation of the second kind may at times be overt; that is the case, for instance, in cloture fights in the Congress. But the point is that it need not be. In fact, when the maneuver is most successfully executed, it neither involves nor can be identified with decisions arrived at on specific issues.

12. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), p. 71.
13. Dahl *partially* concedes this point when he observes ("A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Mode4l," pp. 468–469) that "one could argue that even in a society like ours a ruling elite might be so influential over ideas, attitudes, and opinions that a kind of false consensus will exist—not the phony consensus of a terroristic totalitarian dictatorship but the manipulated and superficially self-imposed adherence to the norms and goals of the elite by broad sections of a community. . . . This objection points to the need to be circumspect in interperting the evidence." But that he largely misses our point is clear from the succeeding sentence: "Yet here, too, it seems to me that the hypothesis cannot be satisfactorily confirmed without something equivalent to the test I have proposed," and that is "by an examination of a series of concrete cases where key decisions are made. . . ."
14. *Op. cit.*, p. 466.
15. *Op. cit.*, p. 478.
16. As he points out, the expectations of the pluralist researchers "have seldom been disappointed" (*ibid.*, p. 477).
17. *Op. cit.*, p. 467.
18. Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," *Public Administration Review*, 14 (Summer 1954), 207.
19. Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961).
20. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
23. *Op. cit.*, p. 467.
24. *Who Governs?*, p. 82. Dahl points out that "the main policy thrust of the Economic Notables is to oppose tax increases; this leads them to oppose expenditures for anything more than minimal traditional city

services. In this effort their two most effective weapons ordinarily are the mayor and the Board of Finance. The policies of the Notables are most easily achieved under a strong mayor if his policies coincide with theirs or under a weak mayor if they have the support of the Board of Finance. . . . New Haven mayors have continued to find it expedient to create confidence in their financial policies among businessmen by appointing them to the Board" (pp. 81–82).

25. Dahl does discuss in general terms (pp. 79–84) changes in the level of tax rates and assessments in past years, but not actual decisions of the Board of Finance or their effects on the public school system.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
27. "A rough test of a person's overt or covert influence," Dahl states in the first section of the book, "is the frequency with which he successfully initiates an important policy over the opposition of others, or vetoes policies initiated by others, or initiates a policy where no opposition appears" (*ibid.*, p. 66).
28. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
29. Dahl is, of course, aware of the "law of anticipated reactions." In the case of the mayor's relationship with the CAC, Dahl notes that Lee was "particularly skillful in estimating what the CAC could be expected to support or reject" (p. 137). However, Dahl was not interested in analyzing or appraising to what extent the CAC limited Lee's freedom of action. Because of his restricted concept of power, Dahl did not consider that the CAC might in this respect have exercised power. That the CAC did not initiate or veto actual proposals by the mayor was to Dahl evidence enough that the CAC was virtually powerless; it might as plausibly be evidence that the CAC was (in itself or in what it represented) so powerful that Lee ventured nothing it would find worth quarreling with.
30. The fact that the initiator of decisions also refrains—because he anticipates adverse reactions—from initiating other proposals does not obviously lessen the power of the agent who limited his initiative powers. Dahl missed this point: "It is," he writes, "all the more improbable, then, that a secret cabal of Notables dominates the public life of New Haven through means so clandestine that not one of the fifty prominent citizens interviewed in the course of this study—

citizens who had participated extensively in various decisions—hinted at the existence of such a cabal. . .” (p. 185).

In conceiving of elite domination exclusively in the form of a conscious cabal exercising the power of decision-making and vetoing, he overlooks a more subtle form of domination, one in which those who actually dominate are not conscious of it themsleves, simply because their position of dominance has never seriously been challenged.

31. Sayre and Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 640. For perceptive study of the “mobilization of bias” in a rural American community, see Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton, 1958).

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7 : *American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory*

THEODORE J. Lowi

Case-studies of the policy-making process constitute one of the more important methods of political science analysis. Beginning with Schattschneider, Herring, and others in the 1930s, case-studies have been conducted on a great variety of decisions. They have varied in subject-matter and format, in scope and rigor, but they form a distinguishable body of literature which continues to grow year by year. The most recent addition, a book-length study by Raymond Bauer and his associates, stands with Robert A. Dahl's prize-winning *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961) as the best yet to appear. With its publication a new level of sophistication has been reached. The standards of research its authors have set will indeed be difficult to uphold in the future. *American Business and Public Policy* is an analysis of political relationships within the context of a single, well-defined issue—foreign trade. It is an analysis of business attitudes, strategies, communications, and, through these, business relationships in politics. The analysis makes use of the best behavioral research techniques without losing sight of the rich context of policies, traditions, and institutions. Thus, it does not, in Dahl's words, exchange relevance for rigor; rather it is standing proof that the two—relevance and rigor—are not mutually exclusive goals.

But what do all the case-studies, including *American Business and Public Policy*, add up to? As a result of these case materials, how much farther along the road of political theory are we? What questions have the authors of these studies raised, and what nonobvious hypotheses and generalizations about "who rules and why" would we have lacked without them?[1] Because of what it does, what it implies, and what it does not do, *American Business and Public Policy* provides a proper occasion for asking these questions and for attempting once again to formulate theories that will convert the discrete facts of the case-studies into elements that can be assessed, weighed, and cumulated. But, first, what theories have we now, and how does this significant new study relate to them?

Existing Notions: The Nontheories of Power in America

It was inevitable that some general notions about power and public policy would develop out of the case-study literature. Together, these notions form what is variously called the group theory, the pressure-group, or the pluralist model of the democratic political system (a model recently also applied to non-democratic systems). No theory or approach has ever come closer to defining and unifying the field of political science than pluralism, perhaps because it fitted so nicely both the outlook of revered Federalist No. 10 and the observables of the New Deal. Group theory provided a rationale for the weakness of parties and the electoral process. It provided an appropriate defense for the particular programs pursued by the New Deal and successive Administrations. And, more importantly, it seemed to provide an instant explanation, in more or less generalizable terms, of the politics of each decision. Analysis requires simply an inventory of the group participants and their strategies, usually in chronological form—for, after all, politics is a process. Each group participant is a datum, and power is attributed in terms of inferred patterns of advantage and indulgence in the final decision. The extremists have treated government ("formal institutions") as a *tabula rasa*, with policy as the residue of the "interplay of forces" measurable as a "parallelogram." More sophisticated analysts avoided the government-as-blank-key approach by treating officials as simply other units in the group process, where Congressman and bureaucrat were brokers but with their own interests and resources.

In group theory, all resources are treated as equivalent and interchangeable. And all the varieties of interaction among groups and between groups and officials are also treated as equivalent, to such an extent that only one term is employed for all forms of political interaction: the *coalition*. Coalitions, so the argument goes, form around "shared attitudes" and are extended by expansion of the stakes of the controversy. Two types of strategies comprise the dynamics of the process: internal and external. The first refers to the problem of cohesion in the midst of overlapping memberships; cohesion is a determinant of full use of group resources. The second refers to expansion of the coalition and the strategy of its use. Large coalitions beat small coalitions. System equilibrium (of unquestionably high-priority value to pluralists) is maintained by the requirement of majority-size coalitions, which are extremely difficult to create but which must be created virtually from scratch for each issue. Thus, power is highly decentralized, fluid, and situational. There is no single elite, but a "multi-centered" system in which the centers exist in a conflict-and-bargaining relation to each other.

As an argument that the group must be the major unit of analysis, pluralism excites little controversy. But controversy is unavoidable insofar as the pluralist model implies a theory of power or power distribution. Most importantly, the pluralist model has, until recently, failed to take into account the general economic *and* political structure within which the group process takes place.[2] On this basis, the leading type of critique of the pluralist model is a set of explicit propositions about power structure and elites. The typical answer to pluralism is a straightforward Marxian assumption that there is a one-for-one relation between socioeconomic status and power over public decisions. Perhaps the more sophisticated version is a combination Marx-Weber approach which specifies the particular status bases most closely related to power—i.e., the major "orders" of society (*ständen*) in our day are the military, the industrial, and the political hierarchies.

This is no place to enter into an elaborate critique of either of these approaches or of the pluralist approach itself. Suffice it to say that while the pluralist model has failed to take the abiding, institutional factors sufficiently into account, the "social sratification" and "power elite" schools wrongly assume a simple relation between status and power. Both these latter schools mistake the resources of power for power itself, and escape analytic and empirical problems by the route of definition.[3] There is no denying, however, that the social-stratification or power-elite approaches can explain

certain important outcomes in a more intuitively satisfactory manner than the pluralist model precisely because each emphasizes that, while coalition-forming may be universal, not all coalitions are equivalent. For certain types of issues (without accepting Mills's argument that these are all the "key" issues), it seems clear that decisions are made by high public and private "officials" in virtually a public opinion and interest-group opinion vacuum. One does not have to go all the way with Mills and insist that behind all apparent conflict there is an elite whose members all agree on specific major policy goals as well as long-range aims. But the pluralist is equally unwise who refuses to recognize that "command post" positions in all orders of society are highly legitimate and that the recruitment and grooming of these institutional leaders make possible a reduction in the number of basic conflicts among them, and equally possible (1) many stable and abiding agreements on policy, (2) accommodation to conflict by more formal, hierarchical means ("through channels") than coalition politics, and (3) settlement of conflict by more informal means (i.e., among gentlemen, without debates and votes) that maintain the leaders' legitimacy and stability.

There is still a third approach to power and policy-making, no less important than the others, which has not been self-consciously employed since its creation in 1935 because it was mistakenly taken as a case of pluralism. I refer to E. E. Schattschneider's conclusions in *Politics Pressures and the Tariff* (New York, 1935). Schattschneider observed a multiplicity of groups in a decentralized and bargaining arena, but the nature of relations among participants was not in the strictest sense pluralistic. The pluralist model stresses conflict and conflict resolution through bargaining among groups and coalitions organized around shared interests. The elitists stress conflict *reduction* among formal officeholders in a much more restricted, centralized, and stable arena. What Schattschneider saw was neither, but contained elements of both. His political arena was decentralized and multicentered, but relationships among participants were based upon "mutual noninterference" among uncommon interests. The "power structure" was stabilized toward the "command posts" (in this case, the House Ways and Means Committee), not because the officials were above pressure groups, but because the pattern of access led to supportive relations between pressure groups and officials. What may appear to one observer as evidence of a power elite appears to another as decentralized pluralism (to

such an extent, indeed, that Schattschneider is often credited with an important share in the founding of pluralist political analysis). Schattschneider's masterful case-study actually reveals neither. At one point he concludes: "A policy that is so hospitable and catholic as the protective tariff disorganizes the opposition."[4] In many important cases completely unrelated to the tariff and much more recent than 1930, we can find plenty of evidence to support this third or fourth[5] approach to a "theory" of power and policy-making. But as a general theory Schattschneider's conclusions would be no more satisfactory than any one approach identified earlier.

The main trouble with all these approaches is that they do not generate related propositions that can be tested by research and experience. Moreover, the findings of studies based upon any one of them are not cumulative. Finally, in the absence of logical relations between the "theory" and the propositions, the "theory" becomes self-directing and self-supportive. This is why I have employed the term "theory" only with grave reservations and quotation marks.

The pluralist approach has generated case-study after case-study that "proves" the model with findings directed by the approach itself. Issues are chosen for research because conflict made them public; group influence is found because in public conflict groups participate whether they are influential or not. Group influence can be attributed because groups so often share in the *definition* of the issue and have taken positions that are more or less directly congruent with the outcomes. An indulged group was influential, and a deprived group was uninfluential, but that leaves no room for group *irrelevancy*.

The elitist approach is no less without a means of self-assessment. If power distributions are defined as "inherently hierarchical,"[6] then a case of coalition politics either represents nonexhaustive research or concerns an issue that is not fundamental and so only involves the "middle levels of power."[7] One need not look for theoretical weaknesses in Schattschneider's approach because his interpretation was mistakenly thrown in with the pluralists. This is most unfortunate, because if the differences between Schattschneider's discoveries (especially his insights into a different *type* of coalition) and those of later case writers had been recognized, a more sophisticated kind of ordered pluralism might have resulted. This is coming close to the approach I will presently propose.

The controversies among the approaches to policy analysis, as well as the logical and empirical weaknesses I have identified, have engendered some of the best empirical work to be found in the literature. But since most of this work is based on the local community, only a collateral attack can be mounted from these findings against assumptions and propositions concerning national power. Only similarly careful and systematic studies of national political processes will lead to a balanced and well-founded attack and to a more productive approach to theory. The first step is certainly *American Business and Public Policy*. While the authors do not offer an adequate theoretical alternative to established approaches, their findings, either explicitly or by implication, are worthy of review in any effort to build such a theory.

American Business and Public Policy starts out as a study of "the flow of communications to and within groups involved in the foreign-policy decision-making process" (p. 5). But while this is carried through for every type of participant and phase in the process, the authors are in a position to deal as well with the substance of the communications, perceptions of them by the recipients, and, therefore, with some of the vital aspects of influence. They have looked into the little black box of political relationships among all the influence-seekers which the pluralists say contains the reality of influence and the elitists say doesn't really exist anyhow. What they have found severely tests the assumptions of both schools of thought. Without significant adjustments, the pluralist framework (called by the authors the "pressure-group model") will be able to encompass a great many of their propositions and findings only with extreme difficulty. For example:

1. There is no one-for-one nexus between the policies at stake and interest-group activation (chap. 9). Protectionists were more highly activated than antiprotectionists.

2. The two "sides" of the controversy never met in a face-to-face conflict with a settlement by compromise. In large part, the basis of the protectionist coalition was a series of interests in individual tariff items, in a relation of "uncommon interest" rather than of "tangential interest." The basis of the anti-protectionist position was *general* opposition in line "with the ideology of the times" (pp. 150 ff. and 209). The outcome depended not upon compromise between the two sides in Congress but upon whose *definition of the situation* prevailed. If tariff is an instrument of foreign policy and general regulation for international purposes, the antiprotectionists win; if the

traditional definition of tariff as an aid to 100,000 individual firms prevails, then the protectionists win.[8]

3. Cohesion was found to be *directly* (not inversely) related to overlapping membership (pp. 333 and 338). Most of the well-organized "associations" were so heterogeneous on the tariff question that they took no stand at all (pp. 334–338). Those groups that were at all cohesive maintained their cohesion "by use of multiple group memberships for purposes which might produce conflict within a single given group" (p. 332).[9]

4. Despite the strong saliency of the trade issues to many groups, little in the way of direct attempts to influence policy-makers could be found. Most group activity "involved interaction with people on the same side." "Scholars have assumed that interest groups had clear interests, of which they were aware. A number of the campaigns we have described show clearly that a pressure group's function is frequently to define the interest of its partisans" (p. 398).[10]

5. Massive activity, expenditures, and influence by monolithic interest groups appeared to constitute an image that opposing groups create of each other rather than the reality of pressure practices (Part IV, especially chap. 28).

6. Most Congressmen were found to have their own independent ideologies and interests and tended to read constituency support from their mail rather than to reflect the messages from the outside. Messages from constituents and groups are so numerous and conflicting that Congressmen have a maximum-choice situation. And, groups were found to hold fairly strictly to the rule of contacting only those Congressmen already known to agree with the group's aims. The predominant group role was found by the authors to be as "service bureaus."[11]

7. Congress displayed no capacity for, nor did Congressmen display any desire for, retaining the power of tariff and trade decision-making (especially pp. 35, 37–38, 197, and 455–456).

But for every single problem that the tariff decisions of a decade pose for the pluralist model, they pose several for the elitist or the stratification approaches:

1. There was never, throughout the entire modern history of tariff and foreign trade, any evidence that the top military played a role of any sort. This is true despite the fact that the effectiveness of military aid and military installations abroad was deeply influenced by the economic health of the

recipient countries. The Millsian complex of military-industrial intimacy would make military participation in foreign trade decisions all the more probable.

2. Only a minority of businessmen large and small ever felt themselves aligned with either side of the issue (p. 125). (This finding hangs heavy upon the elitists who argue that the top business leaders care and control, and upon the pluralists who assume that most business leaders are interested and compete.)

3. Of 128 classifiable responses by big business leaders in their sample, the authors report that 56 percent favored freer trade, 3 percent favored raising tariffs, and the remainder favored leaving tariffs "as is" (p. 111). A more conservative estimate of the distribution of attitudes was 3-to-l preference for freer trade (chap. 8). Yet the protectionists won year after year following World War II.

4. Many of the leaders of the largest firms refused to generalize at all and remained actively inactive throughout the decade because their firms were too diversified to have a clear interest. General Electric and DuPont were identified as "typical of large firms" who left their individual division managers to lobby or not as they saw fit (p. 125).

5. Most other industrialists in the top "command posts" probably favored freer trade. The leading liberal trade group, the Committee for a National Trade Policy, was composed of many of the leading lights of the "establishment": Harry Bullis of General Mills, Joseph Spang of Gillette, John McCloy of Chase National, John Coleman of Burroughs, and Charles Taft and George Ball for themsleves and many others. Their leading opposition, the Nation-wide Committee of Agriculture, Industry and Labor on Export-Import Policy was composed of such "middle levels of power" interest-group leaders as representatives of the UMW, National Coal Association, Manufacturing Chemists' Association, and the Window Glass Cutters' League of America (chap. 3). The CNTP and its official parent, the Randall Commission (Inland Steel, etc.), had gone out of existence well before the 1962 Trade Act successes.

6. The final outcome in the Trade Act of 1962 was the direct result of classic President-Congress interplay, involving many of the kinds of compromises that the most vulgar pluralist view of American politics would lead one to expect. Congressmen appeared to be more independent of constituents and groups than the pressure-group model would allow. But, on

the other hand, the degree to which the Executive would be able to use trade as an instrument of international politics was determined in Congress, and it seemed that such a relationship would continue (pp. 73–79).

Elitists might accommodate to the extraordinarily careful analysis and unimpeachable findings of *American Business and Public Policy* by treating the trade issues of the whole postwar period as "middle-level." But this avoids all the interesting questions and begs a few as well. It was the large industrialists and the high members of the political directorate themselves who defined the issue as fundamental, particularly in the late 1950s after the Common Market was seen to be an immediate rather than a future reality. These were the men who kept trade on the agenda for over ten years. Yet there is nothing in the politics of trade decisions to support the notion that power follows directly from selected, established institutional positions in industry or military and public administration.

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter discovered that the pluralist model was of little use to them. It seems equally clear that the elitist model would have been of even less assistance. But this is because neither approach is a model. Each is, if anything, a self-validating standpoint; the pluralist approach suggests what to look for and the elitist model suggests perhaps what not to look for. Since neither is a theory, neither has much bearing on specific cases. At the end of an empirical study, neither approach affords a means for cumulating the data and findings in coherent and logical abstractions with other findings; they merely provide the basis for repeating the assumptions of the beginning. The following example is drawn from one of the very best case studies:

> The realization of national policy in the United States depends upon the formation and maintenance of coalitions (often of a temporary nature) overcoming the separation of powers, overcoming the fragmentation of power within the legislative and executive branches of government, overcoming weak cohesion by joining elements of both parties and many interests, to accomplish a desired objective. There is no small group of men who, if they agree among themselves, can assure favorable decisions on all or most of the important national policies. Power in Congress is fragmented and dispersed. Bits and pieces of influence are scattered (unequally to be sure) among committee chairmen, party leaders, and many others. . . . National policy is approved or rejected by building a

> coalition majority through bargaining and the proposal of objectives appealing to a wide variety of interests. . . .[12]

The comment "This is where we came in" would be appropriate not only for these general remarks in Wildavsky's study, but also for virtually all case-studies and their generalizations since Bentley. In many respects, one can say of both pluralists and elitists what was said of Debussy, and say it here more meaningfully: they opened up a couple of new streets that have turned out to be blind alleys.

Arenas of Power: An Interpretative Scheme for Cases

American Business and Public Policy, despite its richness as a case-study in the politics of foreign trade, suffers the one debilitating handicap of all case-studies, the problem of uniqueness. The case casts serious doubts on the perspectives employed in most case-studies because of the rare comprehensiveness and exhaustiveness of its analysis, which goes far beyond the story book and paste-pot relations among participants usually contained in case-studies. But still, how are we to know the extent to which the patterns the authors discover apply to all cases? How are we to know at least toward what *class* of cases we can generalize? The authors have too little to say about this. The subtitle of the book, "The Politics of Foreign Trade," implies that everything they say obtains only for this class of cases. However, at one point in the book they argue that the case belongs to a much larger class, a class which probably includes all domestic decisions except "some really new and unexpected issue" (p. 461): "So, on the whole, our case seems to us typical of any issue having economic implications for a number of industries and where, through a historical process, institutional alignments and expectations have been established" (pp. 460–461). On the other hand, one cannot be entirely sure how inclusive a category the authors had in mind, for at another point they say: "The more an organization represents the business community as a whole, the more unlikely it is to become committed on such an issue as foreign-trade policy" (p. 339). The qualification ("on such an issue as") would hardly be necessary if they took foreign-trade policy as typical of all on-going policy processes.

Thus, the authors are unusually clear about their research aim, and self-conscious and skillful as to appropriate techniques of research and data manipulation; but they are far less than clear or self-conscious and skillful about defining their case in terms of some general scheme of classification. If their findings are to be judged for their applicability to all of national domestic policy-making, then we are about where we were before the book was published, except for some healthy negative insights as to prevailing "theories." If foreign trade is part of a smaller category of cases, then we would have to know what the class is, how it is distinguished from others, and what attributes are special to that class and what are general to all classes. Rather than dealing with these problems, the authors came out in favor of cashiering the present approaches altogether and of adopting a communications or "transactional" approach.[13] So, despite the fact that Bauer, Pool, and Dexter have managed an outstanding empirical study, the job of "making something of" the findings still remains, as it has remained for some time.

It seems to me that the reason for lack of interesting and nonobvious generalization from cases and other specific empirical studies is clearly that the broad-gauged theories of politics are not related, perhaps are not relatable, to observable cases. In general, American political science seems to be subject to a continuing fission of theory and research, in which the empiricist is not sufficiently mindful of his role as system-builder and the system-builder is not sufficiently mindful (if at all) of the role that theory is supposed to play. What is needed is a basis for cumulating, comparing, and contrasting diverse findings. Such a framework or interpretative scheme would bring the diverse cases and findings into a more consistent relation to each other and would begin to suggest generalizations sufficiently close to the data to be relevant and sufficiently abstract to be subject to more broadly theoretical treatment.

An attempt at such a framework follows. For over two years prior to the publication of *American Business and Public Policy* I had been working on a general interpretative scheme.[14] The hypotheses drawn from the scheme have so far anticipated most of the patterns described in existing case literature, and few of those patterns not anticipated have been found to be inconsistent with a logical extension of the scheme. A review article as the first published use of the scheme for national politics seemed appropriate because Bauer, Pool, and Dexter's case-study is the most elaborate case yet

published, and it appeared long after most of my hypotheses had been developed.[15]

The scheme is based upon the following argument: (1) The types of relationships to be found among people are determined by ther expectations —by what they hope to achieve or get from relating to others. (2) In politics, expectations are determined by governmental outputs or policies. (3) Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship. If power is defined as a share in the making of policy, or authoritative allocations, then the political relationship in question is a power relationship or, over time, a power structure. As Dahl would say, one must ask, "Power for *what?*" One must control for the *scope* of power and look for elites, power structures, and the like within each of the predefined scopes or "issue areas."[16] My analysis moves in this direction, but farther. Issues as such are too ephemeral; it is on the basis of established expectations and a history of earlier government decisions *of the same type* that single issues are fought out. The study of single issues provides a good test of hypotheses about structure, but the hypotheses must be arrived at in some other, independent way.

Obviously, the major analytic problem is that of identifying types of outputs or policies. The approach I have taken is to define policies in terms of their impact or expected impact on the society. When policies are defined this way, there are only a limited number of types; when all is said and done, there are only a limited number of functions that governments can perform. This approach cashiers the "politics of agriculture" and the "politics of education" or, even more narrowly but typically, "the politics of the ARA bill" or "the politics of the 1956 Aid to Education bill," in which the composition and strategy of the participants are fairly well known before the study is begun. But it maintains the pluralist's resistance to the assumption that there is only one power structure for every political system. My approach replaces the descriptive, subject-matter categories of the pluralists with functional categories. There is no need to argue that the classification scheme exhausts all the possibilities even among domestic policies; it is sufficient if most policies and the agencies that implement them can be categorized with little, if any, damage to the nuances.

There are three major categories of public policies in the scheme: distribution, regulation, and redistribution. These types are historically as

well as functionally distinct, distribution being almost the exclusive type of national domestic policy from 1789 until virtually 1890. Agitation for regulatory and re-distributive policies began at about the same time, but regulation had become an established fact before any headway at all was made in redistribution.[17]

These categories are not mere contrivances for purposes of simplification. They are meant to correspond to real phenomena—so much so that the major hypotheses of the scheme follow directly from the categories and their definitions. Thus, *these areas of policy or government activity constitute real arenas of power*. Each arena tends to develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites, and group relations. What remains is to identify these arenas, to formulate hypotheses about the attributes of each, and to test the scheme by how many empirical relationships it can anticipate and explain.

Areas of Policy Defined

1. In the long run, all governmental policies may be considered redistributive, because in the long run some people pay in taxes more than they receive in services. Or, all may be thought regulatory because, in the long run, a governmental decision on the use of resources can only displace a private decision about the same resource or at least reduce private alternatives about the resource. But politics works in the short run, and in the short run certain kinds of government decisions can be made without regard to limited resources. Policies of this kind are called “distributive,” a term first coined for nineteenth-century land policies, but easily extended to include most contemporary public land and resource policies; rivers and harbors (“pork barrel”) programs; defense procurement and R & D; labor, business, and agricultural “clientele” services; and the traditional tariff. Distributive policies are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule. “Patronage” in the fullest meaning of the word can be taken as a synonym for “distributive.” These are policies that are virtually not policies at all but are highly individualized decisions that only by accumulation can be called a policy. They are policies in which the indulged and the deprived, the loser and the recipient, need never come into direct confrontation. Indeed, in many

instances of distributive policy, the deprived cannot as a class be identified, because the most influential among them can be accommodated by further disaggregation of the stakes.

2. Regulatory policies are also specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable of the almost infinite amount of disaggregation typical of distributive polices. Although the laws are stated in general terms ("Arrange the transportation system artistically," "Thou shalt not show favoritism in pricing"), the impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of directly raising costs and/or reducing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals ("Get off the grass!" "Produce kosher if you advertise kosher!"). Regulatory policies are distinguishable from distributive in that in the short run the regulatory decision involves a direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived. Not all applicants for a single television channel or an overseas air route can be propitiated. Enforcement of an unfair labor practice on the part of management weakens management in its dealings with labor. So, while implementation is firm-by-firm and case-by-case, policies cannot be disaggregated to the level of the individual or the single firm (as in distribution), because individual decisions must be made by application of a general rule and therefore become interrelated within the broader standards of law. Decisions cumulate among all individuals affected by the law in roughly the same way. Since the most stable lines of perceived common impact are the basic sectors of the economy, regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along sectoral lines; regulatory policies are usually disaggregable only down to the sector level.[18]

3. Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations among broad categories of private individuals are involved and, hence, individual decisions must be interrelated. But on all other counts there are great differences in the nature of impact. The categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes. They are, crudely speaking, haves and have-nots, bigness and smallness, bourgeoisie and proletariat. The aim involved is not use of property but property itself, not equal treatment but equal possession, not behavior but being. The fact that our income tax is in reality only mildly redistributive does not alter the fact of the aims and the stakes involved in income tax policies. The same goes for our various "welfare state" programs, which are redistributive only for those who entered retirement or unemployment rolls without having contributed at all. The nature of a redistributive issue is not determined by the outcome of a

battle over how redistributive a policy is going to be. Expectations about what it *can* be, what it threatens to be, are determinative.

Arenas of Power

Once one posits the general tendency of these areas of policy or governmental activity to develop characteristic political structures, a number of hypotheses become compelling. And when the various hypotheses are accumulated, the general contours of each of the three arenas began quickly to resemble, respectively, the three "general" theories of political process identified earlier. The arena that develops around distributive policies is best characterized in the terms of Schattschneider's findings. The regulatory arena corresponds to the pluralist school, and the school's general notions are found to be limited pretty much to this one arena. The redistributive arena most closely approximates, with some adaptation, an elitist view of the political process.

1. The distributive arena can be identified in considerable detail from Schattschneider's case-study alone. What he and his pluralist successors did not see was that the traditional structure of tariff politics is also in largest part the structure of politics of all those diverse policies identified earlier as distributive. The arena is "pluralistic" only in the sense that a large number of small, intensely organized interests are operating. In fact, there is even greater multiplicity of participants here than the pressure-group model can account for, because essentially it is a politics of every man for himself. The single person and the single firm are the major activists. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, for instance, are led to question seriously the "pressure-group model" because of the ineffectiveness of virtually all the groups that should have been most active and effective.

Although a generation removed, Schattschneider's conclusions about the politics of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff are almost one-for-one applicable to rivers and harbors and land development policies, tax exemptions, defense procurement, area redevelopment, and government "services." Since there is no real basis for discriminating between those who should and those who should not be protected (indulged), says Schattschneider, Congress seeks political support by "giving a limited protection [indulgence] to all interests strong enough to furnish formidable resistance." Decision-makers become "responsive to considerations of equality, consistency, impartiality,

uniformity, precedent, and moderation, however formal and insubstantial these may be."[19] Furthermore, a "policy that is so hospitable and catholic . . . disorganizes the opposition."[20]

When a billion-dollar issue can be disaggregated into many millions of nickel-dime items and each item can be dealt with without regard to the others, multiplication of interests and of access is inevitable, and so is reduction of conflict. All of this has the greatest of bearing on the relations among participants and, therefore, the "power structure." Indeed, coalitions must be built to pass legislation and "make policy," but what of the nature and basis of the coalitions? In the distributive arena, political relationships approximate what Schattschneider called "mutual non-interference"—"a mutuality under which it is proper for each to seek duties [indulgences] for himself but improper and unfair to oppose duties [indulgences] sought by others."[21] In the area of rivers and harbors, references are made to "pork barrel" and "log-rolling," but these colloquialisms have not been taken sufficiently seriously. A log-rolling coalition is not one forged of conflict, compromise, and tangential interest but, on the contrary, one composed of members who have absolutely nothing in common; and this is possible because the "pork barrel" is a container for unrelated items. This is the typical form of relationship in the distributive arena.

The structure of these log-rolling relationships leads typically, though not always, to Congress, and the structure is relatively stable because all who have access of any sort usually support whoever are the leaders. And there tend to be "elites" of a peculiar sort in the Congressional committees whose jurisdictions include the subject-matter in question. Until recently, for instance, on tariff matters the House Ways and Means Committee was virtually the government. Much the same can be said for Public Works on rivers and harbors.[22] It is a broker leadership, but "policy" is best understood as cooptation rather than conflict and compromise.

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter are astonished to discover trade associations and other groups suffering from lack of funds and support. They see as paradoxical the fact that "protectionism" as a policy could win out time after time even when a majority of businessmen and Congressmen seemed on principle to favor freer trade. (There are instances of this running clear back to the 1890s.) They see as purposive Congress's "giving up" tariff-making because the "power to dole out favors is not worth the price of having to beat off and placate the insistent pleas of petitioners" (p. 37). Astonishment and

the detection of paradox and a "Congressional group mind" are evidences of an insufficiently broad point of view. There are good and theoretically interesting reasons for each of these phenomena. Distributive issues individualize conflict and provide the basis for highly stable coalitions that are virtually irrelevant to the larger policy outcomes; thousands of obscure decisions are merely accumulated into a "policy" of protection or of natural-resources development or of defense subcontracting. And Congress did not "give up" the tariff; as the tariff became a matter of regulation (see below), committee elites lost their power to contain the participants because obscure decisions became interrelated, therefore less obscure, and more controversy became built in and unavoidable.[23]

2. The regulatory arena could hardly be better identified than in the thousands of pages written for the whole polity by the pluralists. But, unfortunately, some translation is necessary to accommodate pluralism to its more limited universe. The regulatory arena appears to be composed of a multiplicity of groups organized around tangential relations or David Truman's "shared attitudes." Within this narrower context of regulatory decisions, one can even go so far as to accept the most extreme pluralist statement that policy tends to be a residue of the interplay of group conflict. This statement can be severely criticized only by use of examples drawn from nonregulatory decisions.

As I argued before, there is no way for regulatory policies to be disaggregated into very large numbers of unrelated items. Because individual regulatory decisions involve direct confrontations of indulged and deprived, the typical political coalition is born of conflict and compromise among tangential interests that usually involve a total sector of the economy. Thus, while the typical basis for coalition in distributive politics is uncommon interests (log-rolling), an entirely different basis is typical in regulatory politics. The pluralist went wrong only in assuming the regulatory type of coalition is *the* coalition.[24]

One of the most significant differences between the pluralists and Bauer, Pool, and Dexter—the treatment of the phenomenon and effects of overlapping membership—becomes consistent and supportive within this scheme. In fact, it helps to clarify the distinctions I am trying to draw here. Truman, for instance, stresses overlapping membership as a source of conflict, the function of overlapping membership as the reduction of cohesion in any given group. In contrast, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter found that

in tariff politics this very overlapping of membership was a condition for cohesion: “Unanimity (or cohesion) is maintained by the use of multiple group memberships for purposes that might produce conflict within a single given group” (p. 332 n.). They observed that overlapping is a form of specialization allowing individual firms, or special constituent groups within larger associations, the freedom to pursue outside the association the goals that are contrary to other associated groups. Meanwhile the cohesion of the larger group is preserved for the goals that all the constituent groups share. The fact appears to be that both positions are correct. Owing to the unrelatedness of issues in distributive politics, the activities of single participants need not be related but rather can be specialized as the situation warrants it. But the relatedness of regulatory issues, at least up to the sector level of the trade association, leads to the containment of all these within the association and, therefore, to the dynamic situation ascribed erroneously by Truman to all intergroup relations in all issues. When all the stakes are contained in one organization, constituents have no alternative but to fight against each other to shape the policies of that organization or actually to abandon it.

What this suggests is that the typical power structure in regulatory politics is far less stable than that in the distributive arena. Since coalitions form around shared interests, the coalitions will shift as the interests change or as conflicts of interest emerge. With such group-based and shifting patterns of conflict built into every regulatory issue, it is in most cases impossible for a Congressional committee, an administrative agency, a peak association governing board, or a social elite to contain all the participants long enough to establish a stable power elite. Policy outcomes seem inevitably to be the residue remaining after all the reductions of demands by all participants have been made in order to extend support to majority size. But a majority-sized coalition of shared interests on one issue could not possibly be entirely appropriate for some other issue. In regulatory decision-making, relationships among group leadership elements and between them on any one or more points of governmental access are too unstable to form a single policymaking elite. As a consequence, decision-making tends to pass from administrative agencies and Congressional committees to Congress, the place where uncertainties in the policy process have always been settled. Congress as an institution is the last resort for breakdowns in bargaining over policy, just as in the case of parties the primary is a last resort for

breakdowns in bargaining over nominations. No one leadership group can contain the conflict by an almost infinite subdivision and distribution of the stakes. In the regulatory political process, Congress and the "balance of power" seem to play the classic role attributed to them by the pluralists, attacked as a theory by C. Wright Mills, and at least seriously questioned by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter.

The most interesting thing about the work of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, from the standpoint of my scheme, is that they studied a policy that was undergoing a transition from distribution to regulation. It is, I feel, for this reason that they find some support for the pressure-group model but not enough to convince them of its utility. But it is this very transition that makes their case-study so interesting. Beginning with reciprocity in the 1930s, the tariff began to lose its capacity for infinite disaggregation because it slowly underwent redefinition, moving away from its purely domestic significance toward that of an instrument of international politics. In brief, the tariff, especially following World War II and our assumption of peacetime international leadership, became a means of regulating the domestic economy for international purposes. The significant feature here is not the international but the regulatory part of the redefinition. As the process of redefinition took place, a number of significant shifts in power relations took place as well, because it was no longer possible to deal with each dutiable item in isolation. Everything in Bauer, Pool, and Dexter points toward the expansion of relationships to the level of the sector. The political problem of the South was the concentration of textile industry there. Coal, oil, and rails came closer and closer to coalition. The final shift came with the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which enabled the President for the first time to deal with broad categories (to the sector) rather than individual commodities.

Certain elements of distributive politics remain, for two obvious reasons. First, there are always efforts on the part of political leaders to disaggregate policies because this is the best way to spread the patronage and to avoid conflict. (Political actors, like economic actors, probably view open competition as a necessary evil or a last resort to be avoided at almost any cost.) Second, until 1962, the basic tariff law and schedules were still contained in the Smoot-Hawley Act. This act was amended by Reciprocal Trade but only to the extent of allowing negotiated reductions rather than reductions based on comparative costs. Until 1962, tariff politics continued

to be based on commodity-by-commodity transactions, and thus until then tariff coalitions could be based upon individual firms (or even branches of large and diversified firms) and log-rolling, unrelated interests. The escape clause and peril point were maintained in the 1950s so that transactions could be made on individual items even within reciprocity. And the coalitions of strange bedfellows continued: "Offered the proper coalition, they both [New England textiles and Eastern railroads] might well have been persuaded that their interest was in the opposite direction" (p. 398).

But despite the persistence of certain distributive features, the true nature of tariff in the 1960s emerges as regulatory policy with a developing regulatory arena. Already we can see some changes in Congress even more clearly than the few already observed in the group structure. Out of a committee (House Ways and Means) elite, we can see the emergence of Congress in a pluralist setting. Even as early as 1954–1955, the compromises eventually ratified by Congress were worked out, not in committee through direct cooptation of interests, but in the Randall Commission, a collection of the major interests in conflict (p. 47). Those issues that could not be thrashed out through the "group process" also could not be thrashed out in committee but had to pass on to Congress and the floor. After 1954 the battle centered on major categories of goods (even to the extent of a textile management-union entente) and the battle took place more or less openly on the floor (e.g., pp. 60, 62, and 67). The weakening of the Ways and Means Committee as the tariff elite is seen in the fact that in 1955 Chairman Cooper was unable to push a closed rule through. The Rules Committee, "in line with tradition," granted a closed rule but the House voted it down 207–178 (p. 63).[25] Bauer, Pool, and Dexter saw this as a victory for protectionism, but it is also evidence of the emerging regulatory arena—arising from the difficulty of containing conflict and policy within the governing committee. The last effort to keep the tariff as a traditional instrument of distributive politics—a motion by Reed to recommit, with instructions to write in a provision that Tariff Commission rulings under the escape clause be final except where the President finds the national security to be involved—was voted down 206–199 (pp. 64–65). After that, right up to 1962, it was clear that tariff decisions would not be made piecemeal. Tariff became a regulatory policy in 1962; all that remains of distributive politics now are quotas and subsidies for producers of specific commodities injured by general tariff reductions.

3. If Bauer, Pool, and Dexter had chosen a line of cases from the redistributive arena for their intensive analysis, most assuredly they would have found themselves in an altogether different universe, proposing different generalizations, expressing different doubts. The same would have been true of Schattschneider and of the pluralist students of regulatory cases. Compared particularly with the regulatory area, very few case-studies of redistributive decisions have ever been published. This in itself is a significant datum—which Mills attributes to the middle-level character of the issues that have gotten attention. But, whatever the reasons, it reduces the opportunities for elaborating upon and testing the scheme. Most of the propositions to follow are illustrated by a single case, the "welfare state" battle of the 1930s. But this case is a complex of many decisions that became one of the most important acts of policy ever achieved in the United States. A brief review of the facts of the case will be helpful.[26] Other cases will be referred to in less detail from time to time.

As the 1934 mid-term elections approached, pressures for a federal social security system began to mount. The Townsend Plan and the Lundeen Bill had become nationally prominent and were gathering widespread support. Both schemes were severely redistributive, giving all citizens access to government-based insurance as a matter of right. In response, the President created in June of 1934 a Committee on Economic Security (CES) composed of top cabinet members with Secretary of Labor Perkins as chairman. In turn, they set up an Advisory Council and a Technical Board, which held hearings, conducted massive studies, and emerged on January 17, 1935, with a bill. The insiders around the CES were representatives of large industries, business associations, unions, and the most interested government bureaucracies. And the detailed legislative histories reveal that virtually all of the debate was contained within the CES and its committees until a mature bill emerged. Since not all of the major issues had been settled in the CES's bill, its members turned to Congress with far from a common front. But the role of Congress was still not what would have been expected. Except for a short fight over committee jurisdiction (won by the more conservative Finance and Ways and Means Committees) the legislative process was extraordinarily quiet, despite the import of the issues. Hearings in both Houses brought forth very few witnesses, and these were primarily CES members supporting the bill, and Treasury Department officials, led by Morgenthau, opposing it with "constructive criticism."

The Congressional battle was quiet because the real struggle was taking place elsewhere, essentially between the Hopkins-Perkins bureaucracies and the Treasury. The changes made in the CES bill had all been proposed by Morgenthau (the most important one being the principle of contribution, which took away the redistributive sting). And the final victory for Treasury and mild redistribution came with the removal of administrative responsibility from both Labor and Hopkins's FERA. Throughout all of this some public expressions of opinion were to be heard from the peak associations, but their efforts were mainly expended in the quieter proceedings in the bureaucracies. The Congress's role seems largely to have been one of ratifying agreements that arose out of the bureaucracies and the class agents represented there. Revisions attributable to Congress concerned such matters as exceptions in coverage, which are part of the distributive game that Congress plays at every opportunity. The *principle* of the Act was set in an interplay involving (quietly) top executives and business and labor leaders.

With only slight changes in the left-right positions of the participants, the same pattern has been observed in income tax decisions.[27] Professor Surrey notes: "The question, "Who speaks for tax equity and tax fairness?' is answered today largely in terms of only the Treasury Department" (p. 1164). "Thus, in tax bouts ... it is the Treasury versus percentage legislation, the Treasury versus capital gains, the Treasury versus this constituent, the Treasury versus that private group. ... As a consequence, the congressman . . . [sees] a dispute . . . only as a contest between a private group and a government department" (pp. 1165–1166). Congress, says Surrey, "occupies the role of mediator between the tax views of the executive and the demands of the pressure groups" (p. 1154). And when the tax issues "are at a major political level, as are tax rates or personal exemptions, then pressure groups, labor organizations, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the others, became concerned" (p. 1166). The "average congressman does not basically believe in the present income tax in the upper brackets" (p. 1150), but rather than touch the principle he deals in "special hardship" and "penalizing" and waits for decisions on principle to come from abroad. Amidst the 1954–1955 tax controversies, for example, Ways and Means members decided to allow each member one bill to be favorably reported if the bill met with unanimous agreement (p. 1157).

Issues that involve[28] redistribution cut closer than any others along class lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms. If there is ever any cohesion within the peak associations, it occurs on redistributive issues, and their rhetoric suggests that they occupy themselves most of the time with these.[29] In a ten-year period just before and after, but not including, the war years, the Manufacturers' Association of Connecticut, for example, expressed itself overwhelmingly more often on redistributive than on any other types of issues.[30] Table 1 summarizes the pattern, showing that expressions on generalized issues involving basic relations between bourgeoisie and proletariat outnumbered expressions on regulation of business practices by 870 to 418, despite the larger number of issues in the latter category.[31] This pattern goes contrary to the one observed by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter in tariff politics, where they discovered, much to their surprise, that self-interest did not activate both "sides" equally. Rather, they found, the concreteness and specificity of protectionist interests activated them much more often and intensely than did the general, ideological position of the liberal-traders (pp. 192–193). This was true in tariff, as they say, because there the "structure of the communications system favored the propagation of particular demands" (p. 191). But there is also a structure of communications favoring generalized and ideological demands; this structure consists of the peak associations (which were seen as ineffective in tariffs—pp. 334, 335–336, 337–338, and 340), and it is highly effective when the issues are generalizable. This is the case consistently for redistributive issues, almost never for distributive issues, and only seldom for regulatory issues.

Table 1 Published Expressions of Manufacturers' Association of Connecticut on Selected Issues

	Number of References in Ten-year Period (1934–1940, 1946–1948)	*Percent of Favorable References*
1. Unspecified regulation	378	7.7
2. Labor relations, general	297	0.0
3. Wages and hours	195	0.5
Total expressions, redistribution	870	
4. Trade practices	119	13.8
5. Robinson-Patman	103	18.4
6. Antitrust	72	26.4
7. Basing points	55	20.0
8. Fair-trade (Miller-Tydings)	69	45.5
Total expressions, regulation	418	

Source: Lane, *Regulation of Businessmen*, pp. 38 ff. The figures are his; their arrangement is mine.

Source: Lane, *Regulation of Businessmen*, pp. 38 ff. The figures are his; their arrangement is mine.

As the pluralists would argue, there will be a vast array of organized interests for any item on the policy agenda. But the relations among the interests and between them and government vary, and the nature of and conditions for this variation are what our political analyses should be concerned with. Let us say, in brief, that on Monday night the big associations meet in agreement and considerable cohesion on “the problem of government,” the income tax, the Welfare State. On Tuesday, facing regulatory issues, the big associations break up into their constituent trade and other specialized groups, each prepared to deal with special problems in its own special ways, usually along subject-matter lines. On Wednesday night still another fission takes place as the pork barrel and the other forms of subsidy and policy patronage come under consideration. The parent groups and “catalytic groups” still exist, but by Wednesday night they have little identity. As Bauer, Pool, and Dexter would say, they have preserved their unanimity through overlapping memberships. They gain identity to the extent that they can define the issues in redistributive terms. And when

interests in issues are more salient in sectoral or geographic or individual terms, the common or generalized factor will be lost in abstractness and diffuseness. This is what happened to the liberal trade groups in the tariff battles of the 1950s, when "the protectionist position was more firmly grounded in direct business considerations and . . . the liberal-trade position fitted better with the ideology of the times . . ." (p. 150).

Where the peak associations, led by elements of Mr. Mills's power elite, have reality, their resources and access are bound to affect power relations. Owing to their stability and the impasse (or equilibrium) in relations among broad classes of the entire society, the political structure of the redistributive arena seems to be highly stabilized, virtually institutionalized. Its stability, unlike that of the distributive arena, derives from shared interests. But in contrast to the regulatory arena, these shared interests are sufficiently stable and clear and consistent to provide the foundation for ideologies. Table 2 summarizes the hypothesized differences in political relationships drawn above.

Many of the other distinctive characteristics of this arena are related to, perhaps follow from, the special role of the peak associations. The cohesion of peak associations means that the special differences among related but competing groups are likely to be settled long before the polices reach the governmental agenda. In many respects the upperclass directors perform the functions in the redistributive arena that are performed by Congressional committees in the distributive arena and by committees and Congress in the regulatory arena. But the differences are crucial. In distributive policies there are as many "sides" as there are tariff items, bridges and dams to be built, parcels of public land to be given away or leased, and so on. And there are probably as many elites as there are Congressional committees and subcommittees which have jurisdiction over distributive policies. In redistribution, there will never be more than two sides and the sides are clear, stable, and consistent. Negotiation is possible, but only for the purpose of strengthening or softening the impact of redistribution. And there is probably one elite for each side. The elites do not correspond directly to bourgeoisie and proletariat; they are better understood under Wallace Sayre's designation of "money-providing" and "service-demanding" groups. Nonetheless, the basis for coalition is broad, and it centers around those individuals most respected and best known for worth and wealth. If the top leaders did not know each other and develop common perspectives as a

result of common schooling, as Mills would argue, these commonalities could easily develop later in life because the kinds of stakes involved in redistributive issues are always the same. So institutionalized does the conflict become that governmental bureaucracies themselves begin to reflect them, as do national party leaders and Administrations. Finally, just as the nature of redistributive policies influences politics toward the centralization and stabilization of conflict, so does it further influence the removal of decision-making from Congress. A decentralized and bargaining Congress can cumulate but it cannot balance, and redistributive policies require complex balancing on a very large scale. What Riker has said of budget-making applies here: "Legislative governments cannot endure a budget. Its finances must be totted up by party leaders in the legislature itself. In a complex fiscal system, however, haphazard legislative judgments cannot bring revenue into even rough alignment with supply. So budgeting is introduced—which transfers financial control to the budget maker. . . ."[32] Congress can provide exceptions to principles and it can implement those principles with elaborate standards of implementation as a condition for the concessions that money-providers will make. But the makers of principles of redistribution seem to be the holders of the "command posts."

Table 2 Arenas and Political Relationships: A Diagrammatic Summary

ARENA	PRIMARY POLITICAL UNIT	RELATION AMONG UNITS	POWER STRUCTURE	STABILITY OF STRUCTURE	PRIMARY DECISIONAL LOCUS	IMPLE-MENTATION
Distribution	Individual, firm, corporation	Log-rolling, mutual noninterference, uncommon interests	Nonconflictual elite with support groups	Stable	Congressional committee and/or agency**	Agency centralized to primary functional unit ("bureau")
*Regulation**	Group	"The coalition," shared subject-matter interest, bargaining	Pluralistic, multicentered, "theory of balance"	Unstable	Congress, in classic role	Agency decentralized from center by "delegation," mixed control
Redistribution	Association	The "peak association," class, ideology	Conflictual elite, i.e., elite and counterelite	Stable	Executive and peak associations	Agency centralized toward top (above "bureau"), elaborate standards

*Given the multiplicity of organized interests in the regulatory arena, there are obviously many cases of successful log-rolling coalitions that resemble the coalitions prevailing in distributive politics. In this respect, the difference between the regulatory and the distributive arenas is thus one of degree. The *predominant* form of coalition in regulatory politics is deemed to be that of common or tangential interest. Although the difference is only one of degree, it is significant because this prevailing type of coalition makes the regulatory arena so much more unstable, unpredictable, and nonelitist ("balance of power"). When we turn to the redistributive arena, however, we find differences of principle in every sense of the word.

**Distributive politics tends to stabilize around an institutional unit. In most cases, it is the Congressional committee (or subcommittee). But in others, particularly in the Department of Agriculture, the focus is the agency or the agency *and* the committee. In the cities, this is the arena where machine domination continues, if machines were in control in the first place.

None of this suggests a power elite such as Mills would have had us believe existed, but it does suggest a type of stable and continual conflict that can only be understood in class terms. The foundation upon which the

social-stratification and power-elite school rested, especially when dealing with national power, was so conceptually weak and empirically unsupported that its critics were led to err in the opposite direction by denying the direct relevance of social and institutional positions and the probability of stable decision-making elites. But the relevance of that approach becomes stronger as the scope of its application is reduced and as the standards for identifying the scope are clarified. But this is equally true of the pluralist school and of those approaches based on a "politics of this-or-that policy."

To date, no study of policy can equal *American Business and Public Policy* in care, rigor, and exhaustiveness. But its very empirical superiority tends to emphasize its theoretical weaknesses. Data of given amount and quality become a richer and richer source as the context of those data is better and better understood. It is just such a context that I have attempted to sketch out here.

NOTES

1. For similar questions and a critique, see Herbert Kaufman, "The Next Step in Case Studies," *Public Administration Review*, 18 (Winter 1958), 52–59.
2. David Truman's rather weak and diffuse "potential interest group" is a doff of the hat in this direction, but this concept is so nondirective and nonobservable as to be disregarded even by its creator.
3. The best critiques and analyses of all the various currents of thought are found in Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven, 1963); Daniel Bell, "The Power Elite—Revisited," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (November 1958), 238–250; Robert A. Dahl, "Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June 1958), 463–469; and Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, 25 (October 1960), 636–644.
4. *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff*, p. 88. The fact that Schattschneider holds his generalizations to the particular policy in question should be noted here as a point central to my later arguments.
5. There are four approaches here if the "social stratification" school is kept separate from the "power elite" school. While both make the same kinds of errors, each leads to different kinds of propositions. In some

hands they are, of course, indistinguishable and, for good reason, Polsby in *Community Power and Political Theory* treats the two as one. Since the distinction, once made, is not important here, I will more or less follow Polsby's lead.

6. Milton Gordon, quoted in Polsby, p. 103.
7. Cf. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), p. 245: "the political analyst is generally on the middle levels of power himself. He knows the top only by gossip; the bottom, if at all, only by 'research.' " Thus, Mills continues, the professor and free-lance intellectual are "at home with the leaders of the middle level, and . . . focus upon the middle levels and their balances because they are closer to them."
8. Thus, with no major decline in the numbers of industries and groups with a self-interest in protection—indeed, with the defection of virtually the entire South from the free-trade cause—liberal trade lost consistently until 1962. But in 1962 it won because tariff had finally lost its traditional definition. Lest it be concluded that the Administration won merely because of its use of traditional logrolling strategies in its textile concessions, note that on the crucial votes in both Houses most of the Democratic protectionist vote was Southern: in the House vote on the Mason motion for recommittal, 37 of the 44 protectionist Democrats were Southern, mainly from the textile and oil states of North and South Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma. Kennedy's strategy probably got him only Georgia's votes. In the Senate, the crucial vote was on the "peril point," with the Southerners splitting 10 to 10. Despite Kennedy's concessions, the defectors included two from Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Virginia and one from North Carolina.
9. I obtain from this and other propositions in the book a conclusion not reached by the authors but strongly supported by their findings: there are probably *several* kinds of coalitions (rather than "a politics of coalition" where all coalitions are equivalent in every way except size and value of resources). Each type of coalition is appropriate for certain types of issues and each has extreme significance for outcomes, perhaps as much as cohesion and access. More on this presently.
10. Again suggesting that a distinct kind of coalition is involved here, the authors say: "Neither the interest of the New England textile manufacturers in supporting oil imports nor that of the Eastern railroads

in opposing these imports were in any way self-evident. Offered the proper coalition, they both might well have been persuaded that their interest was in the opposite direction" (p. 398).

11. Access to and information about Congress and Congressmen was so poor that the liberal CNTP's list of Congressmen's positions was almost a third incorrect for both Houses in the case of those whose positions had been identified at all. Nearly 15 percent of the members of congress were listed as "undecided," and in most cases this meant no contact at all had been made. Many pluralist writers before Bauer, Pool, and Dexter have recognized the "service bureau" role, but rather than reexamine their premises, they usually catalogue this as a "form of influence."
12. Aaron Wildavsky, *Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics* (New Haven, 1962), p. 311.
13. "*Inter alia*, the transactional analysis here employed makes the concept of 'power' and 'pressure' in the ordinary political-science sense of the terms somewhat more difficult to employ; Arthur F. Bentley himself pointed out to one of us in 1936 that he had long since abandoned these notions as not useful for systematic analysis" (p. 460). See also p. 456.
14. The first formulation, developed for urban politics, appears in my study, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor* (New York, 1964), chaps. 6 and 7. The scheme for national politics which is presented in this article is an adaptation of the national "arenas of power" discussed in a book now in preparation.
15. Their study is of further interest because they are dealing with a type of policy which made a transition from one of my "arenas" to another between 1930 and 1962. That the politics of tariff changed accordingly is the best test I have yet found for my scheme. The very differences they find between 1950s patterns and those reported so exceedingly well by Schattschneider—and which are branded by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter as inconsistent with Schattschneider or as due vaguely to the "changing times"—were both consistent with and anticipated by my scheme.
16. Dahl, *Who Governs?*, and Polsby, *Community Power*, esp. chap. 6.
17. Foreign policy, for which no appropriate "-tion" word has been found, is obviously a fourth category. It is not dealt with here for two reasons. First, it overly extends the analysis. Second, and of greater importance,

it is in many ways not part of the same universe, because in foreign policy-making America is only a subsystem. Winston Churchill, among other foreigners, has consistently participated in our foreign policy decisions. Of course, those aspects of foreign and military policy that have direct domestic implications are included in my scheme.

18. A "sector" refers to any set of common or substitutable commodities or services or any other form of established economic interaction. Sectors therefore vary in size because of natural economic forces and because of the different ways they are identified by economists or businessmen. They vary in size also because they are sometimes defined *a priori* by the observer's assessment of what constitutes a common product and at other times are defined *a posteriori* by the trade associations that represent the identification of a sector by economic actors themselves.
19. *Politics, Pressures*, p. 85.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 135–136.
22. The stable, intimate interlocking of Congressional committeemen and their support groups in the Rivers and Harbors, Congress, and the Corps of Engineers has been made famous by Arthur Maass; see *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), and especially "Congress and Water Resources," *American Political Science Review*, 44 (September 1950), 576–592, reprinted in my reader, *Legislative Politics USA* (Boston, 1962). Cited widely as an example of interest-group strategy and access, this case has not until now, as far as I know, been given its proper significance. That significance comes clear within my scheme. The pattern approaches that of the tariff but not of regulatory situations.
23. Schattschneider, in his more recent book *The Semi-sovereign People* (New York, 1960), offers some fascinating propositions about the "scope of conflict" which can easily be subsumed within the scheme offered here.
24. I was surprised and pleased on rereading Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), after completing the first draft of this article, to find that he identified two types of "mutual assistance," alliances and log-rolling (pp. 362–368). In my scheme, as will soon be clear, there are two types of "alliance," tangential interest and ideology. But what is of interest here is that Truman supports his distinction with

examples perfectly congruent with my theory. His case of the alliance is the aggregation of interests around the 1946 Employment Act (redistribution, even if a peculiar "law"). The typical log-rolling situation he identifies with rivers and harbors appropriations (distribution). The difference between us is that my scheme considers these patterns of coalition as revealing fundamental political relations that are limited to certain types of issues, while Truman implies that they are two strategies in an inventory of strategies more or less appropriate to any issue.

25. Sam Rayburn made one of his rare trips from rostrum to floor to support the closed rule and the integrity of Ways and Means: "Only once in the history of the House, in forty-two years in my memory, has a bill *of this kind and character* been considered except under a closed rule . . (p. 64, emphasis added). It was on the following morning that Rayburn expressed his now-famous warning to the frosh: "If you want to get along, go along" (p. 64).
26. The facts and events are taken from Paul H. Douglas, *Social Se curity in the United States* (New York, 1936); Edwin E. Witte, *The Development of the Social Security Act* (Madison, Wis., 1962); Committee on Economic Security, *Report to the President* (Washington, GPO, 1935); and Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York, 1946).
27. Stanley S. Surrey, "The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist: How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted," *Harvard Law Review*, 70 (May 1957), 1145–1182.
28. "Involve" may appear to be a weasel word, but it is used advisedly. As I argued earlier when defining redistribution, it is not the actual outcomes but the expectations as to what the outcomes *can be* that shape the issues and determine their politics. One of the important strategies in any controversial issue is to attempt to define it in redistributive terms in order to broaden the base of opposition or support.
29. In personal conversations, Andrew Biemiller of AFL-CIO has observed that this is true even of his group. He estimates that perhaps from 80 to 90 percent of their formal policy expressions deal with welfare and general rights of collective bargaining and that only occasionally does the central board touch specific regulatory issues.
30. Robert E. Lane, *The Regulation of Businessmen* (New Haven, 1953), 38 ff.

31. Note also in the table the fairly drastic contrast in the proportion of references that expressed approval. Similarly drastic differences are revealed in Lane's figures on the reasons given for expressing disapproval. On those issues I call redistributive, the overwhelmingly most important reason is "coerciveness." In contrast, this reason was given for about 10 percent of general trade regulation and antitrust references, 3 percent of the basing-point negative references, and not once when Miller-Tydings and Robinson-Patman were denounced. For regulatory issues, the reason for disapproval given most frequently was that the policy was confused and that it failed to achieve its purposes. And there were equally high percentages of residual or "other" responses, suggesting a widespread lack of agreement as to the very meaning of the policy.
32. William H. Riker, *Democracy in the United States* (New York, 1953), p. 216.

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8 : *The Power of Power*

JAMES G. MARCH

INTRODUCTION

Power is a major explanatory concept in the study of social choice. It is used in studies of relations among nations, of community decision making, of business behavior, and of small-group discussion. Partly because it conveys simultaneously overtones of the cynicism of *Realpolitik*, the glories of classical mechanics, the realism of elite sociology, and the comforts of anthropocentric theology, *power* provides a prime focus for disputation and exhortation in several social sciences.

Within this galaxy of nuances, I propose to consider a narrowly technical question: To what extent is one specific concept of power useful in the empirical analysis of mechanisms for social choice? The narrowness of the question is threefold. First, only theories that focus on mechanisms of choice are considered. Second, only considerations of utility for the development or testing of empirically verifiable theories are allowed. Third, only one concept of power—or one class of concepts—is treated. The question is technical in the sense that it has primary relevance for the drudgery of constructing a predictive theory; the immediate implications for general theories of society, for the layman confronted with his own complex environment, or for the casual student, are probably meager. They certainly are not developed here.

By a mechanism for social choice, I mean nothing more mysterious than a committee, jury, legislature, commission, bureaucracy, court, market,

firm, family, gang, mob, and various combinations of these into economic, political, and social systems. Despite their great variety, each of these institutions can be interpreted as a mechanism for amalgamating the behavior (preferences, actions, decisions) of subunits into the behavior of the larger institution; thus, each acts as a mechanism for social choice. The considerations involved in evaluating the usefulness of power as a concept are the same for all of the mechanisms cited above, although it is patently not necessarily true that the conclusions need be the same.

By an empirically verifiable theory, I mean a theory covered by the standard dicta about prediction and confirmation. We will ask under what circumstances the use of *power* contributes to the predictive power of the theory.

The specific concept of power I have in mind is the concept used in theories having the following general assumptions:

1. The choice mechanism involves certain basic components (individuals, groups, roles, behaviors, labels, etc.).
2. Some amount of power is associated with each of these components.
3. The responsiveness (as measured by some direct empirical observation) of the mechanism to each individual component is monotone increasing with the power associated with the individual component.

There are a number of variations on this general theme, each with idiosyncratic problems, but within a well-defined (and relatively large) class of uses of the concept of power, power plays the same basic role. It is a major intervening variable between an initial condition, defined largely in terms of the individual components of the system, and a terminal state, defined largely in terms of the system as a whole.

In order to explore the power of power in empirical theories of social choice, I propose to do two things: First, I wish to identify three different variations in this basic approach to power as an intervening variable to suggest the kinds of uses of *power* with which we will be concerned. Second, I wish to examine six different classes of models of social choice that are generally consistent with what at least one substantial group of students means by *social power*. In this examination, I will ask what empirical and technical problems there are in the use of the concept of

power and in the use of alternative concepts, and under what circumstances the concept of power does, or can, contribute to the effective prediction of social choice. . . .

Six Models of Social Choice and the Concept of Power

The three general approaches described above illustrate the range of possible uses of the concept of power and include most of the recent efforts to use the concept in empirical research or in empirically oriented theory. I wish to use these three examples as a basis for exploring the utility of the concept of power in the analysis of systems for social choice. The utility depends first on the true characteristics of the system under investigation. The concept of power must be embedded in a model and the validity of the model is a prerequisite to the utility of the concept. Second, the utility depends on the technical problems of observation, estimation, and validation in using the concept in an empirically reasonable model.

I shall now consider six types of models of social choice, evaluate their consistency with available data, and consider the problems of the concept of power associated with them. By a *model* I mean a set of statements about the way in which individual choices (or behavior) are transformed into social choices, and a procedure for using those statements to derive some empirically meaningful predictions. The six types of models are:

1. Chance models, in which we assume that choice is a chance event, quite independent of power.
2. Basic force models, in which we assume that the components of the system exert all their power on the system with choice being a direct resultant of those powers.
3. Force activation models, in which we assume that not all the power of every component is exerted at all times.
4. Force-conditioning models, in which we assume that the power of the components is modified as a result of the outcome of past choices.
5. Force depletion models, in which we assume that the power of the components is modified as a result of the exertion of power on past choices.

6. Process models, in which we assume that choice is substantially independent of power but not a chance event.

The list is reasonably complete insofar as we are interested in empirically oriented models of social choice. The approaches to the study of social power previously discussed and a fair number of other theories of social choice can be fitted into the framework.

Chance Models

Let us assume that there are no attributes of human beings affecting the output of a social-choice mechanism. Further, let us assume that the only factors influencing the output are chance factors, constrained perhaps by some initial conditions. There is a rather large number of such models, but it will be enough here to describe three in skeleton form.

The unconstrained model. We assume a set of choice alternatives given to the system. These might be all possible bargaining agreements in bilateral bargaining, all possible appropriations in a legislative scheme, or all experimentally defined alternatives in an experimental setting. Together with this set of alternatives, we have a probability function. Perhaps the simplest form of the function would be one that made the alternatives discrete, finite, and equally probable, but we can allow any form of function so long as the probabilities do not depend on the behavior, attitudes, or initial position of the individual components in the system.

The equal-power model. We assume a set of initial positions for the components of the system and some well-defined procedures for defining a social choice consistent with the assumption of equal power. For example, the initial positions might be arranged on some simple continuum. We might observe the initial positions with respect to wage rates in collective bargaining, with respect to legislative appropriations for space exploration, or with respect to the number of peas in a jar in an experimental group. A simple arithmetic mean of such positions is a social choice consistent with the assumption of equal power. In this chance model, we assume that the social choice is the equal-power choice plus some error term. In the simplest case, we assume that the error around the equal-power choice is random and normally distributed with mean zero and a variance that is some function of the variance of initial positions.

The encounter model. We assume only two possible choice outcomes: We can win or lose; the bill can pass or fail; we will take the left or right branch in the maze. At each encounter (social choice) there are two opposing teams. The probability of choosing a given alternative if the teams have an equal number of members is 0.5. If the teams are unequal in size, we have three broad alternatives:

1. We can make the probability of choosing the first alternative a continuous monotone increasing function of the disparity between the sizes of the two teams.
2. We can assume that the larger team always wins.
3. We can assume that the probability is 0.5 regardless of the relative sizes of the teams, thus making the model a special case of the unconstrained model.

What are the implications of such models? Consider the encounter model. Suppose we imagine that each power encounter occurs between just two people chosen at random from the total population of the choice system. Further, assume that at each encounter we will decide who prevails by flipping a coin.[1] If the total number of encounters per person is relatively small and the total number of persons relatively large, such a process will yield a few people who are successful in their encounters virtually all the time, others who are successful most of the time, and so on. In a community of 4000 adults and about a dozen encounters per adult, we would expect about 12 or 13 adults to have been unsuccessful no more than once. Similarly, if we assume that all encounters are between teams and that assignment to teams is random, the other encounter models above will yield identical results. A model of this general class has been used by Deutsch and Madow to generate a distribution of managerial performance and reputations.[2]

Similar kinds of results can be obtained from the unconstrained-chance model. If we assume that social choice is equiprobable among the alternatives and that individual initial positions are equiprobable among the alternatives, the only difference is that the number of alternatives is no longer necessarily two. In general, there will be more than two alternatives; as a result the probability of success will be less than 0.5 on every trial and the probability of a long-run record of spectacular success correspondingly

less. For example, if we assume a dozen trials with ten alternatives, the probability of failing no more than once drops to about 10^{-10} (as compared with about 0.0032 in the two alternative cases) .

Finally, generally similar results are obtained from the equal-power model. If we assume that the initial position is normally distributed with mean, *M*, and variance, *V*, and that the error is normally distributed around *M* with a variance that is some function of *V*, we obtain what amounts to variations in the continuous version of the discrete models. If we set the error variance equal to *V*, the relationship is obvious. Our measures of success now become not the number (or proportion) of successes but rather the mean deviation of social choices from individual positions, and we generate from the model a distribution of such distances for a given number of trials.[3]

All of the chance models generate power distributions. They are spurious distributions in the sense that power, as we usually mean it, had nothing to do with what happened. But we can still apply our measures of power to the systems involved. After observing such a system, one can make statements about the distribution of power in the system and describe how power was exercised. Despite these facts, I think that most students of power would agree that if a specific social-choice system is in fact a chance mechanism, the concept of power is not a valuable concept for that system.

To what extent is it possible to reject the chance models in studies of social choice? Although there are some serious problems in answering that question, I think we would probably reject a pure-chance model as a reasonable model. I say this with some trepidation because studies of power have generally not considered such alternative models, and many features of many studies are certainly consistent with a chance interpretation. The answer depends on an evaluation of four properties of the chance models that are potentially inconsistent with data either from field studies or from the laboratory.

First, we ask whether power is stable over time. With most of the chance models, knowing who won in the past or who had a reputation for winning in the past would not help us to predict who would win in the future. Hence, if we can predict the outcome of future social choices by weighting current positions with weights derived from past observations or from a priori considerations, we will have some justification for rejecting the chance model. Some efforts have been made in this direction, but with mixed

results.[4] Even conceding the clarity of the tests and the purity of the procedures and assuming that the results were all in the predicted direction, the argument for the various power models against a chance model would be meager. The "powerful" would win about half the time even under the chance hypothesis.

Second, we ask whether power is stable over subject matter. Under the chance models, persons who win in one subject-matter area would be no more likely to win in another area than would people who lost in the first area. Thus, if we find a greater-than-chance overlap from one area to another, we would be inclined to reject the chance model. The evidence on this point is conflicting. As was noted earlier, some studies suggest considerable specialization of power, while others do not. On balance, I find it difficult to reject the chance model on the basis of these results; although it is clear that there are a number of alternative explanations for the lack of stability, nonchance explanations are generally preferred by persons who have observed subject-matter instability.[5]

Third, we ask whether power is correlated with other personal attributes. Under the chance model, power is independent of other attributes. Although it might occasionally be correlated with a specific set of attributes by chance, a consistent correlation would cast doubt on the chance hypothesis. It would have to be saved by some assumption about the inadequacy (that is, irrelevance) of the power measure or by assuming that the co-variation results from an effect of power on the correlated attribute. Without any exception of which I am aware, the studies do show a greater-than-chance relation between power and such personal attributes as economic status, political office, and ethnic group. We cannot account under the simple chance model for the consistent underrepresentation of the poor, the unelected, and the Negro.

And fourth, we ask whether power is *susceptible to experimental manipulation*. If the chance model were correct, we could not systematically produce variations in who wins by manipulating power. Here the experimental evidence is fairly clear. It is possible to manipulate the results of choice mechanisms by manipulating personal attributes or personal reputations. Although we may still want to argue that the motivational or institutional setting of real-world choice systems is conspicuously different from the standard experimental situation, we cannot sustain a strictly chance interpretation of the experimental results.

Chance models are extremely naïve; they are the weakest test we can imagine. Yet we have had some difficulty in rejecting them, and in some situations it is not clear that we can reject them. Possibly much of what happens in the world is by chance. If so, it will be a simple world to deal with. Possibly, however, our difficulty is not with the amount of order in the world, but with the concept of power. Before we can render any kind of judgment on that issue, we need to consider some models that might be considered more reasonable by people working in the field.

Basic Force Models

Suppose we assume that power is real and controlling, and start with a set of models that are closely linked with classical mechanics although the detailed form is somewhat different from mechanics. In purest form, the simple force models can be represented in terms of functions that make the resultant social choice a weighted average of the individual initial positions —the weights being the power attached to the various individuals. . . .

What are the implications of the models? First, unless combined with a set of constraints (such as the power-structure constraints of the French and Harary formulation), the models say nothing about the distribution of power in a choice system. Thus, there is no way to test their apparent plausibility by comparing actual power distributions with derived distributions.

Second, in all of the models, the distance between the initial position of the individual and the social choice (or expected social choice) is inversely proportional to the power when we deal with just two individuals. As we noted earlier, this is also a property of French's model. With more than two individuals, the relation between distance and power becomes more complex, depending on the direction and magnitude of the various forces applied to the system. Since the models are directly based on the ideas of center of mass, these results are not surprising. Given these results, we can evaluate the models if we have an independent measure of power, such as the Shapley-Shubik measure. Otherwise, they become, as they frequently have, simply a definition of power.

Third, we can evaluate the reasonableness of this class of models by a a few general implications. Consider the basic characteristics of the simple force models:

1. There are a fixed number of known power sources.
2. At any point in time, each of these sources can be characterized as affecting the social choice by exerting force in terms of two dimensions, magnitude (power) and direction (initial position or behavior).
3. Any given source has a single, exogenously determined power. That is, power is constant (over a reasonable time period and subject-matter domain of observation) and always fully exercised.
4. The result (social choice) is some sum of the individual magnitudes and directions.

Insofar as the determinate models are concerned, both experimental and field observations make it clear that the models are not accurate portrayals of social choice. In order for the models to be accepted, the m_i (as defined in the models) must be stable. As far as I know, no one has ever reported data suggesting that the m_i are stable in a determinate model. The closest thing to such stability occurs in some experimental groups where the choices consistently come close to the mean, and in some highly formal voting schemes. In such cases, the power indices are occasionally close to stable at a position of equal power. Nevertheless, few students of power have claimed stability of the power indices.

When we move to the probabilistic case—of if we add an error term to the determinate models—the situation becomes more ambiguous. Since it has already been observed that rejection of a purely chance model is not too easy with the available data, the argument can be extended to models that assume significant error terms, or to models in which the number of observations is small enough to introduce significant sampling variation in the estimate of underlying probabilities. However, most observers of power in field situations are inclined to reject even such variations on the theme, although no very complete test has been made.

The basis for rejecting the simple force models (aside from the necessity of making them untidy with error terms) is two-fold:

1. There seems to be general consensus that either potential power is different from actually exerted power or that actually exerted power is variable. If, while potential power is stable, there are some unknown factors that affect the actual exercise of power, the simple force models will not fit; they assume power is stable, but they also assume that power exerted is

equal to power. If actually exerted power is unstable, the simple force models will fit only if we can make some plausible assertions about the nature of the instability. For example, we can assume that there are known factors affecting the utilization of power and measure those factors. Or, we can assume that the variations are equivalent to observational errors with known distributions.

2. There appears to be ample evidence that power is not strictly exogenous to the exercise of power and the results of that exercise. Most observers would agree that present reputations for power are at least in part a function of the results of past encounters. Although the evidence for the proposition is largely experimental, most observers would probably also agree that power reputation, in turn, affects the results of encounters. If these assertions are true, the simple force model will fit in the case of power systems that are in equilibrium, but it will not fit in other systems.

These objections to the simple force model are general; we now need to turn to models that attempt to deal with endogenous shifts in power and with the problem of power activation or exercise. As we shall see, such models have been little tested and pose some serious problems for evaluation on the basis of existing data. We will consider three classes of models, all of which are elaborations of the simple force models. The first class can be viewed as *activation models*. They assume that power is a potential and that the exercise of power involves some mechanism of activation. The second class can be described as *conditioning models*. They assume that power is partly endogenous—specifically that apparent power leads to actual power. The third class can be classified as *depletion models*. They assume that power is a stock and that exercise of power leads to a depletion of the stock. . . .

Process Models

Suppose that the choice system we are studying is not random. Suppose further that power really is a significant phenomenon in the sense that it can be manipulated systematically in the laboratory and can be used to explain choice in certain social-choice systems. I think that both those suppositions are reasonable. But let us further suppose that there is a class of social-choice systems in which power is insignificant. Unless we treat *power* as true by definition, I think that suppression is reasonable. If we treat *power*

as a definition, I think it is reasonable to suppose there is a class of social-choice systems in which power measurement will be unstable and useless.

Consider the following process models of social choice as representative of this class:

An exchange model. We assume that the individual components in the system prefer certain of the alternative social choices and that the system has a formal criterion for making the final choices (e.g., majority vote, unanimity, clearing the market). We also assume that there is some medium of exchange by which individual components seek to arrange agreements (e.g., exchanges of money or votes) that are of advantage to themselves. These agreements, plus the formal criterion for choice, determine the social decision. This general type of market system is familiar enough for economic systems and political systems.[6] It is also one way of viewing some modern theories of interpersonal influence[7] in which sentiments on one dimension ("I like you") are exchanged for sentiments on another ("You like my pots") in order to reach a social choice ("We like us and we like my pots").

A problem-solving model. We assume that each of the individual components in the system has certain information and skills relevant to a problem of social choice and that the system has a criterion for solution. We postulate some kind of process by which the system calls forth and organizes the information and skills so as systematically to reduce the difference between its present position and a solution. This general type of system is familiar to students of indivdual and group problem solving.[8]

A communication-diffusion model. We assume that the components in the system are connected by some formal or informal communication system by which information is diffused through the system. We postulate some process by which the information is sent and behavior modified, one component at a time, until a social position is reached. This general type of system is familiar to many students of individual behavior in a social context.[9]

A decision-making model. We assume that the components in the system have preferences with respect to social choices and that the system has a procedure for rendering choices. The system and the components operate under two limitations:

1. Overload: They have more demands on their attention than they can meet in the time available.
2. Under comprehension: The world they face is much more complicated than they can handle.

Thus, although we assume that each of the components modifies its behavior and its preferences over time in order to achieve a subjectively satisfactory combination of social choices, it is clear that different parts of the system contribute to different decisions in different ways at different times. This general type of system is a familiar model of complex organizations.[10]

In each of these process models, it is possible to attribute power to the individual components. We might want to say that a man owning a section of land in Iowa has more power in the economic system than a man owning a section of land in Alaska. We might want to say that, in a pot-selling competition, a man with great concern over his personal status has less power than a man with less concern. We might want to say that a man who knows Russian has more power than a man who does not in a group deciding the relative frequency of adjectival phrases in Tolstoi and Dostoievski. Or, we might want to say that, within an organization, a subunit that has problems has more power than a subunit that does not have problems. But I think we would probably not want to say any of these things. The concept of power does not contribute much to our understanding of systems that can be represented in any of these ways.

I am impressed by the extent to which models of this class seem to be generally consistent with the reports of recent (and some not so recent)[11] students of political systems and other relatively large (in terms of number of people involved) systems of social choice. “Observation of certain local communities makes it appear that inclusive over-all organization for many general purposes is weak or nonexistent,” Long writes. “Much of what occurs seems to just happen with accidental trends becoming commulative over time and producing results intended by nobody. A great deal of the communities’ activities consist of undirected cooperation of particular social structures, each seeking particular goals and, in doing so, meshing with the others.”[12]

Such descriptions of social choice have two general implications. On the one hand, if a system has the properties suggested by such students as

Coleman, Long, Riesman, Lindblom, and Dahl, power will be a substantially useless concept. In such systems, the measurement of power is feasible, but it is not valuable in calculating predictions. The measurement of power is useful primarily in systems that conform to some variant of the force models. In some complex process systems we may be able to identify subsystems that conform to the force model, and thus be able to interpret the larger system in terms of a force activation model for some purposes. But I think the flavor of the observations I have cited is that even such interpretations may be less common-sensible than we previously believed.[13]

On the other hand, the process models—and particularly the decision-making process models—look technically more difficult with regard to estimation and testing than the more complex modifications of the force model. We want to include many more discrete and nominal variables, many more discontinuous functions, and many more rare combinations of events. Although some progress has been made in dealing with the problems, and some predictive power has been obtained without involving the force model, the pitfalls of process models are still substantially uncharted.

The Power of Power

If I interpret recent research correctly, the class of social-choice situations in which power is a significantly useful concept is much smaller than I previously believed. As a result, I think it is quite misleading to assert that "Once decision making is accepted as one of the focal points for empirical research in social science, the necessity for exploring the operational meaning and theorectical dimensions of influence is manifest."[14] Although *power* and *influence* are useful concepts for many kinds of situations, they have not greatly helped us to understand many of the natural social-choice mechanisms to which they have traditionally been applied.

The extent to which we have used the concept of power fruitlessly is symptomatic of three unfortunate temptations associated with power:

Temptation No. 1; The obviousness of power. To almost anyone living in contemporary society, power is patently real. We can scarcely talk about our daily life or major political and social phenomena without talking about power. Our discussions of political machinations consist largely of stories of negotiations among the influentials. Our analyses of social events are

punctuated with calculations of power. Our interpretations of organizational life are built on evaluations of who does and who does not have power. Our debates of the grand issues of social, political, and economic systems are funneled into a consideration of whether *i* has too little power and *j* has too much.

Because of this ubiquity of power, we are inclined to assume that it is real and meaningful. There must be some fire behind the smoke. "I take it for granted that in every human organization some individuals have more influence over key decisions than do others."[15] Most of my biases in this regard are conservative, and I am inclined to give some credence to the utility of social conceptual validation. I think, however, that we run the risk of treating the social validation of power as more compelling than it is simply because the social conditioning to a simple force model is so pervasive.

Temptation No. 2: The importance of measurement. The first corollary of the obviousness of power is the importance of the measurement problem. Given the obviousness of power, we rarely reexamine the basic model by which social choice is viewed as some combination of individual choices, the combination being dependent on the power of the various individuals. Since we have a persistent problem discovering a measurement procedure that consistently yields results which are consistent with the model, we assert a measurement problem and a problem of the concept of power. We clarify and reclarify the concept, and we define and redefine the measures.

The parallel between the role played by power in the theories under consideration here and the role played by subjective utility in theories of individual choice is striking. Just as recent work in power analysis has been strongly oriented toward conceptual and measurement problems, so recent work on utility theory has been strongly oriented toward conceptual and measurement problems.

Although I have some sympathy with these efforts, I think our perseveration may be extreme. At the least, we should consider whether subsuming all our problems under the rubric of conceptual and measurement problems may be too tempting. I think we too often ask *how* to measure power when we should ask *whether* to measure power. The measurement problem and the model problem have to be solved simultaneously.

Temptation No. 3: The residual variance. The second corollary of the obviousness of power is the use of *power* as a residual category for explanation. We always have some unexplained variance in our data—results that simply cannot be explained within the theory. It is always tempting to give that residual variance some name. Some of us are inclined to talk about God's will; others talk about errors of observation; still others talk about some named variable (e.g., power, personality, extrasensory perception). Such naming can be harmless; we might just as well have some label for our failures. But where the unexplained variance is rather large, as it often is when we consider social-choice systems, we can easily fool ourselves into believing that we know something simply because we have a name for our errors. In general, I think we can roughly determine the index of the temptation to label errors by computing the ratio of uses of the variable for prediction to the uses for a posteriori explanation. On that calculation, I think power exhibits a rather low ratio, even lower than such other problem areas as personality and culture.

Having been trapped in each of these cul-de-sacs at one time or another, I am both embarrassed by the inelegance of the temptations involved and impressed by their strength. We persist in using the simple force model in a variety of situations in which it is quite inconsistent with observations. As a result, we bury the examination of alternative models of social choice under a barrage of measurement questions.

I have tried to suggest that the power of power depends on the extent to which a predictive model requires and can make effective use of such a concept. Thus, it depends on the kind of system we are confronting, the amount and kinds of data we are willing or able to collect, and the kinds of estimation and validation procedures we have available to us. Given our present empirical and test technology, power is probably a useful concept for many short-run situations involving the direct confrontations of committed and activated participants. Such situations can be found in natural settings, but they are more frequent in the laboratory. Power is probably not a useful concept for many long-run situations involving problems of component-overload and undercomprehension. Such situations can be found in the laboratory but are more common in natural settings. Power may become more useful as a concept if we can develop analytic and empirical procedures for coping with the more complicated forms of force models, involving activation, conditioning, and depletion of power.

Thus, the answer to the original question is tentative and mixed. Provided some rather restrictive assumptions are met, the concept of power and a simple force model represent a reasonable approach to the study of social choice. Provided some rather substantial estimation and analysis problems can be solved, the concept of power and more elaborate force models represent a reasonable approach. On the whole, however, power is a disappointing concept. It gives us surprisingly little purchase in reasonable models of complex systems of social choice.

NOTES

1. See H. White, "Uses of Mathematics in Sociology," in *Mathematics and the Social Sciences*, ed. J. C. Charlesworth (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1963).
2. K. W. Deutsch and W. G. Madow, "A Note on the Appearance of Wisdom in Large Organizations," *Behavioral Science*, 6 (1961), 72–78.
3. See D. MacRae, Jr., and H. D. Price, "Scale Positions and 'Tower' in the Senate," *Behavioral Science*, 4 (1959), 212–218.
4. See, for example, Hanson, "Predicting a Community Decision."
5. See, for example, N. W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 474–484.
6. See, for example, Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957); J. M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); and Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions.*
7. Dale Carnegie, *How to Win Friends and Influence People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1936); Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).
8. See, for example, A. Newell, J. C. Shaw, and H. A. Simon, "Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solving," *Psychological Review*, 65 (1958)," 151–166; and D. W. Taylor, "Decision Making and Problem Solving," in *Handbook of Organizations*, ed. March.
9. See, for example, Elihu Katz and P. F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1955); and Angus Campbell,

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11. For example, David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951).
12. N. E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44 (1958), 252.
13. See Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power."
14. March, "An Introduction," p. 431.
15. R. A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (1958).

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